RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 10, 2023

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

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Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10. The GUR published satellite imagery and reported that the Ukrainian surface attack drone strike on Uzka Bay near Chornomorsk, occupied Crimea sunk one Project 1176 Akula-class small landing ship and one Project 11770 Serna-class small landing ship.[1] The GUR reported that the Serna-class ship was carrying a crew and was loaded with armored vehicles, including BTR-82 armored personnel carriers, and that Russian forces previously used Serna-class ships to provide cover for Russian BSF ships during raids when Russian forces lacked naval air-defense equipment.[2] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike on Uzka Bay with four unmanned boats and that it was one of three series of Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea on November 10.[3] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attempted to conduct a drone strike on an oil depot in Feodosia and a Neptune cruise missile strike on BSF and Federal Security Service (FSB) bases in Chornomorsk.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a Neptune missile over the Black Sea off the coast of Crimea and intercepted two drones over Crimea.[5] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[6]

Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger reiterated common complaints about inadequate Russian counterbattery fire, electronic warfare, air defense, and assault operations along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[7] The milblogger especially complained about improper usage of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) to conduct frontal assaults like standard infantry against Ukrainian positions on the east bank even though these frontal assaults are ineffective in this area. The milblogger expressed concerns about possible future Ukrainian operations in the Kherson direction, but other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are currently unable to achieve a breakthrough in this direction.[8]

Russian milbloggers are likely hyperfocusing on east bank Kherson Oblast due to the significant Russian information space neuralgia about Russian military issues in the area. Some Russian milbloggers appear to be less concerned about the possible near-term threat of Ukrainian operations on the east bank and are more upset about the poor Russian conduct of the war and mistreatment of military personnel.[9] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian forces struggle with the “ossification” of poor habits and conduct within the Russian military. These habits include poor communications, lack of proper preparations before or support during assault missions, conducting rotations in columns, Russian commanders selling frontline aid, and uninterest in learning from military mistakes and acknowledging poor battlefield realities.[10] The milblogger specifically emphasized the importance of Russian military professionalism and becoming the best army in the world. Other Russian milbloggers reiterated standard complaints about Russian military capabilities in Kherson Oblast but claimed that Russian forces still inflict high casualties on Ukrainian forces operating on the east bank.[11] Another prominent milblogger claimed that the situation near Krynky, Kherson Oblast is a “tactical problem” for Russian forces but not a strategic threat.[12]

Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on November 10 that Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 500 Shahed-131/-136 drones in September 2023 and several hundred drones in October 2023 but are currently launching drone strikes with fewer Shaheds almost every night.[13] Russian milbloggers noted on November 9 that Russian forces conducted large-scale Shahed strikes against Ukraine almost every night from the end of summer until mid-October 2023.[14] The milbloggers claimed that Russia’s Shahed strikes have been notably smaller and less frequent in the past month due to Russian forces planning to synchronize a new wave of intense combined strikes with the beginning of future large-scale ground operations. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 10 that Russian forces launched six Shaheds, a Kh-31 missile, and a Kh-59 missile at targets in Ukraine on the night of November 9 to 10.[15] Ukrainian air defenses downed five of the six Shaheds and the Kh-59 missile. Ihnat reported that the Kh-31 missile did not strike its target.[16]

Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024. Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and other unnamed commanders briefed Putin on the progress of the invasion and presented new models of Russian military equipment.[17] Russian state outlets published footage of Shoigu and Gerasimov showing Putin the Desertcross 1000-3 all-terrain vehicle.[18] Russian opposition outlet Meduza observed that an information stand displaying data about the Desertcross 1000-3 in the video claimed that the all-terrain vehicle is intended for patrol, reconnaissance, raid, search, and rescue operations, alongside transporting materiel in difficult road conditions.[19] The information stand also claimed that Russian forces are already using 537 Desertcross 1000-3 vehicles in combat and that Russia plans to purchase an additional 1,590 Desertcross vehicles in December 2023 and in the first quarter of 2024. Meduza noted that US-registered brand Aodes (which is headquartered in China) manufactures the Desertcross vehicles and advertises them as vehicles for hunters, farmers, and forestry workers.

Russian milbloggers have been consistently complaining about the lack of military equipment and vehicles in the Kherson direction, and it is possible that Putin is trying to appeal to Russian personnel fighting in this direction by providing them with hunting and farming vehicles rather than dedicated military vehicles.[20] A prominent Russian milblogger, for example, celebrated the news that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would provide Russian servicemen with light frontline vehicles.[21] Putin’s November 10 visit marks his fifth visit to the SMD headquarters since December 2022 after he last visited the headquarters on October 19.[22]

Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign. Russian news outlet RBK stated on November 10 that sources familiar with the matter indicated that the “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference will likely occur in tandem on December 14.[23] Russian opposition media outlet Verstka stated that sources within the Federation Council indicated that the upper chamber will announce the beginning of the campaign period for the 2024 Russian presidential elections on December 13, as required by Russian law.[24] Verstka stated that presidential candidates have 25 days to complete the nomination procedures after the Federation Council’s announcement.[25] Although it is unclear when Putin will announce his presidential campaign, he will likely use the “Direct Line” forum and press conference to promote his candidacy and platform, which a Russian opposition source has indicated will widely avoid highlighting the war in Ukraine.[26] The Kremlin likely decided to hold the two events at once in order to more tightly control and regulate the questions asked. Putin has consistently run as an independent candidate despite his affiliation with the United Russia party, and Russian law dictates that independent candidates must gather at least 300,000 signatures in order to submit their candidacy.[27] Russian opposition media outlets stated on November 10 that the United Russia party is preparing to collect signatures to demonstrate its support for Putin’s candidacy and asked employees of the Kursk Oblast Multifunctional Service Center, a state and municipal service provider, to fill out a survey with their personal information and up to three suggestions about how to improve IT services in Russia.[28] The employees reportedly received a letter with the survey stating that they could write one suggestion three times but to fill out the form by hand.[29]

Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.[30] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Russian authorities forcibly deported Yermokhin from Mariupol after Russian forces took occupied the city in May 2022 and placed him with a foster family in Moscow Oblast.[31] Yermokhin’s lawyer published a video on his behalf on November 9 pleading for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s help after Yermokhin received a summons for military service on November 8, weeks ahead of his 18th birthday.[32] Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed that Yermokhin testified in writing in August 2023 that he did not plan to return to Ukraine, but Yermokhin’s lawyer stated that Russian authorities forced the teenager to write the statement.[33] Meduza reported that Yermokhin previously attempted to escape Russia in March 2023, but that Russian border guards detained him.[34] Lubinets stated that Ukrainian authorities will reunite Yermokhin with his sister in Ukraine in the coming days.[35]

The United Kingdom–led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Operation Interflex, which initially included the United Kingdom but has added Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, and Sweden as partners since its launch in summer 2022, achieved its goal of 30,000 Ukrainian military personnel trained ahead of time on November 10.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff and UK government stated that the UK has trained over 52,000 Ukrainian soldiers since 2014.[37] The UK government stated that Operation Interflex is the largest military training program on UK territory since the Second World War.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10.
• Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign.
• Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.
• The United Kingdom-led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on November 10 along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Russian forces continue to struggle with low morale and poor discipline.
• Ukrainian Telegram channel Mariupol Resistance and Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on November 10 that Ukrainian partisans detonated a police car in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 10 and recently made marginal confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 7 and 9 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk).[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), and northeast of Petropavlivka in the Kupyansk direction, as well as near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km southwest of Kreminna) in the Lyman direction.[40] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces have slightly increased their focus on assault operations in the Kupyansk direction and are beginning to use more vehicles in ground assaults.[41]

Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian assaults near Tymkivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) and Synkivka in the Kupyansk direction on November 10.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern flank on November 10 and made confirmed marginal advances. A Russian milblogger published and claimed to have geolocated footage on November 9 indicating that Ukrainian forces slightly advanced north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault operations in the Bakhmut direction.[44]

Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian positions on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks on November 10 and made confirmed territorial gains. Geolocated footage published on November 10 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced in the forested area north of Klishchiivka.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained some previously lost positions north of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) near a water feature and secured a position in a forest strip behind the railway track, pushing Ukrainian forces away from the T0513 highway.[46] The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions north of Klishchiivka behind the railway line and noted that mines, Ukrainian drones, and mutual artillery fire are complicating Russian attacks on Bakhmut‘s southern flank.[47] One Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russian forces continue to counterattack near Klishchiivka and Berkhivka (directly north of Bakhmut) and have successfully pushed Ukrainian forces “several hundred meters” from the railroad near Klishchiivka.[48] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces continue to advance near the Berkhivka reservoir and are advancing further west along the railway north of Bakhmut.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division) continue to operate in the Bakhmut direction.[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations around Avdiivka on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached and entered the outskirts of Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka) and continue to fight in the area.[52] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger added that Russian forces also secured positions on the railway line, allowing Russian forces to achieve tactical successes near Stepove.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to both create a cauldron around Avdiivka and deprive Ukrainian forces of the ability to maintain positions in rear areas in the Avdiivka direction.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to attack in the direction of the Avdiivka Coke Plant north of Avdiivka and that the main battles are ongoing in the directions of Stepove, Berdychi (5km northwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka).[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults east and southeast of Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka); near Stepove, Avdiivka, Sieverne, and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka); and south of Tonenke.[56] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces’ most important target is the Avdiivka Coke Plant because capturing the plant would allow Russian forces to establish defensive positions in an industrial area instead of in forested terrain.[57]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Avdiivka direction on November 10 and reportedly recaptured previously lost positions. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) and regained some of their previously lost positions.[58] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are consistently trying to counterattack to regain lost positions.[59]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi reported that Ukrainian forces have destroyed over 100 Russian tanks and 100 armored vehicles, approximately 50 artillery systems, and seven Su-25 aircraft during Russian assaults on Avdiivka over nearly a month.[60] Zaluzhnyi added that Russian manpower losses in the Avdiivka direction total about 10,000 personnel. Shtupun reported that daily Russian casualties average between 400 to 600 personnel and noted that Ukrainian forces use aerial reconnaissance and intelligence to prevent Russian forces from reinforcing their troops operating in the Avdiivka direction.[61]

