Aaron David Miller and Daniel C. Kurtzer
Wars in the Middle East rarely end cleanly. Some observers, however, have expressed the hope that the Israel-Hamas war could upend a dangerous status quo and eventually lead to more stability in the region. The war is often compared to the October 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and the combined forces of Egypt and Syria, largely because of the magnitude of Israel’s intelligence failures, the Israeli public’s loss of faith in their government, and the national trauma that followed.
But the truth is that any meaningful comparison ends there. More than 2,800 Israelis were killed in the Yom Kippur War. Yet that conflict never incorporated the kind of sadistic, indiscriminate torture, killing, and hostage-taking that Hamas perpetrated in October 2023—nor the subsequent large-scale airstrikes by Israeli forces that have already resulted in thousands of civilian deaths. The 1973 war lasted merely three weeks and quickly entered a relatively well-structured disengagement agreement brokered by the United States, launching a process that led to a landmark Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed by two strong leaders: the charismatic, heroic Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and the tough Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.
By contrast, the two traumatized societies that emerge from the current war will face a level of anguish, casualties, and devastation that will demand a herculean task of physical reconstruction and psychological healing. As many as 1,400 Israelis and 18,000 Palestinians have died so far. Some 150,000 Israelis and more than 1.8 million Palestinians in Gaza have been displaced from their homes. In the West Bank, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raids and extremist settler vigilantism have already led to the deaths of over 260 Palestinians, the arrests of nearly 2,000, and the displacement of almost 1,000 from their lands. The ideas that Israel, after completing its military operations to disable Hamas, will make a full exit from Gaza and that the Palestinian Authority (PA) can quickly and authoritatively take over are not realistic. And this war does not have heroic leaders: both sides suffer from profoundly ineffectual governance.
There is no realistic prospect in the near term of a dramatic, uplifting denouement to the conflict that validates each side’s sacrifices and provides relief and hope for the future. In late October, U.S. President Joe Biden declared that the region must not return to its pre–October 7 status quo. If Biden wants change, however, his administration must undertake bolder policy moves—ones that firmly guide the region toward a two-state solution. Policymakers may wish to avoid bold moves in a fast-changing situation: such moves will be practically difficult and politically risky. But the facts on the ground suggest that the region cannot return to its unstable prewar status quo. Instead, without careful guidance, a new status quo is likely to emerge that will be even more problematic. Only bold American leadership now will support a good outcome in the aftermath of this war.
UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM
In waging war in Gaza, Israeli officials have stated that their goals are to destroy Hamas and then demilitarize and deradicalize Gaza. What these leaders mean by “deradicalize” remains unclear. But even if the Israelis succeed in destroying Hamas’s military capabilities, they will not simply declare mission accomplished in Gaza and depart. Israel’s leaders have ruled out both Hamas and the PA as governing authorities, and Israel will thus likely remain in Gaza for an extended period.
Israel already controls Gaza’s land, sea, and air access, as well as its electromagnetic spectrum. Even if Israel succeeds in ending Hamas’s rule in Gaza, it will undoubtedly want to retain some authority, ensuring at a minimum that all imports with dual-use military purposes are carefully monitored and controlled. Continued friction with the United Nations and other international aid organizations—already high thanks to Israel’s military operations and the deaths of thousands of Gazans, including UN aid workers—is inevitable.
If Israel tries to remain in Gaza for an extended time, it will face residual attacks from Hamas and other terrorist organizations and enormous challenges in maintaining law and order. Even as some Israeli officials speak of exiting Gaza, they also talk openly about the necessity of creating long-term “buffer zones” and about Israel’s overall responsibility for security. But the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank and those in the Arab states will surely refuse to be subcontractors for Israel’s security operations.
Simply put, no bright line will separate war from peace in this conflict. Instead, Israel’s military actions in Gaza will likely transition from an intensive air and ground campaign to more targeted operations, and Israel will be part of the Gazan landscape for some time. Try as Israel might to avoid former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn” rule—you break it, you own it—an extended Israeli presence in Gaza will inevitably involve taking on more, not less, responsibility for and involvement in the territory’s affairs. And that is likely to inflame tensions with whoever comes to formally govern Gaza.
