Indian Strategic Studies: 01/22/23

22 January 2023

Japan’s Military Resurgence Takes the Heat off India

Mohamed Zeeshan

India’s Minister for External Affairs S. Jaishankar (right) with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN-India summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Nov. 13, 2022.Credit: Twitter/ Dr S. Jaishankar

At an annual preview of Indo-Pacific issues in Washington this month, the White House coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, was very clear about what the United States wants for 2023. “Our interests are to see India playing an ever larger, responsible role in almost everything that we’re doing,” he said.

That’s been a long-standing objective in U.S. foreign policy, and this seems as good a year as any to push India more proactively, given that New Delhi will play host to a pivotal G-20 Summit in 2023.

But so far as Washington is concerned, the road to a no-holds-barred partnership with India will not be without challenges. Through much of 2022, Washington was frustrated by India’s unwillingness to use its seat on the U.N. Security Council to act against various rivals. India abstained on sundry resolutions on Ukraine, Iran, and even Myanmar. India also sat mum through Chinese provocations around Taiwan.

This year, alongside the G-20, India will also hold the presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led by China and Russia — a forum that in recent times has highlighted the burgeoning common ground between the three countries.

The Clash at Tawang: Tensions Rise on the China-India Border

Amrita Jash

On December 9, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian army clashed at Yangtse along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in injuries on both sides. Following the incident, the local Indian commander held a flag meeting with his Chinese counterpart on December 11 in order to restore peace. The clash at Tawang marked the first major skirmish between the two armies in the eastern sector since the Galwan Valley clash in the western sector in Eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 (China Brief, July 15, 2020).

In reviewing the situation on December 13, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told Parliament that “PLA troops tried to transgress the LAC in Yangtse area of Tawang Sector and unilaterally change the status quo. The Chinese attempt was contested by our troops in a firm and resolute manner (Press Information Bureau [PIB], December 13). China responded in two ways. First, PLA Western Theater Command spokesperson Colonel Long Shaohua categorically stated that the PLA was conducting a “routine patrol” on the Chinese side of LAC in the Dongzhang area” and “encountered obstruction from the Indian troops who illegally crossed the LAC.” He stressed that the “Chinese troops made a professional, normative and resolute response, bringing on-site situation under control. Up to now, the Chinese and Indian troops have disengaged” (Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, December 13). Second, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated in a press briefing that “[…] China-India border areas are generally stable” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], December 13).

The PLA’s transgression across the LAC can be understood against the backdrop of two key developments that have occurred in the context of the ongoing border standoff in Eastern Ladakh. The first is the conduct of the 18th iteration of Indo-U.S. joint training exercise “Yudh Abhyas 22” near the LAC at Auli in Uttarakhand (middle sector), which was held from 15 November -December 3 (PIB, December 15). China opposed the joint military exercise claiming that it “violated the spirit of relevant agreements signed by China and India in 1993 and 1996, and does not help build bilateral trust” (FMPRC, November 30, 2022). The second incident in question was Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh on November 19 to inaugurate the Donyi Polo Airport in Itanagar (PIB, November 19).

At a Dead End? China’s Drive to Reform Defense Science and Technology Institutes Stalls

Arthur Ding, K. Tristan Tang

Since becoming China’s top leader ten years ago, General Secretary Xi Jinping has sought to sustain a three-decade effort to reform the defense industry in order to advance the development of defense technology and improve the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities. Recent reforms have focused on transforming defense science and technology (S&T) institutes into enterprise-like entities, but due to political and economic impediments, progress has been slow. This article examines the rationale for defense industry reform, assesses progress in implementation and explains difficulties encountered in the reform process.

Rationale

Since 1949, China has built a large-scale defense industry system with some unique characteristics. [1] The key attributes of this system include complete autarky in each defense industrial sector, from spare parts to assembled systems; total reliance on state support, which contributes to a lack of efficiency and autonomy; and a focus on mission-oriented military research without civil-military integration. Defense S&T institutes, the focus of this round of reform, have been a part of the defense industry system and share these features.

Reforms seek to address key deficiencies in defense S&T institutes, many of which stem from their designation as “public institutions” (PI) (事业单位). In China, PIs are wholly owned and financially supported by the Chinese state with their funding included in the government budget. The assets of defense S&T institutes fall under the Ministry of Finance with-day-to-day oversight managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) (SASTIND, March 9, 2016). Consequently, these state-managed institutes have suffered from all kinds of bureaucratic restrictions, which has contributed to a lack of efficiency and autonomy. For example, decisions over eight million RMB (about $1.14 million) require approval from related government departments (People’s Daily, March 14, 2017). For years, these factors have combined to limit China’s capacity for defense technology innovation.

After the Kabul Hotel Attack: The Taliban and China Confront Security Challenges in Afghanistan

Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai

On December 12, members of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacked a local hotel in Kabul, where several Chinese nationals were staying. The attack injured five Chinese nationals along with 18 other victims, while the three attackers were killed by security forces (China Daily, December 14, 2022). It was reported that Chinese businesspeople run the hotel, which is frequently visited by Chinese diplomats and business people (Global Times, December 13, 2022). In response, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated: “China is deeply shocked at the attack, which is highly egregious, and firmly opposes terrorism in any form” (China Daily, December 14, 2022).

