Fabian Hinz
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The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is continuing to develop advanced space-launch vehicles (SLVs), most recently launching its third satellite in September 2023. The programme is officially aimed at developing a space-launch capability. The technologies used, however, have sparked concern that the programme serves as a hedging effort allowing the IRGC to develop long-range ballistic-missile technology while nominally adhering to its self-imposed 2,000 km range limit.
Space-launch vehicles
The IRGC’s Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization began pursuing solid-propellant SLVs in the 2000s. Under the leadership of Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, the founder of Iran’s missile force, the programme ran parallel to Iran’s main space initiative, with the goal of developing a heavy launch vehicle capable of deploying payloads into geostationary orbit. While significant progress was achieved, a still not fully explained explosion in 2011 resulted in the death of Moghaddam and the destruction of a major research and development facility. This incident set back the programme considerably.
The programme’s Shahroud site remained active, however, and the corps revealed in 2020 that it had resumed the development of solid-propellant SLVs. Statements by IRGC officials indicate that the current programme is pursuing the same goals as the programme before 2011, albeit using newer and more advanced technology and while pursuing a more gradual development approach.
Since the unveiling of the second incarnation of its SLV development programme in 2020, the corps has introduced two new, advanced solid-propellant rocket motors: the smaller Salman and the 68-tonne thrust Raafe. Both motors use lightweight carbon casing and movable nozzles for thrust vector control.
By combining the Salman with a smaller upper-stage motor and a Ghadr liquid-propellant missile used as a first stage, the corps created the lightweight Ghased launcher. It has since been used for successful launches of remote sensing 6U CubeSats named Nour 1 in 2020, Nour 2 in 2022, and Nour 3 in 2023. All three appear to have been used by the corps for reconnaissance purposes. The Ghased was initially positioned as an interim development on the path towards all-solid SLVs, but the IRGC now asserts it will start serial Ghased production and offer it for launching small satellites from various Iranian government entities, universities and even neighbouring countries.
As a next step, the corps paired a small upper stage with the Salman and the Raafe to create the Ghaem 100 solid-propellant SLV. The IRGC launched it twice, once in a suborbital test flight in 2022 and again in what seemed to be a failed satellite launch in 2023 (retroactively declared a suborbital test launch).
While the SLV programme before 2011 proceeded with high secrecy, Iranian officials have openly discussed the programme’s current status and its future trajectory. Iran plans to follow up the Ghaem 100 with the Ghaem 105, the Ghaem 110 and the Ghaem 120. Like the Ghaem 100, the Ghaem 105 will use a Rafee motor as its first stage but will be equipped with a more powerful second stage. Further developments will involve adding larger motors, with IRGC Space Commander Ali Jafarabadi having already announced that the country is setting its eyes on a new large-diameter first-stage motor comparable to a design tested before 2011.
The programme’s ultimate development goal is the creation of a four-stage Ghaem 120, intended for launching payloads into geospatial orbits, an objective that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei elevated to a strategic goal in 2020. While the IRGC has mentioned various Ghaem configurations it plans to develop, it also has made clear that its SLV-development programme is less focused on the development of single platforms and more on creating a set of reliable solid motors that can be flexibly arranged and stacked according to mission requirements.
Dual purpose
The significant overlap between the technologies employed in the SLV programme and those required for the development of longer-range ballistic missiles remains a concern for Western nations. Although SLVs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) share general technological similarities, they are usually optimised for their respective mission profiles. It is therefore noteworthy that Iran appears to have forgone some design optimisations typically associated with SLVs. For instance, while most SLVs are launched from static launchpads, the IRGC has used what it terms ‘tactical launchers’ — mobile launchers similar to those used by Iranian ballistic missiles. Additionally, the use of solid propellant, which offers higher military utility than many of the liquid propellants typically used in SLV programmes, is notable in this context.
These technical features become even more significant when paired with remarks made about the programme by IRGC officials and people associated with them. After Moghaddam’s death, his brother stated that the founder of the missile force had been working on an ICBM. More recently, senior IRGC Aerospace Force advisor Ali Balali referred to the Ghaem as an ICBM before correcting himself and calling it an SLV.
Should Iran decide to convert a future heavy solid-propellant SLV into an ICBM, it would require the development of several additional technologies, most notably a heatshield capable of surviving re-entry into the atmosphere. This particular technology, however, has historically proven to be a manageable challenge for countries developing ICBMs.
While the technological overlap between the IRGC space programme and long-range missile technology is of prime concern to Western nations, its official goal of developing a domestic launch capability should not be entirely discarded. Such a capability would enable Iran to acquire more-capable satellites for military communication and remote sensing, which could serve as force multipliers for the country’s already advanced asymmetric warfighting capabilities.
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