A LIMITED PARTNER
On paper, the best option for Gaza’s future over the long term is Palestinian governance led by a revitalized and legitimized PA. The PA already helps cover Gaza’s public-sector employees’ salaries and assists in paying for the area’s electricity. The international community sees it as the legitimate authority in Gaza as well as in the West Bank. Earlier this month, in a meeting with PA President Mahmoud Abbas, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan talked about the role a revitalized PA might play in governing Gaza.
But because of its own dysfunction—and, in no small measure, Israeli policies—the PA has become weak and ineffectual. Palestinians perceive it to be corrupt, nepotistic, and authoritarian: in an Arab Barometer survey of Gazans conducted just before October 7, a majority of respondents considered the PA to be a burden on the Palestinian people. Abbas is 87 and in the 19th year of what was supposed to be a four-year term. He refused to hold new elections in 2021 and has increasingly lost touch with young Palestinians. When respondents in the same Arab Barometer poll were asked whom they would vote for if presidential elections were held in Gaza, 32 percent chose the imprisoned Fatah activist Marwan Barghouti and 24 percent chose the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Only 12 percent chose Abbas.
During this war, the PA has been unable to protect Palestinians in the West Bank from IDF raids and attacks by settler vigilantes, let alone influence the course of Israel’s operations in Gaza. Hamas’s stock, meanwhile, has risen in the West Bank since its October 7 terror attack and its negotiated release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. For many Palestinians who distrust Abbas and revile Israel’s recent actions, Hamas is becoming the only game in town.
Restoring the Palestinians’ faith in the PA will take a great deal of effort and time. It would require the PA to run fair and free elections in the West Bank and Gaza and to convince voters that it really will aim to end Israel’s occupation and create an independent Palestinian state. Should it succeed, Israel would also need to demonstrate its commitment—in words and actions on the ground—to advancing a two-state outcome. And with the current Israeli government, this scenario is impossible.
POWER GRAB
In one sense, it is not a surprise that the Israel-Hamas war broke out in Gaza rather than in the West Bank. Gaza has often been at the center of tensions between the Israelis and the Palestinians: the first intifada began in Gaza in 1987, and in the twenty-first century, Gaza has been the focal point of at least six significant Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition has focused on the West Bank, attempting to create the conditions for annexation. In the first half of 2023, Netanyahu’s government pushed any possibility of a two-state solution further away by advancing or approving permits for 13,000 new housing units in West Bank settlements, the highest number recorded since 2012.
The fact that Netanyahu presided over the worst terror attack and the worst intelligence failure in Israel’s history, as well as the bloodiest single day for Jews since the Holocaust, has discredited his leadership. Many observers have reasonably presumed that his political career will soon reach its end, as Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir’s did after the Yom Kippur War. But Netanyahu will fight to hang on to power. Facing indictments for breach of trust, bribery, and fraud, Netanyahu desperately wants to avoid jail. Already, he has broken with tradition by suggesting that he will organize the inquiry into the government failures that preceded Hamas’s attack; the resulting inquiry will lack the legal authority of a state commission.
For now, Netanyahu retains a comfortable 74-seat majority in the Knesset, and he has shown he is willing to pay any price to extremist and haredi partners to keep his ruling coalition intact. In May 2023, the Knesset passed Netanyahu’s budget, cementing the coalition’s grip on power until 2025. The terms of the emergency government Israel created days after the war broke out foreclosed taking up any legislation unrelated to the prosecution of the war. Netanyahu’s government is likely to survive for some time to come.
Netanyahu will continue to come under public pressure to step down. Some well-respected former leaders of Israel’s security establishment have already called on him to resign. If he refuses to do so, however, there is no clear mechanism to remove him from office—even though his trial has now resumed.
Should Netanyahu remain in power, the situation in the West Bank is likely to deteriorate.