The ISKP strike in Kabul will further reinforce Beijing’s commitment to giving special attention to the security and stability of Afghanistan. An unstable and volatile Afghanistan threatens Chinese interests and could be a hurdle to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, Chinese sources have expressed concern that uncertainty and unrest could lead to Afghanistan becoming a hotbed for terrorists “targeting China’s Xinjiang and its interests overseas, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, where enhanced communication and coordination between China and Pakistan is required to tackle potential threats” (Global Times, August 19, 2021). In response to these challenges, China has sought to provide the Taliban with enough support to combat all forms of terrorism and extremism in Afghanistan.

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fall of Kabul, ISIS has emerged as one of the main threats to the Taliban government, ethnic minorities, especially the Hazara community and foreign nationals, including Chinese nationals and business interests (China Brief, October 4, 2022). After the withdrawal, the U.S. offered the Taliban assistance in combating ISIS, but the group declined, stating that they could handle the issue. However, the ISIS threat does not seem to be under control in Afghanistan and has now become a headache for the Taliban.

Space Is Going Commercial in Asia, but There’s a Rocky Road Ahead

By Arpit Raswant , Jiye Kim, and Tim Mahlberg

A Falcon 9 rocket carrying Starlink 4-37 payload launches from Space Launch Complex 39A at Kennedy Space Center, Fla., U.S. Dec. 17, 2022.Credit: U.S. Space Force photo by Joshua Conti

Space is commercializing faster than ever and creating opportunities for businesses in what is expected to become a trillion-dollar industry. The global space-related economy expanded to nearly $470 billion in 2021, with the commercial space domain growing more than 6 percent since 2020 and the world witnessing more than 1,000 new spacecraft in orbit during the first half of 2022 alone. This growth has implications for international business, international security, and the environment. The space ecosystem is gravitating to the Asia-Pacific as several regional countries make breakthroughs in the space domain.

Australia is enlarging the space ecosystem in South Australia, and Japan is operationalizing commercial transactions of space resources. Notably, both countries coordinate with U.S.-led initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy. In addition, another U.S. ally, South Korea, continues to make headway in the space race as Seoul develops its capabilities. Last year, in a first, South Korea demonstrated success with a homegrown rocket deploying multiple satellites into orbit.

Also, in the region, India is instituting a new space policy to enable activities by non-government entities in the space sector. India is hosting an exciting space technology start-up drive, expecting an investment of over $300 million in 2023.

Don’t Forget About Water in 2023

Antonia Colibasanu

On Jan. 16, the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources announced that Beijing invested more than 1 trillion yuan ($148 billion) on water resource management in 2022, a whopping 44 percent increase from the previous year. Elsewhere, Pakistan suggested that water resource management projects need to become a priority for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor because by 2025 Pakistan is expected to be a water-scarce country. Weeks earlier, an Iranian official confirmed that 270 cities and towns were suffering from acute water shortage as water levels at dams dropped to critically low levels.

Factories in southwest China had to suspend their work last summer after a record-breaking drought caused some rivers in the country – including parts of the Yangtze – to dry up. Hydropower and shipping were also affected; Sichuan province was deemed to be in a “grave situation” because it generates more than 80 percent of its energy from hydropower.

Pakistan is in a similar situation. The Indus River is a source of more than 17 gigawatts of hydropower, and it provides water to the Indus basin irrigation system, which supports more than 90 percent of the country’s agricultural output. Poor water management, rapid population growth, and drought and floods have created a truly dire situation.

In Iran, a semi-arid climate and declining precipitation over the past decade have played their part in the crisis, but perennial inefficient water management since the 1990s is perhaps the larger problem. After the 1979 revolution, the new regime advanced a policy of national food self-sufficiency, which involved producing enough staple crops to meet the country’s own needs instead of relying on imports. To that end, agricultural production became reliant on groundwater extraction, and slow-filling aquifers have not been able to keep up with the growing number of water users and withdrawals.

These issues may not be new, but they are all getting worse. And the fact that these three countries are geographically interconnected has been a wake-up call for other nations around the world that have dealt with, or are soon to deal with, similar water shortages and their associated consequences.

U.S.-China Rapprochement Will Not Come Quickly

Paul Heer

Secretary of State Antony Blinken will visit China in early February for a trip that was agreed upon during President Joe Biden’s meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia, on November 14. Blinken’s visit ostensibly aims to follow up on the understandings reportedly reached in Bali, especially the agreement—as characterized by the official White House readout of the summit—to “maintain communication and deepen constructive efforts” on a range of bilateral and global issues. The two leaders pledged to pursue such efforts through a “joint working group” and also “discussed the importance of developing principles that would advance these goals” and allow Washington and Beijing to “manage the [US-China] competition responsibly.” According to the Chinese readout of the Bali meeting, the two sides would “take concrete actions to put U.S.-China relations back on the track of steady development.”

