Indian Strategic Studies: 06/17/23

17 June 2023

Takshashila Discussion Document - Analysing India’s Position on the Information Technology Agreement

The global trade in Information Communication Technology (ICT) products and the resultant value chains are dominated by countries like Taiwan and China. They have implemented liberal trade policies and low tariff regimes, primarily facilitated by the World Trade Organization's (WTO) plurilateral Information Technology Agreement (ITA-1), since 1996. The ITA-1 sought to eliminate tariffs on scheduled ICT products to maximise world trade and the development of information technology industries.

While India has been a signatory to the ITA-1 since 1997, its tariff treatment of ICT products has been inconsistent with its stated commitments under the ITA-1. Most recently, on April 17, 2023, a panel set up by the WTO Dispute Settlement Board ruled against India in the matter of a challenge to India's tariffs levied on certain ICT products covered in its schedule. India has maintained that its accession to the ITA-1 adversely affected its domestic ICT manufacturing capabilities and increased its import dependence on such products, particularly from China.

This discussion document compares India’s ICT manufacturing performance with that of China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan, countries that have leveraged ITA-1-enabled tariff regimes to become globally dominant exporters of ICT products. It finds that India’s divergent position on the ITA-1 is based on an incorrect correlation of increased ICT imports with the consequences of an absent complementary industrial and investment policy which hamstrung its ICT manufacturing sector.

Recent government initiatives suggest a growing cohesion in India’s perspectives on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), infrastructure development, and Production-Linked Incentives (PLI), and therefore, this paper proposes that India reiterate its commitment to its ITA-1 obligations, study the potential impact of joining the expanded ITA-2 on other manufacturing sectors, and negotiate Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to consolidate its integration into global ICT value chains.

Who suffered more in the Galwan Valley clash: India or China?

Neeraj Rajput

The Chinese PLA and the CCP Government led by XI Jinping however remained quiet on the number of casualties—both fatal as well non-fatal.

Ahead of the third anniversary of the Galwan Valley skirmish (15-16th June), some photographs and videos on social media have created a sensation leading to speculation as to what exactly happened between armies of India and China in Eastern Ladakh in ‘20. Who had suffered more in the bloody battle between two Asian giants who have a 70 years long border dispute in the high altitude regions of Himalayan region.

An obnoxious twitter account in the (fictitious) name of ‘Aryan_Vedas’ posted a series of pix and videos showing Indian soldiers in the captivity of the Chinese PLA. Many Indian soldiers were seen having grievous injuries while some were seen apologising. After the complaint was made the original post was ‘withheld’ in India but other posts in the thread still exist.

But some Indians were quick to pick up the post by the twitter account which was created in the month of April and has a location in Spain. A former senior military commander who is believed to be present day Modi Government’s baiter, wrote, “Horrifying ! (The) Indian Army m(n)eeds to put up its own videos.”

Another Indian veteran who is now a journalist went on to say, “India should prepare for war with China – countdown has begun with these horrendous Galwan killings pictures released by them- expect war by PLA in 2023-2024 winter. It will not be a border war, but a war of sovereignty. Pakistan will not be a bystander in the war!”

But a close look at the pictures and videos suggest that they are not new. Most of the pictures and videos were already in the public domain. In fact videos were seen on Chinese mainstream news channels and screenshots of the news-items have also been shared by the account which goes by the name ‘Shiva’s Grandpa’ (obviously to irk Indians who rever Lord Shiva) and claim to be born in 1962, the year when China had defeated India along 3488 Km long Line of Actual Control (LAC) and captured Aksai Chin. Disputed Galwan Valley is sandwiched between Aksai Chin and Eastern Ladakh of India.

New UNICRI Report Delivers In-Depth Analysis on Afghanistan's Security Landscape Post-Taliban Takeover

The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) announces the release of a comprehensive new report offering a critical analysis of the evolving security landscape in Afghanistan following the Taliban's takeover in 2021.

The report identifies key trends and examines the implications for regional and global peace, security, and stability. This timely assessment is essential for policymakers, humanitarian organizations, and all stakeholders in addressing the complex challenges associated with the current Taliban rule.

The report details three major security trends in Afghanistan: (1) fragmentation within the Taliban; (2) the presence of regional and global terrorist and violent extremist organizations; and (3) the emergence of anti-Taliban resistance groups. The report underscores the concern about the long-term control of the de facto authorities amid internal tensions and power struggles.

"Afghanistan's security situation has far-reaching consequences. The Taliban's links to international terrorist groups like Al-Qaida and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) pose a serious threat to regional stability," the report states. "It is crucial for the international community to comprehend these risks and take appropriate action."

In particular, the report highlights the increased freedom that Al-Qaida enjoys under Taliban rule, raising concerns that Afghanistan could once again become a safe haven for international terrorists to conduct global operations.

Furthermore, the report delves into the sources of funding for the Taliban, including government revenues, international aid, and illicit financial flows. It also assesses the impact of international sanctions on Afghan society.

Amidst evolving threats, the report of UNICRI underlines the imperative for the international community and the United Nations to concentrate their efforts on mitigating the risks posed by the shifting security landscape in Afghanistan.

Challenging China’s Grip on Critical Minerals Can Be a Boon for Africa’s Future

Edward A. Burrier; Thomas P. Sheehy

Demand for the critical minerals powering the world’s clean-energy technologies, consumer goods and defense applications is skyrocketing. These metals are what the modern economy runs on: we need them for our phones, electric vehicles and satellites, and so much more. Forecasts estimate that in the coming decades, the world will need many times more cobalt, copper, lithium and manganese, among other minerals, than what is currently being produced. This poses a strategic challenge for the United States, as China dominates global critical mineral supply chains, accounting for 60% of world-wide production and 85% of processing capacity. To help meet demand and diversify supply, Western policymakers are increasingly looking to Africa, home to about one-third of the world’s mineral resources.A Chinese-owned cobalt and copper mine in Kisanfu, DRC, April 27, 2021. The DRC supplies 70% of the world’s cobalt, and China owns or holds stake in nearly all of the country’s cobalt-producing mines. (Ashley Gilbertson/The New York Times)

This growing international attention to developing Africa’s critical minerals could help lead to a more prosperous and stable continent. Many African countries have high hopes for what their mineral resources can do for their countries’ development trajectory. Indeed, some senior U.S. policymakers have spoken in bold terms as to the role Western-backed mining could have in transforming African economies. Top White House energy official Amos Hochstein told an African mining conference this year, “The energy transition is an opportunity for an Africa transition.”

However, it is also possible that the intensified development of these natural resources could worsen economic inequalities, increase corruption and spur instability and conflict on the continent, as has been often seen in Africa. The United States and its partners can work with African countries to help ensure that the dividends of these resources go first and foremost to Africans. But it will first have to overcome the immense in-roads China has already made on the continent.

Beijing Firmly Entrenched

How to restructure Chinese supply chains

ANDREW SHENG AND XIAO GENG

HONG KONG – “The old is dying and the new cannot be born,” the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci wrote in the early 20th century.

We seem to be living in a similar interregnum today, likewise marked by “a great variety of morbid symptoms,” including, not least, the breakdown of global supply chains and the return of inflation. The only way forward is to support the development of new markets, industries, and institutions. But who will finance this effort?

In good times, characterized by rapid growth and fat margins, commercial banks and private markets could help emerging and efficient firms raise enough capital to acquire and restructure their inefficient and failing counterparts and create new supply chains. But tighter financial regulation after the 2008 global financial crisis, together with a prolonged period of low interest rates, has made mainstream financial institutions more cautious. They now prefer lower risks and shorter time horizons.

China’s Russia strategy

Alexander Gabuev

Putin’s war on Ukraine has forced him to depend on China like never before. Beijing is happy to help – and to take advantage of its new power.

Thanks to the war in Ukraine, Russia and China are now closer allies than at any time in the two countries’ modern history. As Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Moscow in March highlighted, Russian President Vladimir Putin has found a strong partner in his declared struggle against the West – such a strong partner, in fact, that Russia has been relegated to junior status in the relationship. Yet that is a price President Putin is willing to pay in order to secure access to the resources he needs to sustain his regime and his unprovoked aggression in Ukraine. The relationship also suits President Xi well. As he prepares China for a long-term conflict with the United States and its allies, Russia offers him assets he can’t get anywhere else: modern weapons, cheap oil and gas, support in the UN Security Council, and the ability to distract the United States by causing trouble in many corners of the world.

Although the Ukraine war has intensified their bond, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing has, in fact, been deepening ever since the mid-1980s, when Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping patched up their countries’ schism – a contest for leadership of the global communist movement that had started after Josef Stalin’s death in 1953 – and began working toward a new modus vivendi. Over the course of the 1990s, Moscow and Beijing made steady progress resolving their long-standing differences, such as an unresolved border dispute. Then, in 1995, China began importing oil and, later on, tapping into Siberia’s hydrocarbon resources – establishing a powerful economic bond between a rapidly developing China, with its new surplus of capital, and a resource-rich Russia. Further uniting both governments was their growing concern over U.S.-led democracy promotion and a shared desire to end America’s unipolar moment.

Balance is Needed in China Tech Trade

Gregory Tosi

A growing number of lawmakers and policy experts are pressing to drastically reduce open trade with China, especially in technology. This so-called decoupling movement has adherents in both political parties.

