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5 January 2024

GCAP treaty seeks to avoid past development missteps

Douglas Barrie

This blog was first published on the Military Balance+ on 21 December 2023

The tri-national Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) treaty signature between Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom provides a solid foundation for the fielding of a next-generation combat aircraft. Political hyperbole – of which there was much – aside, the government-to-government treaty is much harder to walk away from than a more nebulous notion to cooperate that, until recently, underpinned the project.

Triparty party

The 14 December 2023 signature in Tokyo by the three countries’ defence ministers clears the way to formally establishing the GCAP International Government Organisation – in effect, one half of the management structure to run the multibillion-pound endeavour. The other half is a pending joint industrial-management construct. The UK’s Grant Shapps, Italy’s Guido Crosetto and Japan’s Minoru Kihara signed the treaty on behalf of their respective governments. The GCAP International Government Organisation will be based in the UK, with its first chief executive officer from Japan, while an Italian will oversee the joint business organisation.

GCAP intends to develop a next-generation low-observable crewed combat aircraft for the three partner countries, with deliveries to begin in 2035. The demanding development schedule is partly driven by the need to replace Japan’s Mitsubishi F-2 around the middle of that decade, while the Royal Air Force may begin replacing its Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4 aircraft around the same time. Italian defence company Leonardo, Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the UK’s BAE Systems are the industrial national leads on GCAP.

Key to meeting the 2035 deadline is ensuring that the governmental and industrial organisations have the requisite decision-making authority to manage the programme. One of the problems with the Eurofighter’s development was that actual power rested with the four participating countries, exposing the programme to policy whims in each of the partner countries. Key decisions often were delayed by years as governments bickered internally or with one another.

GCAP has emerged as one of two industrial pillars of London’s so-called Indo-Pacific tilt; the other is the Australia, UK and US (AUKUS) defence-industrial partnership that aims to produce a nuclear-powered submarine for the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Navy. The submarine effort is intended to be complemented by other advanced-technology cooperation between Canberra, London and Washington.

Labour to do

The UK could provide the first test in the coming year over whether GCAP’s organisational structure can insulate the programme from domestic politics. UK national elections are due no later than January 2025 and will probably be held this year. Current polling suggests voters will vote a Labour government into power after 13 years of Conservative Party rule. Should Labour be elected, then GCAP will likely be scrutinised, given the high financial and political stakes of the commitment. That said, the project has enjoyed support from trade unions, a key stakeholder in the Labour Party.

A new government is all but certain to conduct a new defence review, which Labour has already said is on its agenda. The challenge for Labour would be undertaking a far-reaching defence review without slowing decision-making on GCAP, which faces key milestones in 2024 and 2025. The second half of 2024 should see the submission of the second business-case outline for government approval, with the go-ahead for full-scale development to follow in 2025.

Any delay in that timeline would jeopardise the 2035 fielding timeline and could provide an excuse to politicians in Japan and Italy to move slowly around the time of their own elections, due in subsequent years. Though the treaty puts GCAP on a firm path, these governments still must demonstrate they will not stray.

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