In the two months since Bali, however, there has been little evidence of “concrete actions” or “constructive efforts” in that direction, involving either a joint working group or progress in the development of principles to guide the bilateral relationship. Yes, there have been additional high-level bilateral meetings: Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart in Cambodia shortly after the Bali summit; Assistant Secretary of State Dan Kritenbrink and White House Senior China Director Laura Rosenberger traveled to Beijing in December to discuss Blinken’s upcoming visit; and Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen met Chinese vice premier Liu He in Zurich on January 18. But it remains unclear what if any substantive progress was made in those meetings: the U.S. readouts suggest that they largely consisted of exchanges of predictable talking points, and that American officials largely reiterated the need to “responsibly manage competition” and “maintain open lines of communication”—a minimalist phrase that has become Washington’s standard characterization of the current purpose of U.S.-China engagement.

No ‘pivot’ needed: The US can secure Europe and Asia at the same time

Andrew Michta

First floated more than a decade ago by then President Barack Obama, the “pivot to Asia” signaled the arrival of a new era of US confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Until the war in Ukraine, the need for a pivot away from a supposedly ungrateful Europe and toward fast-growing Asia was increasingly becoming orthodoxy within the US foreign-policy establishment—from “realist” and “liberal internationalist” scholars in academia to think tanks to talk-show hosts. China has been prominently featured in the Biden administration’s recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, though with the recognition of the revisionist nature of Russia’s power.

Today the war now raging in Eastern Europe has shown that the “pivot” approach was misguided. It’s not in the United States’ interest to turn away from Europe as it asserts itself in Asia—and the country is rich and powerful enough to secure its interests in both theaters.

The “pivot to Asia” school misreads how global power is distributed and takes for granted the United States’ continued economic decline and societal fracturing. These adherents assert that we are now in a multipolar world driving toward a Chinese empire by century’s end, with the United States a declining power and Russia a somewhat distant third great power—allowed in the club on account of its nuclear weapons, territorial bulk, and natural resources. Such analyses rely predominantly on comparisons of gross domestic product (GDP), population figures, and military size and professed capabilities.

But theorizing about multipolarity must be checked against realities on the ground. We are currently watching Russia near the one-year mark of a war against a country that—according to virtually all analysts and policy theorists—it should have overrun in a matter of weeks. In Ukraine, we are seeing once again that wars between states are not just about sheer numbers, whether GDP or populations or budgetary dollars and cents. The United States would do well to factor this lesson into its own grand strategic calculus going forward, especially on the Chinese challenge in Asia.

How powerful is China, really?

China’s Economic Growth In 2022 And Future Prospects – Analysis

He Jun

According to the preliminary estimations published by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the country’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022 was RMB 121020.7 billion. Calculated at constant prices, there is an increase of 3.0% over the previous year. In terms of industries, the added value of the primary industry was RMB 8,834.5 billion, an increase of 4.1% over the previous year. The added value of the secondary industry was RMB 4,8316.4 billion, an increase of 3.8% For the tertiary industry, it was RMB 63,869.8 billion, an increase of 2.3%. In terms of quarters, the GDP grew by 4.8% year-on-year in the first quarter, 0.4% in the second, 3.9% in the third quarter, and 2.9% in the fourth.

In 2022, China’s economic growth rate was only 3%, much lower than the 5.5% economic growth target set in March last year. While the result was not surprising, last year’s economic growth rate was the lowest in decades. In the history of economic development of the country, this is the second-lowest economic growth rate in the past 47 years. In 1976, after the Tangshan earthquake, the Chinese economy experienced negative growth (-1.6%) that year. In 1989, the West imposed severe sanctions on China. In 1989 and 1990, China’s economic growth slowed down to 4.1% and 3.8%. Afterward, during the time of the Asian financial crisis that coincided with the Kosovo War, China’s economy maintained a growth rate of more than 7%. Even after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 and during the time of global financial turmoil, China’s economy still maintained a high growth rate of more than 9%. In the past three years (2020-2022) when the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the world, China’s economy has been hit hard. In 2020, due to the outbreak of the pandemic, the economic growth rate dropped to 2.3%, rising to 8.1% in 2021, but in 2022 it slowed down sharply again to 3%. Data shows that, since 1976 and the entire period of China’s reform and opening up, the two lowest economic growth rates have occurred within the past three years.

After the Kabul Hotel Attack: The Taliban and China Confront Security Challenges in Afghanistan

Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai

On December 12, members of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacked a local hotel in Kabul, where several Chinese nationals were staying. The attack injured five Chinese nationals along with 18 other victims, while the three attackers were killed by security forces (China Daily, December 14, 2022). It was reported that Chinese businesspeople run the hotel, which is frequently visited by Chinese diplomats and business people (Global Times, December 13, 2022). In response, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated: “China is deeply shocked at the attack, which is highly egregious, and firmly opposes terrorism in any form” (China Daily, December 14, 2022).

The ISKP strike in Kabul will further reinforce Beijing’s commitment to giving special attention to the security and stability of Afghanistan. An unstable and volatile Afghanistan threatens Chinese interests and could be a hurdle to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, Chinese sources have expressed concern that uncertainty and unrest could lead to Afghanistan becoming a hotbed for terrorists “targeting China’s Xinjiang and its interests overseas, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, where enhanced communication and coordination between China and Pakistan is required to tackle potential threats” (Global Times, August 19, 2021). In response to these challenges, China has sought to provide the Taliban with enough support to combat all forms of terrorism and extremism in Afghanistan.

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fall of Kabul, ISIS has emerged as one of the main threats to the Taliban government, ethnic minorities, especially the Hazara community and foreign nationals, including Chinese nationals and business interests (China Brief, October 4, 2022). After the withdrawal, the U.S. offered the Taliban assistance in combating ISIS, but the group declined, stating that they could handle the issue. However, the ISIS threat does not seem to be under control in Afghanistan and has now become a headache for the Taliban.

Drivers of China-Taliban Engagement

At a Dead End? China’s Drive to Reform Defense Science and Technology Institutes Stalls

Arthur Ding, K. Tristan Tang

Since becoming China’s top leader ten years ago, General Secretary Xi Jinping has sought to sustain a three-decade effort to reform the defense industry in order to advance the development of defense technology and improve the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities. Recent reforms have focused on transforming defense science and technology (S&T) institutes into enterprise-like entities, but due to political and economic impediments, progress has been slow. This article examines the rationale for defense industry reform, assesses progress in implementation and explains difficulties encountered in the reform process.

Rationale

Since 1949, China has built a large-scale defense industry system with some unique characteristics. [1] The key attributes of this system include complete autarky in each defense industrial sector, from spare parts to assembled systems; total reliance on state support, which contributes to a lack of efficiency and autonomy; and a focus on mission-oriented military research without civil-military integration. Defense S&T institutes, the focus of this round of reform, have been a part of the defense industry system and share these features.

Reforms seek to address key deficiencies in defense S&T institutes, many of which stem from their designation as “public institutions” (PI) (事业单位). In China, PIs are wholly owned and financially supported by the Chinese state with their funding included in the government budget. The assets of defense S&T institutes fall under the Ministry of Finance with-day-to-day oversight managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) (SASTIND, March 9, 2016). Consequently, these state-managed institutes have suffered from all kinds of bureaucratic restrictions, which has contributed to a lack of efficiency and autonomy. For example, decisions over eight million RMB (about $1.14 million) require approval from related government departments (People’s Daily, March 14, 2017). For years, these factors have combined to limit China’s capacity for defense technology innovation.

China population: economic model must shift from ‘Made in China’ to ‘Designed in China’, say experts

Luna Sun

China reports first population decline in 6 decades, with birth rate at record low in 2022

China’s declining population will not necessarily lead to an economic slump, though more must be done to respond to the country’s falling birth rates and take advantage of the changing demographic structure, experts say.

Government data released on Tuesday confirmed that China’s population dropped by 850,000 people to 1.4118 billion in 2022, down from 1.4126 billion a year earlier.

Though the figures were not unexpected, official acknowledgement immediately renewed debate about the economic implications and how policymakers should best respond.

“The long-term low fertility rate will inevitably lead to population decline, the trend cannot be reversed, and judging from the practices of countries and regions with low fertility rates, various pronatalist policies are not very effective,” said Chen Wei, a professor with the Population Development Studies Centre at Renmin University.

However, European countries that have undergone natural population declines for decades have not seen their economies shrink, he added.

China’s birth rate fell to a record low of 6.77 per 1,000 people last year, with the total number of newborns falling to 9.56 million – the nation’s lowest total in modern history and the first time the figure has dipped below 10 million.

India is projected to overtake China as the world’s most populous country this year, according to the United Nations, which expects the mainland population to drop to 1.313 billion by 2050 and below 800 million by 2100.

Chinese researchers are making claims that, if true, would threaten national security

JENNA MCLAUGHLIN

Chinese researchers are claiming they can break modern encryption with today's quantum computers. Experts are skeptical, but the possibility remains a top U.S. national security concern.

AILSA CHANG, HOST:

The threat of hackers piercing through the digital protections that guard state secrets - that's the sort of thing that keeps national security experts up at night. So it was news when Chinese researchers recently claimed that they could break a common encryption algorithm with an emerging technology called quantum computing. But some encryption experts are skeptical.

NPR's Jenna McLaughlin is here to explain. Hey, Jenna.

JENNA MCLAUGHLIN, BYLINE: Hey, Ailsa.

CHANG: So what exactly are these Chinese researchers claiming?

MCLAUGHLIN: So there's a brand-new paper that came out on an academic site called arXiv. The authors say that they found a method where today's very basic quantum computers could already break a very common form of modern encryption. It's honestly a really complicated paper, but the experts explained it to me like this - the authors used what's called a heuristic algorithm to try to break encryption. That's basically a formula that's designed to solve a problem really fast by starting with an estimate and using the result to get closer to the answer.

CHANG: OK.

Regional defense partnerships rise with China’s power

By Andrew Salmon

SEOUL — The U.S. and its allies in the long shadow of rising China are forging a complex web of defense relationships, bilateral and multilateral, linking democracies across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

This week, Indian and Japanese warplanes kicked off 11 days of joint drills over Japan featuring Japan’s U.S.-made F15s and India’s Russian-built SU30s. In another first, Australian and British paratroopers this month jumped alongside American and Japanese counterparts in the first exercise to unite airborne troops of all four nations in the skies above Japan.

On Jan. 11, Tokyo and London signed a “reciprocal access agreement” enabling an exchange of forces and equipment. It was based on an agreement that Australia and Japan signed a year ago.