But backers of this 180-degree reversal in global integration want to go too far. Fortunately, there’s time enough to slow and alter the course of this movement before businesses and consumers are further impacted by higher prices and reduced choices. The Biden administration should be congratulated for trying to tap the brakes.

Antagonism between the U.S. and China is not new, of course. China has long been the U.S.’s top commercial rival, a competition that has escalated as China’s economy and military strength has grown to threaten American superiority. Nationalistic feelings in the U.S., exacerbated by economic uncertainty in the wake of the pandemic, have sharpened America’s anti-China sentiment on trade issues.

Jon Bateman, a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has written in Politico Magazine that selective technological decoupling could “help to preserve America’s military edge, protect key U.S. industries from unfair competition, and push back on Beijing’s human rights abuses.” But he also warns that the policy, if taken too far, could backfire, hurting the economies of the U.S. and its allies and undercutting the fragile international cooperation that has prevented military conflicts between the superpowers and mitigated global threats such as climate change.

The answer is for the U.S. to pursue a balanced approach, especially in technology trade.

The everchanging realities of global trade will make it difficult for the U.S. to reach the desired balance. Almost every month, the U.S. government announces new export controls and sanctions on Chinese companies, creating a steady stream of shifting rules for U.S. businesses. These revised export controls, combined with public statements by members of Congress, contribute to an emerging U.S. vs. China Cold War.

But China's significance to the U.S. economy, and indeed to the global economy, cannot be understated. The U.S. is China’s top export destination. China and the U.S. are especially interconnected in technology. The U.S. buys a lot of high-tech gear from China, while China buys a lot of its semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and software from the U.S.

Apple CEO Tim Cook referred to the relationship between Apple and China as a "symbiotic kind of relationship." Elon Musk's recent visit to China highlighted the country's importance for Tesla. China accounts for 50% of Tesla’s vehicle sales and 20% of its production capacity, according to CNBC.

Who runs the world?

Ian Bremmer

That’s the subject of my just-released TED Talk. And, believe it or not, it used to be an easy question to answer.

If you’re over 45, like me, you grew up in a world dominated by two superpowers. The United States and its allies set the rules on one side of the Berlin Wall, while the Soviet Union called the shots on the other. Nearly every other country had to align its political, economic, and security systems with one side or the other. That was a bipolar world.

If you’re under 45, you came of age after the Soviet Union collapsed. The US became the world’s sole superpower, dictating outcomes both through its dominant role in international organizations and also by exerting raw power. That was a unipolar world.

About 15 years ago, the world changed again – and it got a lot more complicated. The United States became less interested in being the world’s policeman, the architect of global trade, and even the cheerleader of global values. And lots of other countries grew powerful enough to ignore rules they didn’t like and, occasionally, to set some themselves. That’s the G-Zero world order I named my media company after and constantly write about – a leaderless world.

Three things happened to cause this “geopolitical recession” – when the global architecture no longer lines up with the underlying balance of power.

First, the US didn’t bring Russia into the US-led international order. Now a former great power in serious decline, Russia has become extremely angry and sees the US as its primary adversary on the global stage. We can argue about who is most to blame for this, but the fact is we are where we are.

Second, the US did bring China into US-led institutions – but on the presumption that as the Chinese grew more integrated, wealthy, and powerful, they would also become American (i.e., a free-market democracy willing to play by the rules without wanting to change them). As it turns out, they’re still Chinese – and the US is not ready to accept that.

Time To Wean Ourselves From Chinese Semiconductors

Brian Cavanaugh & Bonnie Glick

Relying on an adversary to supply critical components in equipment that our nation deems mission-essential is, to put it mildly, foolish. But that is exactly what the United States has been doing when it comes to China and semiconductors.

The expansion and robust implementation of a Zero China Chips policy, originally introduced in the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), would help change this equation. It would mitigate the risks associated with depending on China, while simultaneously boosting semiconductor production domestically and among our allies and partner nations—a reliable path towards removing the PRC’s leverage over the U.S. and the globe.

From critical infrastructure and national defense to innovation for artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and 6G, semiconductors enable nearly every aspect of our digital society. Yet, untrustworthy semiconductors can introduce risks of compromise, malfunction, or sabotage capable of harming health, safety, and the economy. For these reasons and others, semiconductors underpin economic and national security competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Xi Jinping’s relentless crusade for technological, military, and economic supremacy depends on semiconductors and the weaponization of multinational corporations’ short-term earnings focus. Luring multinational corporations with below-market prices and the fleeting promise of market access, the PRC exploits companies’ cost-benefit analyses that prioritize bottom-line cost over supply chain security to siphon needed know how and capital. The revenues derived from outsourced, low-cost manufacturing are used to advance PRC capabilities, build excess capacity through investments in unmatched scale, and aggressively stockpile chokepoint technologies, such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

The intent is clear: undercut and eliminate competitors to create global dependence on the PRC.

