Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability

Veerle Nouwens,Timothy Wright, Dr Euan Graham & Blake Herzinger

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There are significant efforts across the Asia-Pacific region to acquire or expand long-range strike capabilities. This new report examines the existing and planned capabilities of some of the most significant players in the region, along with national drivers and doctrines. It also analyses the second-order implications for the United States’ alliance framework and for regional stability.

Missile arsenals are growing at an exponential rate in the Asia-Pacific region, as countries there attempt to alter or maintain the regional balance of power. China’s and North Korea’s expanding ballistic- and cruise-missile inventories, along with Beijing’s increasingly assertive behaviour and Pyongyang’s aggressive rhetoric and frequent testing of systems, are undermining regional security and driving other countries to improve their own long-range strike capabilities in response, albeit with widely differing levels of resources. Although most of those other countries are not developing missile types analogous to those now possessed by China and North Korea, their focus on long-range strike capabilities has contributed to a regional arms race that is unlikely to be constrained by arms-control limitations in the foreseeable future. It is therefore highly probable that all the countries of the Asia-Pacific will continue to expand their arsenals horizontally and vertically.

In response to China and North Korea attempting to upset the regional balance of power, Australia, Japan and South Korea have advanced furthest in their efforts to maintain the status quo. Australia’s decision to invest in long-range strike capabilities represents an adjustment of Canberra’s defence posture after supporting operations in the Middle East and the South Pacific for the last two decades. Many of the more advanced capabilities Australia seeks to acquire and develop are integral to the trilateral AUKUS agreement, and some will take more than a decade to come to fruition. In the meantime, to boost its deterrence, Australia is procuring several different types of long-range strike capabilities from allies and partners. Meanwhile, Japan’s decision to acquire long-range land-attack capabilities is a major change for a state that has not had a substantial offensive strike capability since the Second World War. Although these capabilities will be used in accordance with Japan’s post-war constitution, they will allow for a greater division of labour between Japan and the United States in the event of any joint military action. As for South Korea, it continues to expand and diversify its long-range strike capabilities in response to North Korean aggression. This has been facilitated by discarding the previous guidelines that restricted the range and warhead size of the missiles South Korea could develop.

Changing threat perceptions of China and North Korea, and resultant defence requirements, are visible elsewhere in the region. Taiwan’s robust indigenous development programme and its ongoing imports of anti-ship missiles from the US reflect its unique security situation. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Vietnam are embarking on their own long-range-strike programmes, although on a smaller scale than Japan and South Korea. For now, many of these efforts are focused on developing anti-ship capabilities, mostly in response to China’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and to ongoing territorial disputes. In the future, however, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam may develop or procure more advanced capabilities, especially if regional security continues to deteriorate.

Despite all these developments, future long-range strike capabilities will need to be supported by connective tissue, including space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and joint commands. While some countries in the region are attempting to address these issues, many US allies will be reliant on Washington to provide these capabilities in the short term.

The spread of long-range strike capabilities could play a stabilising role by helping to maintain the regional balance of power, thereby boosting deterrence against any temptation towards military adventurism that may arise in Beijing following China’s advances in conventional- and nuclear-missile technology. Nonetheless, there are significant risks attached to this new ‘missile age’ in the Asia-Pacific. For instance, if some countries pursue independent capabilities and associated targeting cycles, and plan to operate them unilaterally, this could potentially result in unintentional conflict escalation. Chinese and North Korean missile developments also have a nuclear dimension, given that many of these systems are dual-capable, and their use in a conflict could increase the danger of nuclear escalation because of pre- and post-launch warhead ambiguity. Despite these risks, advocates for arms control are likely to be disappointed, given China’s and North Korea’s intransigence on this issue. An accelerating security dilemma all but ensures this arms-racing dynamic will continue in an environment of limited transparency with regard to capabilities, inventories and intentions.