26 November 2023

What’s next: three main scenarios for Ukraine


We need to understand the possible future scenarios, at least in general terms.

At the very least, businesses need this to plan their activities. So, the scenarios for the development of events at the moment look like this: We are taking a time frame of at least two years here to consider the effects of elections in key countries. You will not like everything I have to say, but someone has to say it. If you prefer not to know, stop here and read no further.

Inputs we know so far:

1. Positional warfare does not lead to a significant change in the contact line. Military analysts say each side's defense capabilities exceed the other's offensive capabilities.

2. The West does not currently consider the scenario of Russian defeat acceptable, given the consequences for the quantity and quality of arms supplies.

3. Putin has chosen a strategy of war of attrition, in which authoritarian Russia has more chances than Ukraine, which depends on democratic allies whose position may change after elections (in which Russia will certainly interfere for this purpose).

This leads to three main scenarios for Ukraine.

1. Continuation of the war of attrition.

The worst-case scenario, and so far, everything is moving along this trajectory. A change of government in the West will lead to a decrease in support to the point where Ukraine will not be able to continue the war and will be forced to negotiate peace on Russia's terms. Even if political support remains at the current level, the number of tension points in the world will increase, distracting from Ukraine. The West's ability to provide weapons will begin to dry up. At the same time, no one will put the American or European economy on a war footing (Ukraine cannot provide itself with enough modern weapons, although it must take all possible steps in this direction).

This scenario means Ukraine's defeat, which leaves no chance for economic recovery (at the same time, it is Russia's defeat, but they are satisfied with the end of the war by mutual defeat). Ukraine also has problems in domestic politics, as it is impossible to hold elections during endless martial law. If they are held, they will preserve the current government in the worst way, giving the West grounds to finally abandon Ukraine as an undemocratic country or lead to mass protests, which will have extremely negative consequences in times of war.

2. Freezing the war.

This scenario provides the West with a way out of the current trap of "defeat, victory, and delay are equally unacceptable." In this scenario, the allies maintain their support for Ukraine at approximately the current level to prevent both Ukraine's defeat and Russia's defeat. Noting the impossibility of achieving success, the Western allies will persuade Ukraine to negotiate a freeze on the conflict while putting intense pressure on Putin.

Either Biden will initiate the negotiations in the spring or summer of 2024 (he needs to look like a winner in the election, or at least a peacemaker), or the winner of the American elections will do so in the spring of 2025. After signing the peace agreement, both sides (Ukraine with the help of the West and Russia with the help of China) will begin to intensively prepare for the next war, which will take place in 5 years (at least 3, maximum 7). Since the peace agreement leads to the lifting of martial law, democratic elections are held, in which new faces representing the course of comprehensive modernization win, while Zelenskyy is associated with defeat and leaves the political scene (refusal to hold democratic elections in peacetime will have even worse consequences for him).

During the preparations, Russia has a chance to learn from the mistakes of 2022, and Ukraine has an opportunity to modernize significantly (not only technically but also institutionally; I would also note in parentheses that it is worth starting now). In the best-case scenario, Ukraine modernizes so well that Russia is afraid to attack. In the worst-case scenario, Ukraine is poorly prepared, and a second invasion leads to a complete defeat and the establishment of a pro-Russian regime (see the first and second Chechen wars).

3. Victory.

Ukraine manages to convince its allies that Russia's defeat is an acceptable (and even desirable) scenario. Aid increases sharply to a level that allows for a successful spring and summer counteroffensive, the liberation of the South and Crimea, a significant reduction in the front line, freezing the occupied part of the East until better times, and, in this format, entering into negotiations on Ukrainian terms. After the peace is signed, Ukraine joins NATO and receives large sums of money to rebuild and modernize its economy. A victorious Ukraine attracts the world's attention in various ways.

The security situation is favorable for economic growth, and the unblocked seas are open for exports. Zelenskyy easily wins the democratic elections as a winner in the war. Meanwhile, Russia's defeat leads to an accumulation of factors that lead to political change, as has always been the case in its history after military defeats. These changes (in the soft form of federalization or the more likely more severe form of decolonization) make it impossible for Russia to engage in further aggression. The "Victory" scenario is the least likely, as it presupposes a level of strategic and negotiating skill that Ukraine does not currently possess. At the same time, it is the only one that ensures the survival of the ruling political team, and it is good that the interests of society and the political elite coincide.

Two final remarks.

There can always be some "black swans" or even "gray rhinos" (a long-awaited event). For example, Putin may die, and the possible duration of concealing this information is much shorter than the time it takes to identify a successor and consolidate power. But it is pointless to bet on such events.

2. Trump is an eccentric and completely unpredictable character, so there is a non-zero probability that, due to certain factors, he will suddenly change his stance and support Ukraine as much as possible. But it is obvious that it would be just as foolish to bet on that.

Once again, I want to emphasize that the future is not predetermined. Better scenarios are possible, but we need to implement them, not just believe in them.

Please give your criticisms in a reasoned manner, not in the format of "Well, it's impossible" or "I still believe in victory."

No comments: