Introduction
France and India have developed a high level of convergence on a wide range of issues, spanning from regional to global. With their close and friendly relations traditionally tracing back decades, the two actors entered into a Strategic Partnership in 1998 and ever since have collaborated in areas of sustainable growth, climate change, cyber governance, etc with defence and security relations being a principal pillar of their partnership. As the twenty-first century began, the strategic partnership between India and France grew even stronger and expanded to encompass various areas, including defence acquisitions, civil nuclear collaboration, and space exploration.
The joint efforts of India and France in security relations extend beyond military ties to also include domains of maritime, space and civil nuclear areas (Carin & Mehlenbacher, 2010). With the two actors entering into their third decade of strategic partnership, it is important to note that several high-level summits and bilateral political visits continue to take place as New Delhi and Paris strengthen their mutual cooperation in areas such as defence, security, cyber-security, digital economy, space security, and also the European Union.
Defence cooperation has now become a fundamental aspect of the Indo-French Strategic Partnership. Both nations have an annual Ministerial level Defence dialogue that has been in place since 2018. Additionally, all the three security services participate in periodic defence exercises, such as Exercise Shakti (Army), Exercise Garuda (Air Force) and Exercise Varuna (Navy). The French-led La Pérouse exercise in April 2021 also witnessed participation and engagement by the Indian Navy. Their partnership further includes staff courses, training programs, and other joint activities. In 2016, an inter-governmental agreement was signed by the Indian Government with the Government of France to purchase 36 Rafale multi-role fighter aircraft from Dassault Aviation. All the aircraft have been delivered to India, and the formal induction ceremony for the first five was held in September 2020, attended by French Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly.
The Rafale deal signed between France and India and the subsequent military acquisition of the fighter jets in the backdrop of a volatile geo-strategic environment between India and China and their tense armed combat situation in Ladakh is a prime example of augmenting India’s air power and military defence. The occurrence of clashes at the Galwan Valley in June 2020 represented a significant shift in India’s relationship with China. Despite already having a strained and problematic relationship with China, the fatal clashes resulted in the loss of 20 Indian soldiers and had a profound impact on the bilateral ties of both nations. As a result, India expedited the process of re-evaluation of its strategic positioning.
It was the need of the hour for New Delhi to actively pursue other extra-regional alliances to strengthen its position in the South Asian region. The induction of the Rafale fighters is therefore much welcome as they would form the backbone of the Indian Air Force in its operations against the People’s Liberation Army of China. The 36 Rafales have now been completely inducted and being the most potent in the entire Asian region, they have played a pivotal role in improving the operational preparedness of India along its border. The Indian Rafale combat aircraft are now all set to participate in a multinational wargame in April–May 2023 titled ‘Orion 2023’ being hosted by France at its airbase and also involving many of its NATO and other important allies.
Under the P-75 Scorpene Project, India signed a contract with DCNS (Naval Group) in 2006 to build six Scorpene submarines with technology transfer at the Mazagaon Docks Ltd. In December 2017, the first of the submarines called INS Kalvari was commissioned, followed by INS Khanderi in September 2019. Further, submarines INS Karanj and INS Vela were also subsequently commissioned in March 2021 and November 2021, respectively. Further, on 20 April 2022, INS Vagsheer, the last of the six Scorpene submarines was officially launched. While the Scorpene submarines are military and naval platforms, they represent a significant aspect of the bilateral relationship between France and India, similar to the Rafale aircraft deal. In recent developments, the Tata group has also tied up with Airbus to manufacture a C-295 tactical transport aircraft in Vadodara, Gujarat. This partnership is based on a shared sense of trust, respect, and commitment to international treaties and conventions, and a common joint vision for a ‘multipolar global order’ that is influenced by effective multilateralism, across civil, diplomatic, and strategic domains. In the context of the given background, the article attempts to analyse India’s efforts towards its military modernisation and their building and consolidating of the indigenous defence production capability. With the evolving security relationship between India and France, the article examines how France has contributed to India’s advancement in military modernisation by sharing resources and technology as well as collaborating on equipment development and production.
Evolving Indo-French Security Relationship
India has had a longstanding cooperative relationship with France in the fields of security, defence, and military matters. The defence cooperation and partnership between India and France can be traced back to the historic interactions of the Indian and French militaries in the Carnatic Wars. India also remained deeply involved in the battlefields of France during World War I and World War II. After India gained independence, the period from 1947 to 1962 was marked by India’s colonial hangover and the imprint of Jawaharlal Nehru’s understanding of international relations and diplomacy on India’s defence policy.1 During this phase, India had limited defence ties with France, which were mainly in the form of a few isolated weapons deals. After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, in which an ill-equipped Indian army faced defeat at the hands of the PLA, France gradually emerged as India’s most trusted defence partner. Despite an arms embargo against India and Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, France continued to supply India with spare parts for fighter aircrafts. The arms embargo was eventually lifted in 1966.2
The period from 1971 to 1991 was influenced by Cold War politics, although some defence cooperation between India and France did take place. During the Bangladesh war of 1971–1972, France helped India procure weapons and ammunition, which contributed towards a massive Indian victory against the US-backed Pakistani military. In the late-1970s, in the wake of America’s decision to sell F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan in response to the Soviet Union’s military invasion of Afghanistan, India and France came together to boost defence cooperation and Paris agreed to sell the French-built Mirage-2000 combat jets to the Indian Air Force. The 1980s saw a steady increase in French weapons sales to India, peaking at $468 million in 1986–1987 following the delivery of the Mirage fighter jets.3
The Strategic Partnership agreement signed in 1998 was a significant step in Indo-France relations. It marked the beginning of a new era in which both countries aimed to deepen and strengthen their strategic relationship. The agreement covered a vast range of areas including defence, nuclear energy, space cooperation, and economic ties. In 2008–2009, France released a Defence White Paper that emphasised its commitment to building diplomatic and defence ties with Asia, especially with India. The article recognised India as a major regional power and highlighted the importance of developing a strong relationship with India to maintain stability and security in the region. The article called for increased cooperation between France and India in defence technology and industry, joint military exercises, and sharing of intelligence. Overall, in terms of security and defence cooperation, the Indo-French relationship evolved significantly after the publication of the Defence White Paper and the two sides became key strategic partners in the twenty-first century. Under the aegis of the Indo-French Defence Cooperation Agreement, a number of meetings centred around industrial collaboration and other exchanges were held between the two sides. This led Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to declare in 2018 that ‘We consider France one of our most reliable defence allies’ and ‘Whether it is the environment, naval security and resources, or freedom of navigation and overflight, we are committed to making our partnership stronger on all these fronts’.4
Over the past decade, India and France have deepened strategic cooperation in different domains. The Indian and French navies now jointly conduct the ‘Varuna’ exercise aimed at enhancing the interoperability between the two navies.5 The ‘Shakti’ and ‘Pegase’ exercises are designed to promote greater military-to-military ties and defence cooperation. While Shakti is specifically aimed at enhancing the two militaries’ counter-terrorism capabilities, Pegase focuses on enhancing the interoperability of the air forces of India and France. The Desert Knight and Garuda exercises are also bilateral air exercises that are aimed at enhancing the operational readiness and tactical capabilities of the air forces of both countries.
Cooperation between France and India in the field of defence has not been limited to just military exercises and joint operations. The two countries have, at several times, collaborated in the areas of research and development, production of defence equipment, and transfer of technology. In 2018, India and France signed a Memorandum of Understanding to launch a joint venture for producing short-range surface-to-air missiles in India. In 2020, the two countries signed a similar agreement to develop and produce air-to-air missiles for the Indian Air Force. These joint programmes have strengthened the Indo-French strategic partnership and helped India in its efforts towards becoming self-reliant in defence production.
In recent times, India has been majorly concerned with China’s growing naval presence and port building in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Beijing’s wolf-warrior and debt trap diplomacy towards smaller states in the region. To counter Beijing, New Delhi has accorded added importance to India–France naval cooperation and similar cooperation with other like-minded regional partners. In this context, President Macron’s suggestion of a new maritime alliance connecting France, India, and Australia can be seen as an indication of France’s willingness to deepen its engagement with India and also counter China’s elevating influence in the region. With France having already established its presence in the IOR through its island territories, it can provide valuable strategic support to bolster the Indian Navy’s prowess and enhance India’s primary role as a net security provider in the IOR.
France has been actively seeking to increase its presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2018, France released a strategy document called ‘France and Security in the Indo-Pacific,’ which highlighted the country’s commitment to maintaining stability and security in the region. This document also emphasized the importance of partnerships and collaboration with countries of the region, including India.6 India, on the other hand, has been expanding its strategic footprint in the Indo-Pacific, driven by concerns over China’s increasing assertiveness in the IOR. India’s ‘Act East’ policy seeks to deepen its engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and enhance its economic, strategic, and security ties with them.7 Given their shared interests and common concerns in the Indo-Pacific, France and India are expected to strengthen their partnership in the region.
The deepening of maritime ties between France and India is essential in the context of their shared interests and common challenges in the IOR. As China continues to expand its presence in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative and naval deployments, it is important for France and India to work together to counterbalance Chinese influence and maintain the rules-based order. The military presence of France in Abu Dhabi and Djibouti, strategic locations in the southwest Indian Ocean, has given it a unique advantage in terms of surveillance and projection of power in the IOR. By collaborating with India, France can expand its reach and effectiveness in countering any potential threats to regional security and stability.
For India, deeper maritime cooperation with France provides an opportunity to enhance its maritime capabilities and establish itself as a key player in the IOR. As a net security provider in the region, India has been working towards enhancing its military and economic ties with countries in the region, and France can serve as a valuable partner in this regard. India and France have strengthened their maritime partnership by organising joint naval exercises and activities. In March 2022, India conducted the ‘Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Maritime Exercise’ (IMEX-22) in Goa, where France participated along with 14 other members of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). France, as a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (which it joined in 2020), has increased its participation in several multilateral initiatives in the region.
As an observer nation to the IMEX-22, France has also provided financial assistance to the IORA for enhancing its capabilities to achieve its goal of creating a stable, prosperous, and rules-based IOR. India’s prominence in the IORA makes it a valuable partner for France, and therefore, both countries can leverage their strategic and geopolitical advantages to further enhance their maritime security collaboration. Overall, the expansion of maritime cooperation between France and India would be mutually beneficial and contribute towards the maintenance of a free and open IOR.
The strength of their security cooperation as well as their strategic partnership lies in India’s and France’s shared vision of international relations. Both countries highly value the rule of law and multilateralism, as well as their independence and strategic autonomy. To further these objectives, it is important for India and France to continue their joint partnerships and collaborations at both bilateral as well as multilateral levels. This can be further attained through deepening their participation in regional institutions as well as engaging with other countries in various sectors and domains.
Tracing India’s Military Modernisation
According to the Global Firepower (GFP) annual defence review of 145 countries, India’s military has been ranked the 4th most powerful in the world, only after the US, Russia, and China (Global Firepower, 2023). The expansion and modernisation of the Indian military have been primarily motivated by perceived threats in its neighbouring region, changes in the global security landscape, and the choices made by the Indian political leaders (Ganguly, 2015). Historically, the first shift of transformation towards modernisation of the Indian military can be attributed to several factors. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in India losing a critical ally, which had been a primary and reliable source of military supplies. Further, the political instability in Russia and other former Soviet countries that followed further exacerbated the situation, leaving India with inadequate and unreliable arms. This had prompted Indian leaders to focus on achieving strategic autonomy, essential in an increasingly uncertain global political and strategic security landscape.
India was seen to be moving from ‘a position of non-alignment and non-commitment to having specific strategic interests taking it on a path of poly-alignment’ (Hedrick, 2009). As Brian K. Hedrick from the Strategic Studies Institute describes it, this path towards poly-alignment follows four different but amalgamated courses: attempting to attain regional power status across the IOR, securing and maintaining ties with countries across the globe, maintaining its level of leadership in its commitment towards non-alignment, and developing strategic partnerships with actors across the globe which are constructed as leaders of a multipolar order in order to seek modern military capabilities including modern weapon systems, technology, and licensed production systems (Hedrick, 2009).
In order to accelerate the development of the Indian military, diversify its defence procurements, and achieve major power status, the Government of India focussed on expanding its defence relationships and strategic partnerships with several countries. India also began to engage in bilateral and multilateral military exercises with emerging security actors to strengthen and consolidate defence relationships. While New Delhi worked hard to deepen existing strategic ties such as with Russia, which till today continues to be the primary supplier of arms to the country, it also focused on building new relationships, particularly with leading weapons suppliers such as the US, Israel, France, Germany and the European Union. However, with India adopting Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ in 2020, the primary focus of defence procurement has shifted towards indigeneity.8
Self-sufficiency in weapons procurement is the cornerstone of Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ initiative. The drive towards self-sufficiency in defence production may provide India with several economic, military, and technological advantages. For instance, instead of importing expensive weapons and systems from foreign suppliers, if India could domestically produce high-quality weapons for its military it would lead to more efficient use of scarce resources and accelerate India’s military modernisation. The expansion of domestic defence production will also boost Indian industry’s investments in research and development, particularly in cutting-edge technology, and lead to greater economic activity and employment opportunities for skilled and semi-skilled workers (India Brand Equity Foundation, 2022). Over the next decade, India aims to meet 70% of its defence needs from indigenous sources (from the current 16%). If India can achieve this target, it will come closer to China, which currently meets 92% of its defence needs from domestic sources (SIPRI, 2022).
Since 1993, India continues to hold the position of being the largest importer of arms globally, accounting for approximately 11% of the total global arms sales, while Russia remains the largest supplier of arms to India with an overwhelming 45% of the total imports in the period 2018–2022 (SIPRI 2023). This highlights India’s persistent failure to establish a robust defence-industrial base. In order to gain a strategic edge over its adversaries as well as reduce the dependence on one player for its military requirements, it is the need of the hour for India to advance its defence technology, develop customised and unique capabilities in order to respond to various security threats.
France accounts for 29% of the imports by the virtue of the US$7.2 billion deal for 36 Rafale fighters. Although Russia continues to be the largest supplier of arms to India, its share of total arms imports reduced from a big 64% in 2013–2017 to 45% in 2018–2022, due to increased arms production in India coupled with the restrictions on Russia’s exports owing to its war on Ukraine. This provided other competitive security actors, mainly France, as an appropriate window to expand their role in the Indian defence sector.
India is attempting to achieve self-reliance through the notification of positive indigenisation lists, which requires the armed forces to procure certain listed defence items through domestic manufacturers only. The Government has also allowed private companies to enter the defence production sector and increased the FDI limit in the defence sector to create a favourable marketplace for the Indian vendors. This will enable the defence capital procurement budget to reserve at 75% for the domestic industry in 2023–2024, up from the 68% as announced by the defence minister during the Bandhan ceremony of the 14th Aero India in Bengaluru on February 15 2023 (PIB 2023). With India’s target of attaining a domestic turnover of US$21.2 billion in the defence and aerospace sector by 2024–2025, the expenditure on procuring defence supplies and weapons from foreign sources has also reduced over time from 46% in 2018 to 36.7% in 2022 as observed in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Value of Defence Exports from India.
In the fiscal year 2021–2022, the value of the country’s armaments exports amounted to US$1.4 billion, six times higher than the figure recorded in 2014. This significant increase was credited to various government-initiated measures aimed at boosting defence exports and streamlining business operations.
The Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has increased the allocation of the country’s defence budget in the fiscal year 2023–2024 by 13% to US$ 72.48 billion up from US$64 billion in the previous fiscal year. Out of this budget, US$19.6 billion have been earmarked for capital expenditure, which includes the procurement of weapons, aircraft, warships, and other military equipment, increasing the finances for the acquisition of advanced weapon systems and platforms. The earmarked figure constitutes a small percentage of India’s GDP and further strengthens the case of indigenisation of defence production.
India’s strategic independence and growth in the domestic defence and aerospace industry are likely to be strengthened through self-reliance in the defence production sector. The private sector also stands to benefit from this transformation due to the government’s approval for exports and the embargo placed on imports of various products. By increasing domestic production, India can decrease its reliance on imports. Furthermore, India can also increase its defence exports and reach its goal of exporting US$4.4 billion by 2025. India’s defence exports clocked a high in 2022–2023 with US$1.95 billion, through its exports of the Brahmos missiles and the Akash missiles to Vietnam and Philippines. India has also been exporting major platforms like the Pinaka rockets, Dornier 228, and the Advanced Towed Artillery Guns (ATGs). Further, with Egypt and Argentina showing a strong interest in Light Combat Helicopters and Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, India’s defence exports could increase in the future, which would be a shot in the arm for defence indigenisation and modernisation.
Role and Impact of France
France has played an active role in investing more in the defence manufacturing sector in India. On 5 January 2023, the 36th India–France Dialogue took place in New Delhi and the delegation was led by Emmanuel Bonne, the diplomatic advisor of the French President Emmanuel Macron. At this meeting, the French delegation reconfirmed its commitment towards defence cooperation with India, particularly in the production of aircraft engines and long-range Scorpene class submarines, in line with Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Make in India’ vision. Under Indo-French cooperation, the Mazgaon Docks Limited and the Naval Group of France have partnered on the ‘P-75’ project to construct six Scorpene-class diesel–electric submarines for the Indian Navy. Five submarines have been built at the Mazgaon docks in India and inducted into service; the last one is expected to be operational by 2024. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and France’s Sarfran Group have entered discussions to jointly develop and manufacture fighter jet engines in India. France has also increased its cooperation with India on a number of other defence items. For example, Bharat Dynamics Limited, an Indian missile manufacturer, has produced over 10,000 ‘Milan’ anti-tank missiles with French collaboration. Similarly, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited manufactures light helicopters such as the Chetak and the Cheetah with French technical support. India may also use nuclear technology and design offered by France to produce a new class of nuclear-powered submarines in India in the near future.
While the potential of Indo-French defence cooperation under the ‘Make in India’ vision is huge, several impediments may slow down progress. India faces a number of issues when it comes to defence procurement, ranging from bureaucratic delays, political considerations, in terms of changing governments and delays in decision making, along with several logistical hindrances and roadblocks. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) along with its supporting bodies have faced the incapacity to guarantee timely acquisition resulting in the loss of allocated financial resources, and susceptibility to external pressures focussed on imports, as well as corruption and disputes.9
According to Amit Cowshish, former financial advisor (acquisitions) in the Ministry of Defence, the primary problem of the framework and system of defence acquisition in India is the scattered centres of responsibility as well as the perceived lack of professionalism during acquisition. There are several independent parties, which are accountable for different acquisition tasks such as drafting technical specifications, releasing tender documents, conducting evaluations and subsequent trials, providing assurance in quality, and making payments to vendors. However, these authorities have not been appropriately trained for their assigned duties and have not been granted sufficient time to develop institutional capacity (Cowshish, 2021). France, on the other hand, has a well-established defence industry and a streamlined procurement process. India can, in turn, learn from France’s procurement process and also leverage the French expertise to overcome its defence acquisition challenges and achieve its goal of building a self-sufficient defence industry.
France has always followed a centralised system of defence procurement that is domestic-driven. With an advanced defence manufacturing sector, almost 90% of France’s defence equipment is indigenously manufactured. The French defence procurement system has been a stellar success story owing to the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) at the centre of the system as observed in Figure 2. As an important pillar within the Ministry of Defence, the head of the DGA holds a rank higher than the other military and civilian officers within the defence ministry. The primary motivation in ‘creating a centralised procurement agency was rooted in the political ambition of achieving what many analysts say was a small-scale version of a superpower status, for which self-reliance in arms, particularly nuclear weapons, was the prime consideration’ (Behera, 2016). By equipping the armed forces, promoting arms exports, and preparing the domestic defence industry to be ready to meet the military’s future requirements, the well-organised DGA is responsible for the realisation of the twin goals of mitigating threats as well as achieving self-sufficiency in the industry.
Figure 2. French System of Defence Procurement.
France has been successful in establishing a procurement system that is majorly industry-driven and, hence, can indeed offer valuable inspiration to India, which has been facing challenges in achieving a similar objective. France’s procurement system is known for its strategic approach to promoting domestic industries while also ensuring cost-effectiveness and competitiveness. This system involves close collaboration between the government and the private sector; the government works closely with domestic industries to identify their procurement needs and provide them with the necessary support to meet those needs. This approach has led to the development of a strong and diversified industrial base, with France being a leading exporter of a wide range of products, including high-tech defence equipment. India, on the other hand, has struggled to develop a robust domestic procurement system, often relying heavily on imports to meet its defence requirements.
This has resulted in significant outflows of foreign exchange and a heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, which can compromise national security in times of geopolitical tensions. By studying the French procurement model, India can learn how to leverage its own domestic industries to meet its defence needs while also promoting competitiveness and cost-effectiveness. Thus, India can learn a valuable lesson from France’s procurement system, which is both integrated and centralised. This system is responsible for both acquiring weapons and developing the defence industry, making it a dual-purpose approach that India could benefit from. Overall, France’s success in developing a procurement and acquisition system that is primarily driven by the domestic industry can serve as a valuable example for a country like India looking to strengthen its domestic defence industry and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers.
Challenges
India’s goal is to achieve self-reliance in all sectors of defence, including design, development, manufacture, as well as modification of all aspects of the defence system. The dream remains to gain complete indigenisation, such that the country has complete control over the entire process, from envisioning and integrating the different parts of the defence sector, testing them under various conditions, maintaining the system as well as upgrading it when required. However, the path towards indigenisation has met with a number of challenges. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi proclaimed, ‘…even the tears we shed in this country are not our own. Every tear gas shell used by our security agencies is actually imported!’ (Rathi et al., 2019).
India’s defence technology sector has been bedevilled by several problems—over-ambitious goal setting, complex individual as well as institutional issues, and isolation and a lack of accountability. Despite intention and expertise, the sector has struggled to produce tangible results despite possessing ‘a few pockets of excellence’ (Mohanty, 2014). This has forced the country to continue to rely on imported arms. To achieve self-sufficiency in defence procurement, four major policy directives should be considered important: creation of a front licensing strategy, creation of specific and mission-oriented institutions, creation of a robust research and development structure, and the creation of a technical and scientific workforce. Although the ‘Make in India’ initiative has instilled a sense of urgency, there is still a good degree of indecisiveness at various levels of implementation.
To implement the ‘Make in India’ concept more robustly, the structural framework of the existing research and development policy infrastructure needs to change. Further, in order to achieve self-reliance in defence production and indigenisation, in addition to acquiring weapons platforms, it is necessary to devise a strategy for acquiring technology evolution in concordance with development and manufacturing. Development of technology-driven defence structures requires significant investment in terms of finances, time, and human resources. Additionally, different countries have their respective policies that restrict the export of defence technologies. In this context, it becomes crucial to identify long-term capability requirements and develop appropriate technology accordingly through perspective planning, in order to acquire the necessary technology and to realise the goals of self-reliance.
In both the government and private defence sectors, there is a perception that security forces intentionally set high technology requirements that are not available from domestic players. However, the need for continuous R&D arises due to long procurement periods, short technology life spans, and the requirement to perform better than the opposing forces. This has often led to wariness among the defence forces, which is why they avoid the procurement of weapons from Indian firms, leading to feelings of exclusion among the private defence contractors. There is also a need to make the R&D projects in the defence sector economically appealing in order to generate funds for defence projects with longer gestation times. Also, as the Ministry of Defence remains the primary customer for the defence industry in India, without long-term agreements, certainty of volumes, quick alternative strategies, openness, and reasonable payment terms and conditions, there is little incentive for private players to take place in the bidding process.
Along with the development of the private sector and in-house capability in terms of research and development, there is also a need for better coordination in terms of sharing information, infrastructure as well as responsibility. In addition, the production capacities of public sector units must also be upgraded to integrate with the private sector expertise in management, manufacture, and marketing. In order to develop the defence sector, it is inevitable to develop the complementary sectors such as communication alloys, metallurgy, components, composites, precision engineering items, etc. India needs to take serious action by implementing a defence technology vision document as a guiding force with a practical politico-bureaucratic direction, flexible structural arrangements with horizontal, interdisciplinary interactions and diffusion, regular reviews, and accountability within the institution and at higher governance levels.
Having formulated a strong defence and security partnership, India and France often tend to followed divergent priorities. India’s ‘good neighbour’ and ‘poly-alignment’ policies often diverge and potentially clash with France’s ‘global interests’. Another problem stems from the absence of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between India and France, which impedes free flow of trade and commerce between the countries and allows France to export more to India including defence items, thus creating a trade imbalance problem that both nations are trying to address. France is also sceptical of India not sufficiently safeguarding intellectual property rights, which has harmed French businesses operating in India.
Conclusion
With defence and security as one of the major areas of convergence, the partnership between India and France provides a model for East-West cooperation that simultaneously supports an inclusive multipolar order while prioritizing national strategic autonomy. This model was celebrated at the 36th round of the Indo-French Strategic Dialogue attended by India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and his French counterpart Emmanuel Bonne on 5 January 2023. The discussion aimed at bolstering plans for future cooperation between the two countries, majorly in the defence and security sectors, in the backdrop of current geopolitical trends.
France has been a consistent supporter of India on many international issues and has also become India’s second largest supplier of defence equipment between 2017 and 2022. India, in turn, has offered persistent support to France on several matters such as counter-terrorism policies and France’s role in global politics. As a result, the strategic partnership between India and France continues to gain immense impetus given that both sides pledge their commitment to democracy, stability, peace, and strategic autonomy in a multi-polar global order.
The strategic partnership between France and India is a practical way to bring together major powers from the West and East. The two countries have acknowledged the intricacies of the current global geopolitical situation, and have been successful in expanding and strengthening their collaboration to tackle ongoing challenges in international affairs. Unlike other European states who are more interested to pursue economic gains in the Indo-Pacific region, France’s interests in the region are more focused on political, security and defence related issues. To counter China’s growing economic and military footprints and to enhance their own geopolitical position in the Indo-Pacific region, India and France have found a ‘naturalness’ to their growing security and strategic partnership.
The Indo-French security relationship is likely to be influenced by the growing strain between China and the United States, which may further destabilise the Indo-Pacific region in the future. Indo-French security ties in the future could also be impacted by how states and international institutions respond to global supply chain and travel disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, trade wars, and geopolitical confrontations and military conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war.
The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on India and the Indo-French strategic partnership has been telling. The emerging Russia-China strategic partnership could be a worry for India. Russia’s supply of military weapons, ammunition, and equipment to India has slowed down due to Moscow’s priorities in Ukraine. As a result of Western economic sanctions on Russia, defence payments between India and Russia have suffered delays, which has further slowed down Russian supply of defence items to India. Russia has also struggled to provide India with spares for Russian-made military equipment, particularly after the onset of the Ukraine war. Given that over 60% of India’s defence equipment are of Russian origin, this delay may adversely affect India’s military readiness, particularly against China and Pakistan. India, therefore, has been forced to source weapons and parts from Europe, particularly France, the United States, and Israel.
Overall, the Indo-French strategic partnership and security cooperation continue to show a strong upward trajectory. India and France have a shared view of international relations, both value multilateralism and the rule of law and strongly cherish their independence and strategic autonomy. These factors help to incentivise cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels, deepen engagements in regional institutions, and build stronger partnerships with other countries across various fields and sectors.
As India and France celebrate 25 years of their Strategic Partnership, a statement issued by the Indian External Affairs Ministry stated that ‘Prime Minister’s Narendra Modi’s visit to Paris in July 2023, in order to attend the Bastille Day Parade is expected to signal towards the next phase in the Indo-French Strategic Partnership by setting new and ambitious goals for strategic, cultural, scientific, academic, economic cooperation that includes in a wide range of industries’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023). Recognised as France’s National Day, Bastille Day is observed as a significant event to commemorate the French Revolution, thus making the visit of the Indian Prime Minister as historic and significant.
As observed, France has now become a key defence partner for India with converging security interests. The two actors share a number of pivotal defence deals and large-scale military-to-military engagement. France and India have developed a strong security relationship, and this can be further deepened through strengthening cooperation in areas of defence like joint military exercises, transfer of technology, and future cooperation in industry-driven defence production. Given the mutual interests and substantially shared resources, both actors would need to continually develop and implement the possibilities of their strategic partnership, within the changing dynamics of Indo-Pacific security and geopolitical structure. In a post-pandemic world, it becomes all the more imperative for the two actors to deepen their cooperation and expand it to new domains. As their long-standing armament cooperation has been a testimony to their mutual trust and partnership, both actors value the synergy in the field of security and defence. In order to take this momentum forward, and for India to truly realise its goals of self-reliance and reduce their heavy dependence on Russia, it is the need of the hour to find innovative ways to deepen France’s involvement in the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ initiative with advances in manufacturing, exports, defence technology, and subsequently encouraging future industry-to-industry partnerships.
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