RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 8, 2023

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

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Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne), and Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during a video address to the Reuters NEXT conference in New York on November 8 that Ukrainian forces have a battlefield plan for 2024 that he cannot disclose.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have several paths for future advances in southern Ukraine, eastern Ukraine, and Kherson Oblast. There are also plans to advance to specific occupied cities.[4] Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations without interruption in several sectors of the front, and Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that these operations will continue into this winter.[5]

Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian General Staff uses battlefield maps that differ from tactical reality in response to another milblogger who questioned why Russian forces were not striking alleged large Ukrainian force concentrations close to the frontline.[6] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian personnel on the front have access to the “real” map and that Russian commanders order Russian forces to conduct routine assaults to make gains that align the “real” map with the Russian General Staff’s map.[7] A separate milblogger claimed that there had been previous individual cases of Russian battalion and regiment-level assault operations aimed at achieving compliance with inaccurate maps of the frontline but that this is the first time that he has heard of a wider operational imperative to make advances that comply with a reported General Staff map.[8] A milblogger claimed that Russian commanders are incentivized to make the tactical gains depicted in the General Staff’s maps because the General Staff increasingly requires positive reports from frontline commanders.[9] Russian milbloggers have routinely criticized Russian commanders throughout the chain of command for delivering false and overly positive reports to their superiors and have identified the Russian General Staff as fostering this widespread institutional dishonesty.[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.[11] Putin promoted Kuzmenko to the rank of colonel general following Kuzmenko’s meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu during Shoigu’s visit to the Eastern Grouping of Forces command post in the south Donetsk direction (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) on October 25.[12] Shoigu’s visit confirmed Kuzmenko's position as the Eastern Grouping of Forces commander and likely the Eastern Military District (EMD) commander. This promotion is likely routine and intended to give Kuzmenko a rank appropriate to his position. Putin also promoted three Russian officers to the rank of lieutenant general, 11 officers to the rank of major general, and 29 internal affairs officers to the rank of major general and lieutenant general.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia’s alleged stability and criticisms of the West.[14] Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reported on November 8 that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the presidential campaign aims to paint Putin as a leader who made Russia an “island of calm.”[15] Meduza sources claimed that Putin’s ratings increase after speeches in which he criticizes the West and that Russian state propaganda will encourage this by increasingly publishing stories about “difficulties” in Western countries and the United States’ alleged inability to support Ukraine and Israel simultaneously. A Meduza source also reportedly stated that the campaign would only discuss the war in Ukraine if there were a “very serious [Russian] success” on the front instead of continued “positional warfare.” Putin is reportedly preparing to announce his campaign this month, and Russian sources have consistently indicated that the campaign will not prominently promote the war in Ukraine.[16] Putin previously downplayed the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka, referring to it as “active defense,” which would be consistent with these reports.[17] The Kremlin-backed United Russia Party also reportedly realized that using the war in Ukraine in their election campaigns in the run up to the September 2023 State Duma elections was ineffective and counterproductive.[18] Concerns within the Kremlin and United Russia over domestic support for the war are not indications that United Russia or Putin’s dominance of Russian politics faces a legitimate threat in the upcoming presidential election, however. This campaign framing, if it occurs, would double down on Putin’s refusal to mobilize Russian society to a wartime footing and may increase the informational cost necessary to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine.

Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine. Russian and occupation officials reported on November 8 that a car bomb killed LNR People’s Council member and the LNR Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Colonel Mikhail Filiponenko in occupied Luhansk City.[19] Filiponenko previously headed the LNR People’s Militia and the LNR’s Joint Center for Control and Coordination (JCCC).[20] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR agents and Ukrainian partisans conducted the attack.[21] GUR stated that Filiponenko organized torture camps for Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) and that Filiponenko personally participated in the torture.[22] These accusations would be an apparent violation of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8.
• Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia’s alleged stability and criticisms of the West.
• Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8 and advanced in some areas.
• Russia is reportedly attempting to reacquire components for military equipment from states to which it previously sold the equipment, including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, and Belarus.
• Russian occupation administrations continue to create new administrative bodies meant to further integrate occupied territories into Russian governance systems.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued localized offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 8 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (21km southeast of Kupyansk), Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove), and the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[24] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on November 7 that Russian forces continued to advance west of Pershotravneve (20km east of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[25] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to advance due to dense minefields in the area.[26] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction lost 1,826 personnel and 200 pieces of military equipment, including 22 tanks and 54 armored combat vehicles, between November 1 and 6.[27]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled two Ukrainian assaults southeast of Kupyansk near Tymkivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) on November 8.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault operations south of Bakhmut on November 8.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced on November 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances from Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) towards Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also successfully counterattacked near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces reentered the settlement.[31] ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Bohdanivka, Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka and reportedly advanced on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Keramik (14km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Tonenke (7km northwest of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) are pressuring Ukrainian forces in the direction of Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have advanced to positions 400 meters from the southern border of Avdiivka, but ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[35] Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces advanced near the railway line near Stepove, but Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces suffered high casualties to make this advance.[36] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on November 7 that Russian forces in the Avdiivka area lost 585 personnel within the past day during light infantry attacks without armored vehicle support.[37]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Russian forces remain committed to the Avdiivka effort despite high losses and inclement weather. Ukrainian military spokesperson Anton Kotsukon stated that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 “reserves” in the Avdiivka direction, though it is unclear how many of these personnel are committed to offensive operations.[38] Ukrainian officials have recently stated that Russian forces have 40,000 total personnel in the Avdiivka area.[39] Kotsukon stated that Russian forces have recently been attacking in groups of 10-20 personnel and using a large number of drones to identify Ukrainian counterbattery elements.[40] Ukrainian Avdiivka Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian forces are likely ready to conduct a third wave of assaults on Avdiivka but that inclement weather will impede Russian use of equipment.[41]