Turnaround Bundeswehr: What Money Cannot Buy

Imke Magdalena Kügele studied law in Bonn, Rotterdam and Konstanz. She has worked as a civil servant for the Bundeswehr since 2009. From August 2021 till August 2022, Imke Kügele was a visiting scholar at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey (CA) at the department of National Security Affairs. She is also chairperson of the board of BundeswehrGrün, which is an association that aims to foster civil military interaction between the Bundeswehr and civil society.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the Bundeswehr, the Federal Ministry of Defence, or the Federal Government of Germany.

The war in Ukraine has shifted the focus of politics in every European state. In the case of Germany, this shift was almost a complete turnaround, or as Chancellor Olaf Scholz said in his historic speech on February 27, “eine Zeitenwende”. Chancellor Scholz explained in his speech that this was the time to show, “whether power is allowed to prevail over the law. Whether we permit Putin to turn back the clock to the nineteenth century and the age of the great powers. Or, whether we have it in us to keep warmongers like Putin in check.” The Chancellor described the consequences he would draw from that question. He acknowledged the necessity to increase the national budget for the German armed forces. He also confirmed a clear commitment to NATO criteria for the future. The corresponding bill to establish the increased funding for defence was adopted by the German Parliament on June 3rd, 2022.

But money alone will not make the German armed forces better.

This article will point out that the increased funding must be accompanied by an improvement of civil-military interaction between military leadership and political decision makers. In addition, the understanding of each soldier as an active player in civil-military relations on the level of society must be reinforced.

The Lingering Fog of War and Lessons From Vietnam

MARK MOYAR

With Americans across the political spectrum increasingly skeptical of massive aid to Ukraine while domestic woes mount, staunch Ukraine supporters in Washington must explain more convincingly why Ukraine deserves continued financial support from America. The Ukrainians have fought with admirable courage and skill, and Ukraine’s democracy bests Russia’s autocracy in both moral and practical terms. And yet, critical questions remain. With a population more than three times the size of Ukraine’s, can Russia ultimately prevail through bloody attrition? How much aid will other countries contribute to the combatants in the next year? What plausible conditions will convince both sides to agree to peace?

The Biden White House and its supporters in Congress and the media have offered fresh assurances about favorable prospects. Biden recently asserted, for instance, that Ukraine is now strong enough to retake Crimea. Western press reports depict a Russian military depleted and in disarray. Yet reports of Ukrainian casualties on par with Russian casualties give reason to question such sunny forecasts. The Russians are showing signs of rectifying initial incompetence, something they did in their remarkable victory over the Wehrmacht in World War II.

History constantly reminds us that our knowledge of today’s wars is incomplete at best, and misleading at worst. Our enemies as well as our allies strive to conceal their intentions, strengths, and vulnerabilities. When we look back 50 years from now, we surely will find that administration officials, intelligence analysts, pundits, and journalists got a lot wrong about Russia and Ukraine. That reality doesn’t necessarily recommend either more or less aid, but it does demand exceptional vigilance and preparation for the unexpected.

Post-Putin Possibilities

CARL BILDT

Now that Russia has been so greatly damaged and diminished by President Vladimir Putin’s reckless war of choice in Ukraine, what might the country’s future hold? Plausible scenarios range from a power grab by a hardline security adviser like Nikolai Patrushev to an election victory by a dissident like Alexei Navalny. But one thing is almost certain: Putin’s regime will not survive the war he started.

After all, Putin’s so-called power vertical may span many economic and political domains, but it is fully dependent on tight control from the top. The entire structure will invariably start to fracture as that control is weakened, and as different groups and interests start maneuvering to scoop up the spoils from the inevitable collapse. The system’s main strength – all-powerful top-down control – thus will become its fatal weakness.

This new “time of troubles” – a recurring theme in Russian history – will follow immediately from Putin’s departure. But which political forces will assert themselves as he falls remains to be seen. My guess is that the impetus to continue Putin’s Ukraine misadventure will be quite limited. Putin started the war himself, and we know that even his top security officials were never enthusiastic about it. That was obvious as early as the famous televised Kremlin security-council meeting on February 21, 2022.

Even after a year of relentless repression and propaganda, Russian public support for Putin’s war is lukewarm, at best, with opinion polls showing that a majority favors peace talks. Any leader or faction that emerges after Putin will have to make it a priority to end the war rapidly.

Palantir CEO to those who don't support U.S. military work: 'Don't work here'

Billy Mitchell

Palantir CEO Alex Karp reaffirmed his commitment to supporting the values of the West via his company’s algorithmic intelligence software on Wednesday, telling any current or prospective employees who don’t support that mission: “Don’t work here.”

Asked by David Rubenstein, co-chairman of private equity firm the Carlyle Group, during an interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, about the tension many major tech companies face from “left-leaning” employees when working with the U.S. military and others, Karp stood firmly by Palantir’s mission to support the West from adversaries, whether that’s terrorist cells or developed nations like Russia and China who threaten democracy.

“We are not everyone’s cup of tea. We may not be your cup of tea,” Karp said. “To make society work, there are basic functions that have to work, one of which is the reduction of terrorism, pushing back on, in my view, human rights abuses largely done by adversaries to the West. You may not agree with that, and bless you. Don’t work here.”

Many large American tech companies, like Microsoft, Google and others, have faced public backlash from employees for their willingness to use tech to support the Department of Defense’s use of lethal force. Palantir, on the other hand, has been bullish about expanding its work with the DOD, vying to compete with behemoth traditional prime contractors like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing and others.