In the meantime, Netanyahu is moving to shore up support among his right-wing partners. In fact, his administration appears to be taking advantage of the attention Gaza is drawing away from the West Bank to pursue more settlement expansion and repress the Palestinians. Since October 7, extremist settlers in the West Bank have been involved in scores of incidents of aggression and intimidation against Palestinians, forcing at least a thousand—including entire shepherding communities—off their land. A third of these episodes involved settlers drawing firearms on Palestinians. In almost half the total incidents, the IDF accompanied or actively supported the settlers.
If the IDF succeeds in its war aims by killing Hamas’s top leaders, Netanyahu could even regain some support. Israel’s electorate had shifted to the right well before this war. Hamas’s terrorism may well encourage a further radicalization of the Israeli population.
Should Netanyahu remain in power for any extended period, the situation in the West Bank is likely to continue to deteriorate, possibly leading to a Palestinian uprising stimulated in part by extremist settlers. He will also exploit for his own benefit whatever the United States decides to do or not do. If Biden tries to revive the peace process, Netanyahu will likely emphasize what he has already told his Likud Party: that only he can stop the creation of an independent Palestinian state. If, on the other hand, Biden assesses that the chances of a two-state peace process are nonexistent in the near term, Netanyahu will trumpet his ability to convince the Americans to stay out of his way.
BINARY OPTIONS
For the United States, the policy dilemmas appear terribly complex. But after 56 years of Israeli occupation with no end in sight, these dilemmas need to be settled sooner rather than later. The United States’ choice is binary—either try to help create the conditions for a two-state solution or adjust to a postconflict situation that is worse than the status quo ante, resolves no underlying issues, and probably sets up the conditions for another war.
Pushing hard for a two-state solution would be complicated. The United States would have to help orchestrate several critical processes simultaneously: setting in place Gaza reconstruction mechanisms to be ready to operate the day the IDF leaves, bringing reluctant Arab parties on board to help maintain law and order and set up interim governance in Gaza, keeping the remnants of Hamas at bay, compelling the PA to restructure itself so it can regain the confidence of the Palestinian public, and addressing legitimate Israeli security concerns.
This course of action by the United States would also be politically risky: it could have the unintended effect of giving Netanyahu a campaign tool to remain in power. Success is far from assured. The United States will be dealing with traumatized leaders who may be unwilling or unable to make big decisions. And the Israelis and the Palestinians have failed many times to create a pathway to peace when the external context was far less fraught than it is today.
Even if Netanyahu leaves office, no other top politician in Israel appears eager to embark down a path of peace.
As a potential peace broker, the United States also lacks credibility. To move toward a two-state solution, Arabs and Europeans would need to have faith in the United States’ intentions and follow-through. The United States’ vetoes and no votes in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly on resolutions for humanitarian cease-fires have not inspired confidence. And even those allies that trust Washington to implement its plans will wonder what will happen if Biden loses his upcoming reelection bid.
But the alternative approach—hoping for a return to the pre–October 7 status quo without a serious effort by the United States to advance the prospects for a lasting peace—could be worse. Even if Netanyahu leaves office, no other current top politician in Israel appears eager to embark down a path of peace. And there are no Palestinian leaders with the gravitas and political weight to engage seriously with Israel in the aftermath of the conflict. Some speak of Barghouti as a potential Palestinian leader, but he is serving five life sentences for murdering Israelis and has no track record in political life that suggests he would be a peacemaker.
Stimulating the PA to reform itself is a task beyond the capability of the United States alone. Washington will need to act in concert with others to get the PA to do what it has resisted doing for decades: become less authoritarian, fight corruption, and agree to hold new elections for its presidency and its Legislative Council. Pressuring the PA to reestablish its legitimacy among Palestinians will require significant efforts by Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—the so-called Arab Quartet—as well as the EU, which has always played an important role in Palestinian institution building. To bring about this multilateral effort, however, Arab actors will need to see a clear American policy that goes beyond Gaza and focuses on ending the decades-long conflict.
CALCULATED RISK
But the risks of advocating for a two-state approach are worth taking. Other actors will take the measure of U.S. credibility from what Washington is prepared to do to confront the inconvenient realities that will almost certainly define the postconflict landscape. The Biden administration has the smarts and the backbone to follow through even when the going gets tough. And the going will get tough. A bold effort to push a two-state solution, however, could attract support from Arab states to help ensure basic law and order, interim governance, and reconstruction in Gaza, as well as a safety net for the PA as it embarks on the necessary efforts to reform itself.