Ukrainian forces reportedly made marginal gains during counterattacks near Avdiivka on November 8. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success while counterattacking Russian positions near Vodyane.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City but did not advance on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Marinka (immediately west of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[43]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on November 8 and recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on November 6 shows that Russian forces advanced north of Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[44] Russian sources made similar claims of Russian advances in the area and claimed that there is additional fighting in the dacha area west of Mykilske and that hostilities near Vuhledar have intensified in recent days.[45]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed offensive operations on the western and southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City or in western Donetsk Oblast on November 8.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) on November 8.[46]

Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Staromayorske and south of Prechystivka (17km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 77th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) is operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[48]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[49] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne).[50] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to capture unspecified heights northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne), where Russian forces withdrew from several unspecified positions.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces with armored vehicle support continued attacks near Robotyne and Verbove over the past several days.[52]

Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive actions in the Zaporizhia direction.[53] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Verbove on November 7.[54] Russian milbloggers amplified footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 237th Airborne Assault (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and 22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade operating near Verbove.[55] A Russian milblogger amplified footage on November 8 claiming to show elements of the Russian 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (7th VDV Division) also operating near Verbove.[56]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and reportedly advanced near Krynky on November 8. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 7 and 8 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[57] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on November 8 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Krynky.[58] One Russian milblogger claimed on November 7 that Ukrainian forces are “creeping” forward at a rate of one meter per day.[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed on November 8 that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[60] Prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to transfer personnel to reinforce Ukrainian positions on the east bank.[61]

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on November 8 that Russian air defenses downed three Ukrainian missiles over occupied Henichesk Raion, Kherson Oblast.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were targeting Crimea.[63]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 7 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems downed 17 Ukrainian drones, primarily targeting the Belbek and Saky airfields (just north of Sevastopol and 60km north of Sevastopol, respectively) in occupied Crimea.[64]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia is reportedly attempting to reacquire components for military equipment from states to which it previously sold the equipment, including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, and Belarus. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on November 8 that Egypt agreed in July 2023 to give Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopter engines back to Russia after Egypt reneged on a deal to send Russia rockets.[65] WSJ reported that Russia offered to forgive Egyptian debt and continue wheat supplies to Egypt in exchange for the engines and that Russia also threatened to remove its arms industry advisers from Egypt if Egypt did not agree to return the engines. WSJ reported that Egyptian shipments of about 150 engines will likely begin in December 2023. WSJ reported that Russia also asked Pakistan to return at least four Mi-35M helicopter engines and asked to buy back 12 decommissioned Mi-35M engines from Brazil, which Brazil reportedly refused. WSJ reported that Belarus agreed to sell six Mi-26 helicopter engines back to Russia and that Russia rerouted weapons destined for India and Armenia to Ukraine.

The Russian military reportedly attempted to conscript a Ukrainian minor illegally deported to Russia. The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration and Russian opposition outlet Vazhye Istorii (iStories) stated on November 8 that Russian authorities issued a military summons to a 17-year-old Ukrainian who was illegally deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia, where he then lived with a Russian foster family and received a Russian passport.[66] The minor’s lawyer reportedly appealed for the teenager’s return to Ukraine to Kremlin-appointed Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who previously claimed in April 2023 that Russian security forces detained the Ukrainian teenager on the Belarussian border as he tried to return to Ukraine.[67] ISW previously reported that Lvova-Belova continuously attempts to justify the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia as part of a large-scale Russian deportation campaign in Ukraine.[68]