Karp claims that his company’s algorithmic intelligence software powers the clandestine operations of most Western nations — “whether they tell you that or not,” he said — including the U.S. Department of Defense, which he credits in a large way for giving Palantir its start through a small In-Q-Tel contract.

“Interestingly, it was that part of the DOD that got us off the ground because they were struggling with finding out where terrorists were putting improvised explosives, and we figured that out in our product,” Karp said.

Great in Theory: Does the U.S. Need a New Strategic Paradigm?

Joe McGiffin

To cite this article:McGiffin, Joe, “Great in Theory: Does the U.S. Need a New Strategic Paradigm?”, Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 8, Issue 3, winter 2022, pages 10-15.

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Department of Defense.

Military theory is a critical and oft-neglected piece of any state’s national security strategy, and the United States is no exception. It is conceptual and abstract, making it all but anathema to the comfort and safety of quantifiable information and empirical methodologies that pair so effectively with the increasing might of technology and computational power. However, the absence of a theoretical framework for any state’s strategic process is always evident in hindsight of a security problem gone poorly. From Bernard Brodie’s iconic lamentation: “Soldiers usually are close students of tactics, but rarely are they students of strategy and practically never of war;” to Colin Gray’s amusement at the persisting “buzzword” culture of the U.S. security sector, the world’s greatest strategic scholars have consistently observed that there is something missing from U.S. security policy and scholarship which manifests in a consistent failure to develop effective strategy.[i]

One key but neglected analytical tool in crafting cohesive strategy is epistemology: “the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope. Epistemology is the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from fiction.”[ii] Without a common theoretical system, a strategy’s validity conflates with its popularity, promoting a climate of catchy phrases and trendy ideas. There is no framework from which to gauge the merits and drawbacks of any given course of action until after it has most likely failed in execution.

This research inductively identifies the current U.S. strategic framework, assesses its effectiveness, and proposes a more effective paradigm for future use. Ultimately, this paper finds that the U.S. relies on a flawed understanding of Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) theory and suggests that identifying objectives based on environmental trends should dictate technological development efforts rather than trying to anticipate the next generation of evolution for existing defense platforms. This paper first provides the historiography of RMA theory and then presents two case studies which portray how it has influenced U.S. strategic history. Subsequently, the paper introduces a trend-based paradigm which would make better use of its resources.

Battling Biological Threats: Complacency, Progress, or Both?

Thomas Cullison and J. Stephen Morrison

As 2023 opens, there are reasons to be hopeful that the United States can bridge its political divides and keep its eye on what is most important to protect Americans against future biological threats—building a bipartisan consensus, driving forward a new national policy doctrine on health security, strengthening U.S. capabilities, and achieving measurable, sustained progress. Realism, of course, is still very much in order. The environment remains very challenging. And stark new challenges continue to emerge, such as recent action by Congress to rescind the Covid-19 vaccine mandate for U.S. servicemen and women. Yet there is reason to be cautiously optimistic.

The coronavirus pandemic has passed its three-year mark at a murky, hazardous, and yet still promising moment. The United States, like many other countries acutely impacted by Covid-19, is yearning to achieve a normalization while continuing to face serious disease and mortality at home. Outside U.S. borders, the runaway outbreak in China, following the end of zero-Covid policies there in early December, reminds us of the fearsome damage the virus can wreak and the continued risk of dangerous new subvariants in 2023 that could rapidly pose serious global consequences. In the meantime, many low- and middle-income countries achieved woeful vaccine coverage, continue to struggle with vaccine uptake, and remain ill-equipped for current and future threats.

Though 1.1 million Americans have died from Covid-19 and 300–400 still perish each day, pressures persist within the United States to move beyond this tragedy, amid a legacy of acute polarization and division that surrounds many, if not most, pandemic interventions, and which has eroded public trust and confidence in science and public health authorities. Throughout 2022, U.S. policymakers have repeatedly faced tough financial and political impasses in securing new substantial funding to continue to support a robust Covid-19 response and to build the capacities essential to future pandemic preparedness.

The Problem With Primacy

By Van Jackson

In its policies toward Asia, the United States has long sought to reconcile its unsurpassed military, economic, and rule-setting prowess with a desire for stability. Until recently, this was not hard to accomplish. Washington’s international dominance coincided with the post-1979 “Asian peace”—a period of remarkable stability in East Asia and the Pacific—and so the United States had little trouble holding sway over the region without provoking any conflicts. Over time, Washington even came to believe that U.S. supremacy and regional tranquility could not just coexist but were causally related. As a result, U.S. policymakers made

Wartime Putinism What the Disaster in Ukraine Has Done to the Kremlin—and to Russia

By Michael Kimmage and Maria Lipman

Winning a long war requires a mobilization of troops and supplies that can outlast the other side. Positive objectives and clearly defined goals are the path to victory. After the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt was able to mobilize American society around the imperative of Japan’s unconditional surrender. After a shocking attack on U.S. soil, Americans rallied around the objectives of defeating Japan, avenging the assault on Pearl Harbor, and eliminating the threat posed by imperial Japan. Those goals would have been sufficient to sustain the U.S. war effort, but Americans

Why it's time for the dawn of stakeholder geopolitics

Børge Brende

Over the last few years, the world has experienced a gradual slide from cooperation to competition to conflict. The post–Cold War international order has been replaced, first by a period of intensifying global rivalry and then by war in Europe. In this new and unsettled era, world leaders must adapt their understanding and practice of geopolitics because time is running out to address critical global challenges.

In a year that began with conflict and warning signs of geoeconomic fragmentation, it was remarkable that November 2022 delivered a restoration of US-Chinese climate dialogue, a reaffirmation by the G20 of the need for economic cooperation, and an agreement at the UN Climate Conference in Egypt that provided historic “loss and damage” climate adaptation funding for vulnerable countries.

But such welcome news should not be taken as a sign that a retreat from geopolitical rivalry is underway or that a cooperative order can be fully restored. World powers still hold starkly different visions of what should guide global politics and are vying to shape the new world order accordingly. For this reason, current efforts at cooperation could prove fleeting, giving way to new rounds of conflict. In such a turbulent geopolitical climate, the question becomes: what can a framework for durable cooperation look like?

This question has gained even greater urgency against the backdrop of an ongoing pandemic, a potential global recession, heightened nuclear proliferation risks, and a “now or never” moment for addressing climate change. These challenges are cascading and creating what some analysts refer to as a global “polycrisis” – a situation in which multiple crises compound one another. Because the drivers of these crises are not confined to any one nation, addressing them requires leaders to come together to forge solutions despite the reality of broader geopolitical disagreement.

‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. and Taiwan Trapped

By Raymond Kuo

As the United States settled into the winter holiday season, China dispatched 71 aircraft for military maneuvers around Taiwan, its largest single incursion ever. The incident came on top of hundreds of flights over the past 18 months as well as military exercises and missile launches near the main island in the wake of then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August last year. Alongside warnings of further military reprisals, Beijing has also increased its nuclear warhead stockpile, deployed a hypersonic glide vehicle, launched a third aircraft carrier, and further modernized its military.

Meanwhile, the United States continues to debate how best to maintain the status quo in the region, support the self-ruled island, and deter a Chinese attack. Washington’s current policy is one of “strategic ambiguity”—based on the theory that it’s best to keep all parties guessing whether, and to what extent, the U.S. military will intervene in a war across the Taiwan Strait. Is that still the appropriate strategy to deter Beijing? Or should Washington publicly commit to Taiwan’s defense, as former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged on Jan. 5?

Strategic ambiguity typically is understood as deliberately creating uncertainty in Beijing and Taipei about whether the United States would intervene in a war. This supposedly creates dual deterrence: The threat of U.S. intervention prevents China from invading, and the fear of U.S. abandonment prevents Taiwan from sparking a war by declaring independence, which China considers a casus belli. This approach, supporters contend, has kept peace for decades and prevented entrapment, whereby the United States unwillingly gets pulled int

U.S. prepping major military package for Ukraine

LARA SELIGMAN and PAUL MCLEARY

The U.S. is gearing up to announce a major new weapons package for Ukraine on Friday, as top military leaders from around the world gather in Germany to discuss how to help Kyiv in its fight against Russia, according to three U.S. officials and another person familiar with the discussions.

While the next tranche will include additional artillery, ammunition and armor — likely Stryker armored combat vehicles — the U.S. is not expected to sign off on American M1 Abrams tanks, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the talks ahead of an announcement.

The Biden administration currently has no plans to send the Abrams, the Army’s 60-ton main battle tank, the people said.

The reluctance is due to the logistical and maintenance challenges of the tanks, and not over concern that their transfer could escalate the conflict, one of the U.S. officials said. This person noted that the U.S. has helped Ukraine obtain Soviet-era tanks and supports the British decision to send around a dozen of its Challenger 2 tanks.

The package will likely include a number of Strykers, an eight-wheeled armored fighting vehicle built by General Dynamics Land Systems, as well as ground-launched Small Diameter Bombs, which have a range of roughly 100 miles, two of the people said. POLITICO first reported last week that the Pentagon was considering sending Strykers in the upcoming tranche of aid. Reuters first reported that Boeing-made Small Diameter Bombs were under discussion.

From Fake News to Fake Views: New Challenges Posed by ChatGPT-Like AI

By Nikolas Guggenberger, Peter N. Salib

Just over a month ago, OpenAI released ChatGPT, a text-producing artificial intelligence (AI) application. ChatGPT is impressive. It can draft unique, plausible, college-level essays on topics ranging from economics to philosophy—in iambic pentameter if asked. At least without specialized tools, the AI’s writing is indistinguishable from that of a reasonably articulate, competent human, and it can produce such content across various domains.

ChatGPT is obviously a powerful new tool that has the potential to do much good in many sectors. But there will also be downsides. Among them, AIs like ChatGPT will be able to produce a limitless and practically free supply of “opinions” on anything. These fake opinions will supercharge online influence campaigns and erode another pillar of trust in liberal discourse: the very idea that our counterparts online are real people.