Microsoft’s Big Footprint In China Is Out Of Step With U.S. Security Concerns

Loren Thompson

U.S. strategy identifies China as the most important threat to national security. Beijing’s steadily rising investment in military capabilities aimed at achieving dominance of the Western Pacific region is only one facet of this threat. The larger concern focuses on China’s bid to overtake and surpass America in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence.

Against that backdrop, Washington has increasingly moved to limit the sharing of key technologies with China. However, some of America’s top tech companies have been slow to respond to growing U.S. security concerns. MicrosoftMSFT +0.9%, the world’s largest software maker, is a case in point.

Although Microsoft acknowledges that state-supported Chinese actors are exploiting its products to steal foreign intellectual property and penetrate vital infrastructure, it has not slowed its business activities in China. Quite the opposite. It sells over 70 products in the People’s Republic and employs thousands of software engineers—many of whom work on cutting-edge innovations.

Microsoft is not alone among U.S. tech companies in having a China presence, but it may be unique in the sensitivity and diversity of the work it funds. Even a cursory review of its activities raises red flags for U.S. national security.

Market presence. Microsoft opened its first office in China in 1992, at a time when U.S. leaders had some basis for believing that the world’s most populous country was evolving towards more democratic norms. Six years later, the company established Microsoft Research China, which has steadily expanded to sprawling campuses in Beijing, Shanghai and other Chinese cities.

John A. Gentry, Information Operations against the United States: Defensive Actions are Needed, No. 556, June 12, 2023

John A. Gentry

John A. Gentry is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. He is a former CIA analyst and a retired U.S. Army Reserve officer. He writes frequently on intelligence-related topics.

Countries long have tried to influence important foreign audiences, often by using their intelligence services. They have had different targets and goals, used various methods, and experienced different degrees of success. Communist countries have been especially prominent users of such methods. Soviet intelligence services conducted “disinformation” operations as part of lengthy “active measures” campaigns that largely were information-oriented. Many such efforts became institutionalized, meaning they continue to influence targeted groups long after the demise of the Soviet Union.[1] More recently, information operations have attracted popular attention as Russian intelligence services tried to influence elections in Western countries and the “hybrid warfare” campaigns Russia waged in Ukraine in 2014 and elsewhere had appreciable information components.[2] Also recently, Chinese “influence” operations have generated increased scholarly and government attention globally.[3] China prominently uses legal techniques designed to avoid politically embarrassing flaps over illegal actions.

The United States, as a major world power, an open democracy, and a land of immigrants, is a lucrative and relatively easy target of influence operators. While friendly countries such as Norway seek innocuously to inform Americans of issues of interest to them, adversary states have insidious goals, including the literal destruction of the United States. Hence, this paper focuses on U.S. vulnerabilities that the influence operations of China and Russia, including previous Soviet operations that remain on-going, seek to exploit and suggests ways to ameliorate and counter them, respectfully.[4]

While the three programs share some characteristics, they have appreciably different strategies, tactics, and key targets.[5] The Soviets aimed to defeat and destroy their capitalist adversaries, uniting the world under Moscow-led socialism. Russia has lesser but still substantial goals, mainly in Europe. In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to remake world institutions in its image by co-opting, rather than defeating, its enemies.[6] All these influence campaigns focus on Americans who can influence large numbers of other persons—especially politicians, journalists, and educators. Each has sought, in different ways, to manipulate foreign elections. Consistent with their substantial ambitions, China and Russia now target a wide range of institutions, including businesses and think tanks.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT FOR THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR

As part of our ongoing transparency efforts to enhance public understanding of the Intelligence Community’s (IC) work and to provide insights on national security issues, ODNI today is releasing this unclassified IC product dated July 2022.

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) plays a central role in coordinating intelligence products and is responsible for leading analysis across the IC to inform immediate and long-term policy deliberations. National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) serve as the principal subject matter experts to the DNI and national security decision makers on all aspects of analysis related to their regional and functional roles. Download the report.

Ukraine’s third wave of military reform 2016–2022 – building a military able to defend Ukraine against the Russian invasion

Deborah Sanders

This article explores an important and often overlooked element of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against the Russian invasion in February 2022 – the adoption of a modified western transformational model of military reform – which has focused on mass and building a western style NATO interoperable and trained military. This article argues that Ukraine’s military reform since 2016, in particular the focus on Command and Control, the development of an NCO Corps and Special Forces as well as clear procurement priorities have created the enabling conditions for the development of a flexible and adaptable military force, able to limit Russia’s battlefield success and bring the fight to the enemy. Despite this progress, however, a recurring problem facing the Ukrainian military, that is likely to continue in the future, is how to balance the ongoing requirement for mass against the urgent need for military modernisation.

