The Climate Envoys Who Could

Lili Pike

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Early last month, John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua, the special climate envoys representing the United States and China, held talks in southern California ahead of the Xi-Biden summit. The location—Sunnylands, a desert estate near Palm Springs—was symbolic. It was there that Xi Jinping and Barack Obama first met as presidents in 2013 and secured a climate breakthrough: a commitment to phase out hydrofluorocarbons, a group of powerful greenhouse gases used in refrigerators and air conditioners.

As Kerry and Xie arrived in Sunnylands 10 years later, they found themselves in more perilous circumstances, and with a finite window of opportunity. Friction between the U.S. and China disrupted climate talks in 2022, and new tensions—whether from the South China Sea or Taiwan’s upcoming January election—could slam the window shut again. Plus, Xie, China’s lead climate negotiator for the better part of two decades, will reportedly retire later this month.

The two envoys wasted no time during their summit, according to two climate experts familiar with the discussions. Kerry, who is 79, and Xie, who is 74 and recently recovered from a stroke, stayed up until 2 or 3 a.m. every night, hashing out plans. When the meetings reached their scheduled end, Kerry and his team drove west to Los Angeles with Xie, checking in to the Chinese team’s hotel to continue talking until their flight’s departure.

Climate has become a rare area of in-depth coordination between the two superpowers; the joint statement that would emerge from Sunnylands was the latest of three such statements from Xie and Kerry in the past three years. They are the elder statesmen of the climate circuit—Xie’s ruddy, round face as familiar as Kerry’s gaunt silhouette at international conferences. The extent of U.S.-China cooperation, former Chinese and U.S. officials as well as climate experts told Foreign Policy, is partly attributable to the two envoys and their bond, developed over decades of negotiations.

“This is a very good example of how personal leadership can transcend national differences,” said Li Shuo, director of the China climate hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute. “I think both Xie and Kerry, they are pushing that potential to the limit.” The two men have known each other for 25 years, and for both, climate diplomacy is far more than a job—it is a mission.

Xie, then vice chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (left), and U.S. special envoy for climate change Todd Stern (right) initial a memorandum of understanding on clean energy and climate change between the U.S. and China in Washington, D.C.

Born the same year as the People’s Republic of China, 1949, Xie’s early years were similar to those of many officials of that generation. During the Cultural Revolution, he was “sent down” to the countryside along with millions of other young people—to the northeastern tip of China, bordering Siberia. “My sense is the people who had that experience came back with a profound sense of the need for development, but [Xie] always coupled it with this view that the environment needs to be protected,” said Deborah Seligsohn, an assistant professor of political science at Villanova University who was formerly an environmental counselor at the U.S. Embassy in China.

Xie went on to study engineering at Tsinghua University and became an environmental official in the 1980s. By 1993 he was head of China’s version of the EPA. He held that position through the height of China’s economic boom—a difficult time to be in charge of protecting the environment. In 2005, Xie resigned from his position after a major chemical spill in the northern Songhua River. Though he had taken the fall for the crisis, he proved resilient. In 2007, he was appointed vice minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, a powerful post given the department’s role in economic planning. At the same time, he became China’s lead international climate negotiator—and it was then that his path intertwined with Kerry’s

Kerry’s own interest in environmentalism was sparked early on. “Carson instilled in me and a whole generation a sense of moral urgency,” Kerry wrote in his 2018 autobiography, referring to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, published his freshman year at Yale, which documented rampant pesticide pollution. As a Massachusetts senator starting in the ‘80s, Kerry promoted environmental legislation and attended international climate negotiations. “All through the years when he was a senator, if one senator would show up at the COP meetings at the end of the year, it was John Kerry,” Todd Stern, the lead U.S. climate negotiator during the Obama administration, said in a 2021 interview, referring to the annual U.N. climate summits called Conference of the Parties.

Xie’s first meeting with Kerry as head of the Chinese delegation, at the Bali COP in 2007, was a fiery standoff, said Qian Guoqiang, a Chinese climate diplomat in attendance. “Xie was sitting down and Kerry opened up the talk in a very tough way,” telling China what to do, Qian said. Xie replied, “‘We aren’t going to talk in this way. You first need to realize you have your problems,’” Qian recalled. “They were like two lions fighting with each other.” Eventually, Kerry moderated his tone, Qian said.

Then-U.S. Sen. John Kerry (center) speaks to journalists with Australian Environment Minister Peter Garrett (left) near the venue of the U.N. Climate Change Conference 2007 in Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia.

That early meeting shows not only how far the diplomats’ relationship has come since, but also how far the two countries have moved toward consensus on climate action. At the time, there was a divide under the Kyoto Protocol, the prevailing climate agreement, between developed countries and developing countries, with the latter free of any binding obligations. The U.S. and other major countries didn’t support that framework—particularly after China became the world’s largest emitter in 2006. Meanwhile, Xie and other Chinese officials argued that China’s per-capita emissions remained much lower than those of developed countries—the largest historical emitters—which still hadn’t met their climate promises. The argument came to a head at the 2009 COP in Copenhagen, which was supposed to produce a new global climate framework but failed to yield consensus.

In those years, Xie was known to publicly air his frustration with developed countries. At the 2011 COP in Durban, South Africa, he gave a widely broadcast speech in the final hours of the negotiations. “You’ve talked for 20 years, but you haven’t honored your commitments,” Xie said, pounding his fist. “We’ve done what we should do, but you haven’t. What qualifications do you have to lecture us?” The hall of delegates erupted in applause.

“He’s a canny negotiator,” said Jonathan Pershing, a former lead U.S. climate diplomat in the Obama and Biden administrations. “He uses a combination of charm—he’s completely charming—and bluster.”

As another former senior Obama-era climate negotiator described Xie, “He’ll pound his fist on the table, and then give you a hug. But part of the reason that works is because I think nobody ever questions … [whether] he’s genuinely committed.”

A Chinese worker walks among the solar modules of a newly installed 100MW photovoltaic on-grid power project in Dunhuang of China’s northwest Gansu province.

Despite the fireworks, the U.S. and China started to move toward one another behind the scenes. Stern told Foreign Policy that after Copenhagen, China “wanted to find a way forward in general, but also in particular with the United States.”

China saw that climate action could be in its interest, allowing it to develop competitive green industries and reduce air pollution. “If you talked to Xie at that point, what you got from him was we’re doing climate, but we’re doing it on the back of these other issues,” Pershing said.

In order to bridge their countries’ differences, Stern and Xie also set about building their relationship. Stern and other leading U.S. climate diplomats traveled to Xie’s hometown, Tianjin, for climate meetings and rode the shiny, new high-speed rail there at their host’s invitation. Back in the U.S., Stern gave Xie the full American hot-dog-and-cracker-jacks experience at a Chicago Cubs game. “I sort of liked him right away,” Stern said. “I mean, he’s a very colorful guy.”

While Stern led the U.S. negotiations in those years, he credits Kerry for driving the process forward as secretary of state. According to his autobiography, Kerry made it his personal mission to help forge a new climate deal. He knew “the essential first step was finding a way to cooperate with China.” Kerry had witnessed the acrimony at Copenhagen and talked with Xie frequently in the following years. “We met in China, in the United States, at conferences around the world, all of which steadily built a trusting, personal relationship,” Kerry wrote.

Through this flurry of personal diplomacy, a major breakthrough came in 2014. The U.S. and China put forward new national emissions targets together, and in doing so, paved the way for the Paris Agreement, which all the COP countries agreed to the following year. Recalling the moment Obama announced the bilateral deal with Xi in the Great Hall of the People, Kerry wrote, “I finally felt we had reached a moment of turning. … In Beijing, there was a real sense of possibility.”

That U.S.-China climate consensus turned out to be short-lived, of course. Donald Trump soon pulled the U.S. out of the freshly inked agreement. But China stayed in the pact and went on to set a new goal on its own terms. In 2020, before the United Nations General Assembly, Xi announced that China would strive to be carbon neutral by 2060—a boost for the world’s climate hopes.

The pledge took the world by surprise, but Xie had been lobbying for it for years. He had taken a post as president of Tsinghua’s new climate institute; there he coordinated dozens of think tanks to model China’s pathways to carbon neutrality. Xie presented the results of that research to China’s highest-level policymakers ahead of Xi’s announcement, according to Zou Ji, president of Energy Foundation China, which funded the research. “I would say Minister Xie played a very important role to push—to facilitate—that process; otherwise, I saw no one else pushing that at such a high level.”

Kerry, as U.S. special presidential envoy for climate, shakes hands with Xie before a meeting in Beijing.

Joe Biden’s election and decision to rejoin the Paris Agreement revived hope—as well as questions about U.S.-China climate cooperation. Could the two countries pick back up where they had left off? And if so, what would successful U.S. climate diplomacy look like now that the two countries had set their respective targets?

Both presidents knew who to turn to for answers. Biden appointed Kerry the first U.S. special presidential envoy for climate. Subsequently, Xie, who had left government for Tsinghua, was brought back as a special envoy on the Chinese side. “The two of them were absolutely the best choices for their two governments to be the climate envoys in this difficult period,” said John Holdren, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School who served as Obama’s top science advisor.

The old lions returned to a harsher political landscape. The Biden administration sought areas of cooperation but maintained a tough-on-China stance. China, in turn, didn’t accept the U.S. framework of overall “competition” between the two countries. Temperatures flared at the first bilateral meeting in Anchorage, Alaska.

Nonetheless, both sides seemed to agree that climate cooperation was in their best interest. A month after the Anchorage meeting, Kerry became the first Biden official to visit China. Later in 2021, after meeting 30 times, the two envoys reached a breakthrough during the Glasgow COP. In a joint declaration, they made some important new contributions: China had previously pledged to start decreasing its coal use in the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030)—at Glasgow it agreed it would make “best efforts” to decrease its coal use earlier; both countries would work together to reduce potent, short-lived methane emissions this decade; and China would publish its own methane action plan.

That deal reflected some of the limits of China’s cooperation. For instance, China agreed to the softer methane language with the U.S. after declining to sign on to an international pledge to cut methane emissions 30 percent by 2030. “I always have the sense that [Xie’s] caught … between officially representing the interests of his country as defined by a system that’s bigger than him. … But also, within that context, genuinely pushing for positive progress with the belief that engagement and cooperation and joint leadership works,” said the former Obama-era U.S. negotiator.

Pershing, who was the no. 2 climate diplomat in Biden’s first year, credited Kerry for moving the conversation forward. “He’s indefatigable—the guy doesn’t seem to need to sleep very much. … I go to meetings, and around three o’clock in the morning, I’m going, ‘I think we’re not getting anywhere.’ And John is still out there continuing to say, ‘No, no, we can fix this. We can make this happen,’ and my experience is that he’s actually right.”

The nascent era of climate cooperation wasn’t insulated fully from the broader tensions, though. In August 2022, after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, Chinese officials cut off cooperation across the board, including on climate change.

As diplomats in the U.S. tried to repair the bilateral relationship, Kerry and Xie quietly went back to work. After meeting frequently over the past year, and following their meeting in southern California last month, the envoys published the Sunnylands Statement, the longest and, in Stern’s opinion, strongest statement yet. China, for the first time, agreed to include all sectors of the economy and all greenhouse gases in its next Paris targets, due in 2025. Another critical, albeit wordy, goal on China’s side was to achieve “post-peaking meaningful absolute power sector emission reduction” in the 2020s—a significant goal because it “indicates [China’s] growing confidence in early peaking,” Li wrote. Both sides also supported the international goal to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030.

The Sunnylands Statement is also notable for what it was lacking—for one, any clear commitment from China to stop building coal plants. Republicans have criticized Kerry for being soft on China and not forcing the country to take more aggressive measures in line with U.S. climate targets.

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The reality is that the U.S. has a limited ability to push China these days. In July, right as Kerry was visiting Beijing for talks with Xie, Xi said that China was committed to its climate goals, but the pathway and pace for meeting them “should be and must be determined by ourselves, and never under the sway of others.”

Climate experts acknowledged that the declaration is far from perfect, but they said it is significant, nonetheless. Referring to China’s commitment to establish an all-encompassing set of targets in 2025, Pershing said, “That’s a big thing. It doesn’t read like a big thing because we assumed that that would be true. But don’t assume. It’s not trivial. Making these statements alters the domestic action.”

Experts also said these statements have teed up progress in international climate talks. According to Pershing, unless the U.S. and China collaborate effectively ahead of negotiations, “the system kind of grinds, and maybe doesn’t move.” China also helps push forward recalcitrant countries, he added. “If you get China, which is a big partner for many places, you can move the rest of the world.”

At a press conference last month on the eve of COP28, Kerry echoed his sentiment, stating, “Without China and the United States aggressively moving forward to reduce emissions, we don’t win this battle.”

Kerry and Xie walk through the COP28 U.N. climate summit in Dubai.

After the current round of climate negotiations in Dubai wraps up next week, Xie is expected to retire from government. Kerry has also previously discussed retirement, Axios reported, although he hasn’t announced a date.

Liu Zhenmin, who most recently served as undersecretary-general of economic and social affairs at the United Nations, is expected to replace Xie. Climate experts are waiting to see whether Liu’s style and approach will align with Xie’s. Liu notably brings deep experience, having led China’s early U.N. climate negotiations, including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, in his career with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Despite renewed U.S.-China cooperation, the hardest work lies ahead. In China’s case, this includes actually reducing emissions. By 2025, all countries are expected to set their climate targets for 2035—which for China means determining a pace for emissions reduction for the first time. So far, China has only committed to peaking its emissions before 2030. At COP last week, Xie said China would submit new climate targets for 2030 along with its goals for 2035, signaling that the government may be willing to step up its ambition.

The U.S., meanwhile, has been implementing the Inflation Reduction Act—the most significant climate bill in U.S. history—but it must reduce its emissions at a faster rate to meet its 2030 targets. It has also yet to provide developing countries with the full financial support it has pledged—let alone what experts say is needed.

“What happens in the post-Kerry-Xie era is a huge question mark,” said the former senior U.S. climate diplomat who helped negotiate the Paris Agreement. “I sense that both Kerry and Xie are seriously in legacy-cementing mode,” fighting “as hard as they can to lock in as much progress as they can before they ride into the sunset.”