In 2015, the small-d democratic problem with online speech was disinformation and misinformation. Fabricated news stories claiming that, for example, Hillary Clinton helped to run a child trafficking ring out of a Washington, D.C., pizza shop spread like wildfire. These and countless following lies fed directly into a political movement that culminated in the Jan. 6, 2021, insurrection attempt. No doubt, addressing deliberate disinformation is a difficult problem—especially when these lies come from the highest-ranking political officials in the country. Combating disinformation raises constitutional questions, and responses necessarily contain difficult trade-offs around free speech. Yet traditional media has updated its approach to covering disinformation, and social media has become more successful in identifying, labeling, and suppressing false information. Twitter’s recent, more lenient, approach to misinformation and particularly right-wing propaganda does not reverse the general trend. Sprawling research into disinformation and misinformation after the 2016 U.S. presidential election has contributed to a better understanding of howinformation consumption habits are changing, and digital media literacy is making its way into classrooms. Some studies show that younger people fare better at distinguishing facts from fiction. Altogether, the developments over the past years give some reason for hope.

‘No Big Bang’: Cyber successes in Ukraine are no cause for complacency in US

SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.

WASHINGTON — In cyberspace, as on the ground, Ukraine has done a remarkable job fending off Russian attacks. That’s not because Russian cyber warfare is weak, warned officials and experts at a National Security Institute event here on Thursday. It’s because, after the shocking losses of Crimea and Eastern Donbas in 2014, Ukraine got serious about the threat and — with extensive US and European help — spent eight years preparing for an all-out Russian attack.

But has the US taken its own defenses as seriously? Has it prepared as well for an attack on critical public and private networks as Ukraine did before 2022? According to NSI founder Prof. Jamil Jaffer, no.

“Have we operationalized it [cyber defense] effectively, for real?” Jaffer told Breaking Defense during a sidebar interview after the public panel, which featured experts from the NSA, Homeland Security, State Department, and Google. “Of course not — and while we’ve made significant progress, without a crash effort and real commitment from both government and industry, we’re probably years away from that, maybe a decade away.”

“On the cyber front, I think the lesson to be learned is that we’ve actually done pretty decently in Ukraine, where we helped build resilience ahead of time,” he said. “And if we’d done that years earlier, we would have been even better — as is the case if we do so here at home.”

It’s crucial to realize that the Russian cyber attacks haven’t failed for lack of trying, but because of the strength of the Ukrainian defense backed by almost a decade of Western assistance.

Pentagon Says "Software" May Decide Who Wins The Next War

Kris Osborn, President

(Washington D.C.) The future of stealth fighter jets, robotic attack vehicles, missile guidance systems, tank target acquisition and even ICBM performance are merely a few of the many things largely reliant upon continuous software modernization.

Recognizing this, and the ever-increasing pace of technological change, the Pentagon is making a specific and decided push to reshape the way it acquires, modernizes, integrates and operates software. Much of the strategy aligns with the Pentagon’s longstanding effort to ensure technological upgrades of key weapons systems keep pace with the changing threat landscape and rapid technological advancement.

Keeping pace with software modernization, senior Army leaders explain, requires rapid, continuous modifications in alignment with the pace of change on an ongoing basis without having fixed “increments” or software drops spread out by years in between. The Under Secretary of the Army, Gabe Camarillo, described this as “agile software development.”

“We are now conducting several pilots across the software requirements development and testing communities to establish a process that streamline the requirements definition base, implementing early testing of incremental deliveries and maximizing automation as much as possible,” Camarillo told reporters recently when talking about the service’s fast-evolving combat network.

Camarillo cited the Army’s fast-evolving Robotic Combat Vehicle program as evidence of how “agile” software acquisition and development can quickly improve key performance parameters. Rapid integration of new software, for example, can improve the sensing, targeting and surveillance capacity of armed robots in need of quickly confirming or identifying threat information. Camarillo’s reference to “automation” also seems quite significant, as advances in computing and autonomy can, for instance, speed up and improve the pace and accuracy with which a robotic vehicle can acquire and then “verify” emerging targets.

How spies, soldiers and the public should use open-source intelligence

When into the valley of Death rode the six hundred, William Howard Russell’s account of the charge of the Light Brigade, a failed British attack on Russian cannons in the Crimean war in 1854, took about three weeks to appear in the Times. Last November, after Ukrainian soldiers entered Kherson and pushed Russian forces over the Dnieper, hours, if not minutes, elapsed before images were shared with the entire world on social media and messaging apps.

7 chief digital officers on how they are navigating an unstable world

Manju George

Digital transformation can help organizations and companies safely navigate a changing world.

Technology can be a stabilizing factor in a changing world, enhancing business resiliency.

Chief digital officers should scale use of data and artificial intelligence, while investing on emerging technologies, such as quantum computing.

The roadmap to meeting the 2030 SDGs rests on competitive and responsible development of technology by business.

Against a backdrop of global shocks, fragmented systems and an uncertain business environment, we asked chief digital officers from diverse industries about their priorities for technology leadership in 2023. They highlighted the need to double down on digital innovation that creates meaningful and responsible outcomes for people and the planet.

How can digital technologies help deliver the climate goals?

To enhance consumer experience, business resilience and competitiveness, leaders must continue to scale the use of technologies of today, such as data, cloud and artificial intelligence, while also investing in frontier technologies such as metaverse, quantum computing and synthetic biology to open up a new era of discovery.

'Innovate with cloud, AI and metaverse'

Paul Daugherty, Accenture

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