Ukraine’s ability to survive the brutal onslaught of a full-scale Russian military invasion in February 2022 might appear to have been little short of a miracle. Ukraine’s military has stopped the enemy from achieving its key goals, successfully prolonged this conflict, significantly increased the costs of this war for the Russian Federation, and more recently has also made some notable progress in retaking territory. There are of course many reasons for this success. These include the political, economic, and military support of many western nations, the unity, strength, and determination of the Ukrainian people and the emergence of a strong and charismatic Ukrainian war leader, President Zelensky. It is also widely recognised that Russia’s miscalculations and military failures have also played a crucial role in creating the enabling conditions for Ukraine’s military success.Footnote1 This article explores another important, and often overlooked, element of Ukraine’s success – the reform and modernisation of its military. It looks at how Ukraine reformed and built up its military forces prior to 2022, what its priorities have been and what accounts for its success. Ukraine made sufficient progress in a number of key areas, and that this created the enabling conditions for the development of a flexible and adaptable military force, able to limit Russia’s battlefield success and bring the fight to the enemy. In essence, Ukraine’s adoption of a modified western transformation model of military reform, with an emphasis on bringing its forces up to NATO standards,Footnote2 on selective procurement, all combined with a focus on mass, has given the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) significant levels of flexibility and adaptability and the ability to seize the initiative even when confronted by a militarily superior force.

In making this argument, the article is divided into three sections. The first examines Ukraine’s military reform and argues that Ukraine has moved away from the government’s stated goal of adopting a transformation model of military reform and has instead adopted more of a hybrid model that retains the best elements of the former, but also recognises the need for mass – a large standing force – given its unique geostrategic environment. The second section examines Ukraine’s adoption of key elements of the transformation model including improved command and control, the introduction of an NCO Corp and a strong focus on the development of its special forces, all of which has not only increased Ukraine’s combat power, but also the ease and speed with which Ukraine has absorbed and utilised western military equipment and support. Over the last few years Ukraine’s adoption of a process of what might be termed “smart” or “tailored” procurement – filled important gaps that would prove vital in allowing it effectively to adopt a defensive and latterly more offensive military strategy. Ukraine also went into this war with a battle-hardened military that has learnt many lessons from fighting the Russian backed separatists in the east – not least of which the need for a large standing army with decentralised and flexible command structures. The third section looks at some of the problems Ukraine has faced in reforming its military, the most important of which has been the difficultly in balancing the cost of building and sustaining a large standing force with the need to modernise and upgrade its weapon systems.

Germany unveils its first national security strategy

Frank Jordans and Geir Moulson

BERLIN — The German government said Russia is the greatest security threat “for the foreseeable future” and advocated a balanced approach to China as it unveiled its first comprehensive national security strategy Wednesday.

The strategy was part of an effort to address what Germany views as growing military, economic and social risks to the country. Germany’s biggest opposition party criticized the government’s position as “anemic.”

Chancellor Olaf Scholz said the new strategy, which his three-party governing coalition pledged to draw up when it took office at the end of 2021, had gained added importance since Russia attacked Ukraine almost 16 months ago.

The war in Ukraine has heightened anxiety in Germany about the preparedness of its own armed forces, prompting Scholz to announce a “turning point” on military spending.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated “what many of our neighbors in Eastern Europe have warned us about — that Europe is vulnerable,” German Foreign Affairs Minister Annalena Baerbock told reporters at a news conference in Berlin also attended by Scholz and other top officials.

A 76-page document outlining the strategy states that “today’s Russia is, for the foreseeable future, the greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.”

It also warns that some countries are “trying to reshape the existing international order according to their view of systematic rivalry,” an oblique reference to the threats of disinformation, cyberattacks and economic pressure from major powers such as China.

The document makes several references to security threats posed by climate change. These include a heightened risk of famine, disease and conflict around the globe, as well as extreme weather events and damage to critical infrastructure in Germany.

US MARINES REVEAL THEIR RULES FOR THE ROBOT WARS

Hope Seck

When the robot wars begin, the Marines are determined that they’ll be ready.

The release of the GPT-4 large language model system in March has launched a freshly urgent conversation about how vastly more capable artificial intelligence will change society and warfare. The Marine Corps is among the first of the service branches to address the realities of a future battlespace with intelligent robotics and machines that can “think” on a level previously only seen in science fiction.