The question facing the Biden administration is what can it realistically do in the year before the upcoming U.S. presidential elections given the constraints posed by American politics and those it is likely to encounter in Israel, among the Palestinians, and throughout the Arab world. In the near term, the United States can take actions that would help overcome some early obstacles to a two-state solution. First, Biden should continue to press Israel to quickly end its intense ground and air campaign—which is certain to keep causing substantial civilian casualties—in favor of more focused and targeted operations.
His administration must also push hard for an increase in the amount of humanitarian assistance that enters Gaza, including by ensuring that the recently opened Kerem Shalom border crossing remains open and pressing for the resumption of negotiations to release Hamas’s remaining Israeli hostages. And the administration must press Israel and the PA to clamp down on violence by extremist settlers and Palestinian militants in the West Bank.
The risks of advocating for a two-state approach are worth taking, and the Biden administration has the smarts to follow through.
Third, the United States needs to ensure that Israel respects U.S. guidelines on Gaza, including no reduction of Gaza’s territory, no forced relocations of Gazans, and Palestinian governance. U.S. officials should make clear, both in their public statements and in their private contacts with Israelis and others, that Gaza and the West Bank must remain one integral unit and that the PA will eventually resume its governance of Gaza.
The United States will also need to be proactive in trying to ensure that conflict along the Israeli-Lebanese border does not erupt into a full-scale war. At least 60,000 Israelis have been displaced from their homes in the north of Israel. If the 2006 UN Security Council resolution mandating Hezbollah’s withdrawal north of the Litani River is not enforced, Israel may deploy its military to contain Hezbollah, which could prompt a full-blown war with a terrorist organization far more potent than Hamas. To blunt this risk, the United States will need to maintain the deterrent military forces it dispatched to the region in October 2023.
Finally, the Biden administration must make sure that all regional players understand that a two-state solution is the United States’ preferred outcome. It must define a pathway toward that outcome that clarifies what steps each side must take to create the right environment for eventual negotiations. U.S. leaders should tell the Israeli people that it is time for them to face the fundamental choice the country has avoided since 1967: Will Israel occupy Palestinian territory indefinitely, or can it live alongside a Palestinian state? The United States must send the message to the Palestinians that the time has come for them, too, to make a choice: Will they remain under occupation or reform their governance? U.S. leaders must work closely with key Arab countries such as Egypt, the Gulf states, and Jordan to support these shifts. Saudi Arabia, given its interest in normalization with Israel, will have an especially important role to play.
THE ONLY GOOD BET
Can any of this succeed with the current Israeli and Palestinian leadership at the helm? Not a chance. Netanyahu must go. And Abbas, too. But even if they stay in power in the near term, the United States has stronger options. Biden must not threaten to withhold necessary military assistance from Israel. But he can make it clearer to the Israelis that the continued strength of their relationship with Washington rests on Israel understanding that it cannot reoccupy Gaza, and that their ultimate security guarantee will be a peace agreement with a similarly peace-minded Palestinian state. By framing his rhetoric as the kind of straight talk that Netanyahu avoids, Biden may be able to influence Israeli attitudes without diminishing his chances of reelection in 2024.
Most government policy memos, including many we wrote during our service in the U.S. State Department, propose three options: a bold one that suggests moves the policymaker will find difficult to swallow, a status quo option that allows the policymaker to believe that not much needs to be done, and a “Goldilocks” option that proposes just enough action to show muscle but not enough to ruffle feathers. Often, the Goldilocks option is chosen: it affords a sense of movement while incurring minimal risks.
Yet there will be no Goldilocks option available in the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas war. Biden should adopt a determined stance—in words and deeds—that seriously advances the prospect of a two-state solution. Should he gain a second presidential term, the groundwork he lays in 2024 toward a more lasting resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will position him well to engage more intensively: the situation cannot be allowed to deteriorate until after the U.S. election season passes. Great political and practical pressures weigh on Biden, should he should choose to be bold. But far greater risks may emerge if he doesn’t.
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