John Raine
External forces, regional powers and non-state actors have all at some stage dictated the course of geopolitics in the Middle East. Prior to 7 October, it appeared that regional states, which had become both more assertive in their foreign policies and more conciliatory towards each other, were wresting control of the agenda from non-state actors. But Hamas’ attack on Israel marked a sudden and violent return to the era in which terrorism dominates the agenda. It remains to be determined whether states, or external actors, will be able to reassert themselves.
Non-state actors ranging from militias to political and religious movements have been powerfully formative for the regional and global security agenda. Palestinian terrorist groups of the 1970s; Islamist terrorism in Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s; al-Qaeda; the Islamic State (ISIS); and, above all, Hizbullah and other Iranian-sponsored groups in the past two decades have all driven and shaped the foreign and security policies of regional states and their external allies. Even when non-state actors have not dominated the agenda, they have remained a permanent feature of the region’s geopolitics. Many have been sustained by moral and material support from state backers or sympathisers. Kurdish and Palestinian groups have been fuelled by nationalist aspirations and decades of grievances, Islamist extremist groups by radical ideologies, and actors within Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen by Iranian financial and operational sponsorship. Sectarianism and identity politics within countries divided along ethnic and religious lines have also played a defining and sustaining role. The result is a region in which, despite the strength of its states, a disproportionately large share of power remains outside of the state-based system.
The persistence of power resting with those excluded from the state-based system has many causes. Firstly, state failure, as in Lebanon and Yemen, has left vacuums into which non-state actors (political and armed) have moved, embedding themselves within the social fabric of communities. They provide public services (otherwise absent), social solidarity and inspiration through their ambitions, often backed by a unitary and zealous armed wing. They also offer salaries and support for families, which are attractive to young men of fighting age in economies where job opportunities and job security are scarce.
Secondly, third parties, out of genuine sympathy or geopolitical expediency, have fostered the causes that non-state actors espouse. Few causes have as many foster-parents as the Palestinian one. In the last 30 years, regimes in Iran, Iraq and Syria have competed for the title of champion of the Palestinian people. Iran, though the least qualified culturally and geographically, has clinched the title through a combination of the fighting power and regional influence of its partner, Hizbullah, and Tehran’s willingness and expertise in training and equipping militias and terrorist groups. It has done more than any other state to perpetuate excluded power, primarily through the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Doubts as to whether Qasem Soleimani’s successor as Quds Force commander, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, would be as effective or aggressive as his predecessor were laid to rest by the clear role Iran played in enabling the 7 October attacks.
Thirdly, the influence of non-state actors has been perpetuated by the absence of a regional consensus on, or an international commitment regarding, the significance of the phenomenon. States have tried to deal with single groups as part of the resolution process of individual conflicts. But the connectedness of the groups and the influence of their key backer, Iran, have ensured their survival. A regional status quo has emerged by default that allows statehood and sovereignty to be compromised through the persistence of excluded power. This is most evident in the powerful Shia groups tied to Iran: Hizbullah, Ansarullah (the Houthis) and the Popular Mobilisation Units in Iraq. There is a risk, however, that these tolerances extend to groups backed by other states, for example, in Libya, where the country is divided between a United Nations-recognised administration in Tripoli and a powerful militia originally backed by Egypt and close to Russia in Benghazi.
The persistence of excluded power stands in contrast to the more assertive foreign affairs emerging in the region. This has been a function of the global rise of China, the maturing of Gulf economies and societies, and simmering differences with, and doubts about, the United States. Recent events including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have crystallised this trend.
In the last three years, increased national strategic confidence has also resulted in some countries attempting to resolve old feuds. The Gulf Cooperation Council and Qatar resolved their rift; rivals Turkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are leaning towards developing an economic partnership; and, more controversially, the Arab League re-admitted Syria. This concert among regional states began to form and cohere not due to external powers – although both China and the US were active sponsors of conciliation – but by common consent. Whether it will survive the shock and the emotional polarisation of Israel’s war with Hamas is unclear. Much will depend on the nature of Israel’s campaign and popular reaction in the region.
The motives for rapprochement prior to 7 October were deep, however, and may not be overridden by current events. The region’s most powerful leaders shared a view that their best interests lay in de-escalation and a focus on economic development. That meant either solving or stepping over disputes. The UAE’s ‘zero problems’ foreign policy was the clearest example of this, which other states were beginning to emulate given their interest in realising global economic ambitions (Saudi Arabia) or in seeking economic stability by attracting foreign and regional investment (Egypt and Turkiye). These economic opportunities and imperatives remain. In addition, the appetite for state-level conflict or intervention on behalf of third parties (including the Palestinians) had ebbed both in Arab states and Iran, which, although it had not ceased its intervention through third parties, had avoided direct hostilities with Israel. Despite threatening rhetoric from Tehran, the cost of war and the risk of uncontrollable domestic consequences are serious considerations for leaders who are increasingly isolated from the concerns of the country’s restless youth.
Regional states have therefore, to varying degrees, sought to sympathise with the Palestinians over the war in Gaza without risking becoming embroiled in military conflict with each other or with an Israel backed by combat-ready US firepower. Retaining control of their and the region’s agenda is an unstated but implied objective. While external actors have varying degrees of influence in the region, key states have asserted themselves as independent actors in regard to the US. Conversely, while the US has attempted to mediate in the current crisis, it is debatable whether it can regain its traditional position as regional power broker or do more than join firefights at a time when it is preoccupied with China, NATO, the Ukrainian resistance to Russia and domestic elections. Regional states, whether they like it or not, may now own not just the region’s politics but Palestinians’ future.
Of all the regional states, the situation is most risky for Iran, which stands to be exposed for instrumentalising the causes of others. It has not intervened as Israel has launched a ferocious attack on Hamas. Neither has Hizbullah, whose leader Hassan Nasrallah has postured awkwardly as the champion of Hamas and offered moral but not material support. If, therefore, states are intent on maintaining their fragile concert, to what uses can it be put? Its fissures have only recently been mended, but there may be sufficient lines of communication, shared interests and enough familiarity between interlocutors to do more than de-escalate. Many of the region’s richest and most influential states have intervened in other conflicts as bridge-builders and intermediaries, most notably Qatar, but also Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Their strategic assertiveness could now crystallise into a plan to build something from a crushed and leaderless Gaza. This might be overly optimistic, but sacrificing the relationships and liaisons that Middle East leaders have developed in recent years rather than using them constructively would cede control of the region’s agenda to non-state actors and terrorism.
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