In the annual update to the Marine Corps strategy document Force Design 2030, released in June, the service spends several pages addressing “Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous Systems,” or IRAS. It outlines, among other things, the rules under which the service wants Marines to train and eventually fight alongside and even against these smart machines.

While the larger culture has been captivated recently by computers that can write term papers and automate a frightening number of work tasks, the U.S. military has been paying close attention to machines in warfare for much longer. It took particular note of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War in the South Caucasus, in which the use of drones by Azerbaijan played a decisive role in the outcome of the conflict. Weaponized and surveillance drones have also been plentiful and highly effective in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, sometimes destroying equipment that is orders of magnitude more expensive and complex.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Threat Systems Management Office operate a swarm of 40 drones to test the capabilities of the rotational unit during the battle of Razish, National Training Center on May 8th, 2019. This exercise was the first of many held at the National Training Center. (U.S. Army Photo by Pvt. James Newsome)

To be ready for such a fight, the new force design update states, the force must reject a “platform-centric” approach, focused on specific combat tools and equipment, to a “capability-centric” approach, “where [IRAS] are employed by trained specialists who contribute to all-domain operations.”

Why Putin Will Never Agree to De-escalate

Maxim Samorukov

As Ukraine accelerates its counteroffensive across several sections of the front, a rational person might conclude that 2023 must surely be the last year of Russia’s war against its neighbor. Russian military resources are depleted, Moscow’s long and bloody winter offensive in the Donbas has yielded meager results, and Russian society longs for the return of prewar stability. Logic dictates that the Kremlin has no better option than to seize any opportunity to cut short its disastrous war, saving face as far as possible by clinging to the shreds of its territorial gains. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken echoed this line of thinking at a press conference this week, when he said that a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could have the effect of “causing Putin to finally focus on negotiating an end to the war that he started.”

How Might Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive End, and What Comes After?

William Courtney & Terrence K. Kelly , Howard J. Shatz , Gian Gentile

Emergency workers inspect a damaged multi-storey apartment building caused by the latest rocket Russian attack in Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine, Tuesday, June 13, 2023. (AP Photo/Andriy Dubchak)

Ukraine may soon launch a counter-offensive against Russian forces entrenched in its east and south. The West has provided substantial military assistance for it and appears committed to providing support for the long haul. The West is likely to assist Ukraine with reconstruction on a scale that could rival the post-World War II Marshall Plan.

Deterring Russian aggression in Europe and securing Ukraine are important, even vital, Western interests. This is underlined by the huge scale of Western support to Ukraine. Russia’s naked aggression, including shocking atrocities, has hardened Western determination to confront it. Arguably, the West has become more unified than at any time since the end of the Cold War three decades ago.

Russia’s circumstances are less sanguine. Fighting this summer is likely to put Ukrainian forces in a stronger position. Even though many Russians back the war, large numbers of the better educated are fleeing. Battlefield casualties and declining living standards may erode confidence in Kremlin leadership, as they did in the 1980s when the USSR lost a smaller and more distant war in Afghanistan.

On multiple occasions, China has warned Russia not to go nuclear in Ukraine. Furthermore, China seems not to be supplying Russia with substantial lethal weaponry. Vladimir Putin’s and his ex-KGB cohort’s grip on power—visibly challenged by hardliners such as Yevgeny Prigozhin—could be weakening. Russian leaders likely worry about the risks of military humiliation in Ukraine, which could lead to the “loss” of its largest East Slavic neighbor. Putin could be obsessed by such anxiety.

In this context, we consider three ways Ukraine’s counter-offensive might end and their implications for the future.

Mick Ryan assesses Ukraine’s counter-offensive

This week there have been frequent comparisons between D-Day in 1944 and the Ukrainian military offensive that is currently unfolding. Although both were launched in the month of June, a better comparison may be to Operation Cobra, a large ground operation launched by the United States First Army almost two months after the Normandy landings. While starting inauspiciously, with the accidental killing of Leslie McNair, an American lieutenant-general, and unfolding slowly at first, once the operation gathered pace it was highly effective. It was Cobra that broke open German defences for the Allies to exploit in subsequent offensives.

President Volodymyr Zelensky, his armed forces and their supporters in the West will be hoping for something similar. They need a decisive campaign that not only recaptures swathes of Ukrainian territory but also destroys a significant part of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine so they cannot conduct offensive operations again in 2023. The best case would see all of Ukraine liberated this year. The most likely is that large parts of the east and south of the country are liberated, placing Ukraine in a good strategic position to regain Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014.

National security officials make case for keeping surveillance powers

Tim Starks

Congress will not renew powerful, expiring surveillance authorities without substantial changes to shield Americans from warrantless eavesdropping, senators in both parties warned Biden administration officials Tuesday.

That message came during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing where national security officials pressed their case for reauthorizing the surveillance powers, known as Section 702, in part by revealing previously classified details about how spy agencies have used those authorities to combat threats such as fentanyl trafficking and prominent ransomware attacks.

Information Operations against the United States: Defensive Actions are Needed

John A. Gentry

John A. Gentry is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. He is a former CIA analyst and a retired U.S. Army Reserve officer. He writes frequently on intelligence-related topics.

Countries long have tried to influence important foreign audiences, often by using their intelligence services. They have had different targets and goals, used various methods, and experienced different degrees of success. Communist countries have been especially prominent users of such methods. Soviet intelligence services conducted “disinformation” operations as part of lengthy “active measures” campaigns that largely were information-oriented. Many such efforts became institutionalized, meaning they continue to influence targeted groups long after the demise of the Soviet Union. More recently, information operations have attracted popular attention as Russian intelligence services tried to influence elections in Western countries and the “hybrid warfare” campaigns Russia waged in Ukraine in 2014 and elsewhere had appreciable information components. Also recently, Chinese “influence” operations have generated increased scholarly and government attention globally. China prominently uses legal techniques designed to avoid politically embarrassing flaps over illegal actions.

The United States, as a major world power, an open democracy, and a land of immigrants, is a lucrative and relatively easy target of influence operators. While friendly countries such as Norway seek innocuously to inform Americans of issues of interest to them, adversary states have insidious goals, including the literal destruction of the United States. Hence, this paper focuses on U.S. vulnerabilities that the influence operations of China and Russia, including previous Soviet operations that remain on-going, seek to exploit and suggests ways to ameliorate and counter them, respectfully.

While the three programs share some characteristics, they have appreciably different strategies, tactics, and key targets. The Soviets aimed to defeat and destroy their capitalist adversaries, uniting the world under Moscow-led socialism. Russia has lesser but still substantial goals, mainly in Europe. In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to remake world institutions in its image by co-opting, rather than defeating, its enemies. All these influence campaigns focus on Americans who can influence large numbers of other persons—especially politicians, journalists, and educators. Each has sought, in different ways, to manipulate foreign elections. Consistent with their substantial ambitions, China and Russia now target a wide range of institutions, including businesses and think tanks.

Pentagon pitches six steps to speed up foreign arms sales

Stephen Losey

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon aims to speed up its lagging Foreign Military Sales process, in part by fostering better discussions with other nations about their defense needs as well as expanding industry’s capacity to build more military equipment.

Defense officials at the Pentagon on Tuesday announced six recommendations on how the department plans to speed up foreign military sales, which also include streamlining the processes for reviewing and releasing technology to allies and partner nations; finding ways to speed up the approval of non-programs of record cases; better mapping out the process for prioritizing and awarding foreign sales; and working with the State Department, lawmakers and other parts of the government to find more ways to improve the process.

“Our allies and partners are a center of gravity and the greatest strategic advantage for the U.S. military” as it prepares for a possible conflict against an advanced nation, according to Sasha Baker, deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

“The [National Defense Strategy] is a call to action for the defense enterprise to incorporate our allies and partners across the board at every stage of defense planning, and obviously FMS has a big role to play in that process,” Baker said in a briefing with reporters.

The United States typically sells tens of billions of dollars of weapons to foreign governments each year, reaching a recent high of $83.5 billion in 2020, before dropping to nearly $35 billion the next year and then growing again to nearly $52 billion in 2022.

But the government’s pace of approving and delivering weapons to nations such as Taiwan has been consistently sluggish, often languishing for months or years, and has drawn the ire of lawmakers and partner nations who want the U.S. to move faster.

Baker said the Pentagon’s panel reviewing the FMS process knew it must change how the military does business, noting the department frequently heard from customers that such sales “can be a pain point for them.”

But, she cautioned, there was no single “silver bullet” to fix the process, and the panel settled on an assortment of smaller improvements.

DoD finding it ‘hard to orchestrate’ services on zero trust, holding monthly discussions: Resnick

JASPREET GILL

Chief of the Department of Defense Zero Trust Portfolio Management Office Randy Resnick, and DoD Acting Principal Deputy Chief Information Officer for Cybersecurity and DoD Senior Information Security Officer, David McKeown, hold an off-camera, on-the-record virtual press briefing on the release of the DoD Zero Trust Strategy and Roadmap at the Pentagon, , Nov. 22, 2022. (U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jack Sanders.)

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is keeping a close eye on the military services as they develop their own plans for implementing the department’s zero trust vision, a key official spearheading the effort said today.

The Defense Department’s zero trust strategy, released last November, tasked each service to develop its action plan to achieve a baseline level of zero trust by fiscal 2027. But Randy Resnick, the director of the Defense Department’s zero trust portfolio management office, said today that it’s proving “hard to orchestrate” each service’s individual zero trust efforts into something cohesive.

As a result, DoD has started doing weekly “huddles” and larger monthly meetings with the services and “communities of interest” (COI) in an effort to educate them on how to execute the department’s vision outlined in its zero trust strategy.

The quarterly meetings are “deep dives into the technology and the successes that some of our folks in the DoD have achieved up to this point,” Resnick said the Potomac Officers Club’s Cyber Summit. They’ve “been very lively conversations. Each one … of the TEMs and the COI probably has maybe 150 people that call in. And maybe for the huddle, the week to week, it’s maybe 50. So this is a big number going across DoD.”

The military services are expected to submit their implementation plans by October.

At the same time, Resnick said he’s working with the services to see where the 91 activities outlined in the strategy to get to the “targeted” baseline level of zero trust by FY27 can be mitigated “to make it simpler, while still maintaining the ability…to stop the adversary.”

Congress should give Pentagon more flexibility in buying, budgeting, report urges

SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.

WASHINGTON — To fix the Pentagon, start in Congress. That’s the central takeaway from an Atlantic Council commission co-chaired by Mark Esper, former Secretary of Defense, and Deborah Lee James, former Secretary of the Air Force.

The commission’s interim report, released today, argues that before the Defense Department can adopt new technology at the speed and scale required to compete with China, legislators must loosen statutory limits in an array of areas, from reprogramming funds between projects mid-year to contracting with start-up companies. It also calls for Congress to accept less detailed budget data in the Pentagon’s annual requests.

In return, the Hill would get a new digital “dashboard” that lets staffers directly access the latest program information from the Pentagon’s Advana acquisition analytics, without waiting for defense officials to process a formal request for updates.

The report also urges internal reforms that DoD can do itself, such as bypassing and streamlining the notoriously bureaucratic JCIDS process, which generates many of the official requirements needed to launch new weapons programs. (James noted today that one of these recommendations, strengthening the Defense Innovation Unit, was already executed by DoD last week). But of the ten broad recommendations made in the report, nine require at least some action on the Hill.

“The United States is the global leader when it comes to innovation,” Esper declared at the report’s roll-out this afternoon. “We are the envy of the world. We do not have an innovation problem in this country. However, the Pentagon’s ability to quickly adopt this advanced technology is woefully inadequate. That is where the problem resides.”

“The United States of America does not does not have an innovation problem,” echoed Lee. “But we do have, within the Department of Defense, an innovation adoption problem.

Enhancing Cyber Security of Industrial Control Systems

Sungbaek Cho

With the prevalence of information and communications technology, industrial control systems used by critical infrastructures are increasingly exposed to cyberattacks. This paper provides an overview of the security characteristics of industrial control systems, focused on major cyberattacks and essential security measures as well as how to perform cybersecurity risk management. The paper also addresses the roles and responsibilities of the government in protecting critical infrastructures and enhancing cybersecurity.

Advancing Equitable Decisionmaking for the Department of Defense Through Fairness in Machine Learning

Irineo Cabreros, Joshua Snoke, Osonde A. Osoba, Inez Khan, Marc N. Elliott

Research QuestionsWhat are DoD's equity goals?

Which developing ML technologies for personnel management interact with these goals?

How do these equity goals compare with technical definitions of equity found in the literature?

How can DoD develop algorithms that meet both DoD's equity goals and broader institutional objectives?

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) places a high priority on promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion at all levels throughout the organization. Simultaneously, it is actively supporting the development of machine learning (ML) technologies to assist in decisionmaking for personnel management. There has been heightened concern about algorithmic bias in many non-DoD settings, whereby ML-assisted decisions have been found to perpetuate or, in some cases, exacerbate inequities.

This report is an attempt to equip both policymakers and developers of ML algorithms for DoD with the tools and guidance necessary to avoid algorithmic bias when using ML to aid human decisions. The authors first provide an overview of DoD's equity priorities, which typically are centered on issues of representation and equal opportunity within personnel. They then provide a framework to enable ML developers to develop equitable tools. This framework emphasizes that there are inherent trade-offs to enforcing equity that must be considered when developing equitable ML algorithms.

The authors enable the process of weighing these trade-offs by providing a software tool, called the RAND Algorithmic Equity Tool, that can be applied to common classification ML algorithms that are used to support binary decisions. This tool allows users to audit the equity properties of their algorithms, modify algorithms to attain equity priorities, and weigh the costs of attaining equity on other, non-equity priorities. The authors demonstrate this tool on a hypothetical ML algorithm used to influence promotion selection decisions, which serves as an instructive case study.