Russian forces attacked west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 10 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Marinka (on Donetsk City’s western outskirts) and Novomykhailivka (12km southwest of Donetsk City).[62] Shtupun stated that Russian forces continue to attack Marinka and Novomykhailivka with “Storm-Z” units, which are mostly composed of Russian convicts.[63] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults on Ukrainian positions near Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City) and on Marinka’s western outskirts on November 9.[64]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces tried to advance near Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast on November 10 but did not specify the outcome of this attempt.[65]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) on November 10.[66] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area in the past week.[67]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and south of Zolota Nyva (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) on November 10.[68]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 10. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne) and Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne) and that fighting is ongoing for the heights northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[69] A Russian source claimed that there are meeting engagements near Robotyne.[70] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled 14 Ukrainian attacks near Verbove and Robotyne in the past week.[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on November 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne and Verbove.[72] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and advanced in the direction of Robotyne on November 9.[73]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an MLRS strike on Kamianka-Dniprovska west of Enerhodar on November 10.[74]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 10. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Poyma (10km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km southeast of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), Pidstepne (18km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), and Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River).[75] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces partially gained a foothold south of Krynky on November 9 but later withdrew due to Russian shelling.[76] Russian sources claimed that gaps in Russian air defenses are allowing Ukrainian forces to operate attack and tactical aviation near the front near Krynky.[77]Geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Krynky.[78]

A Russian source claimed that the Ukrainian missile strike on Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast on November 9 struck the 126th Military Investigative Department of the Russian Investigative Committee. The source claimed that two Ukrainian HIMARS rockets struck the building during a meeting, killing eight to 10 Russian officers and personnel, including the acting head of the 126th Military Investigative Department.[79]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces continue to struggle with low morale and poor discipline. The Russian State Duma is considering a bill that would impose the same harsh criminal penalties on Russian military volunteers as on Russian mobilized personnel for refusing to comply with orders, voluntarily surrendering, damaging weapons, or deserting.[80] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that a group of mobilized personnel of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) beat their regiment’s deputy commander, ”Lieutenant Muserbekov,” in occupied Simferopol on November 1 and that Muserbekov died from his injuries on November 7.[81] The GUR stated that the mobilized personnel subsequently fled to Krasnodar Krai dressed as civilians.

Russia continues to form new irregular formations to support combat operations in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 10 that the newly-formed “Volga” volunteer artillery brigade reinforced the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[82]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

BBC’s Russia service reported on November 10 that Ukrainian drone pilots stated that Russian forces are using drones to seize the initiative near Bakhmut.[83] BBC’s Russia service stated that Russia is copying Ukraine’s use of maneuverable combat drones and expanding the use of these drones to include dropping explosives on the enemy. A Ukrainian drone platoon commander stated that Russian drones are operating in the air day and night, which he stated indicates that Russia has established mass production of drones for reconnaissance, surveillance, and strikes. The commander estimated that Russian forces have twice the number of drones that Ukrainian forces have in the Bakhmut sector.

Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) is reportedly producing its own “Zhirinovsky” drone variant, likely to commemorate LDPR’s late leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Russian sources claimed that LDPR Chairman Leonid Slutsky presented 10 “Zhirinovsky” drones to an unspecified motorized rifle battalion during a visit to Crimea on November 9 and suggested that the drones will likely be used in the Kherson direction.[84] Vladimir Oblast’s Rokot-Center 33 reportedly manufactured LDPR’s drones, which can operate in inclement weather, switch frequencies in case of signal loss, and have a range of up to 12 kilometers. Rokot-Center 33 claimed on November 9 that the organization has been in contact with the LDPR party for almost five months.[85]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian Telegram channel Mariupol Resistance and Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on November 10 that Ukrainian partisans detonated a police car in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[86] Mariupol Resistance published photos showing the aftermath of the explosion and stated that partisans took advantage of “a convenient opportunity.”[87] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities believe there are over 5,000 Ukrainian partisans in occupied Ukraine but have failed to suppress them.[88]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 10 that Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) authorities are distributing propaganda literature that justifies Russian occupation and denies the existence of Ukrainian identity in non-ROC churches in occupied Ukraine.[89] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russian authorities are persecuting representatives of all non-ROC faiths and have looted and co-opted all non-ROC churches in occupied Ukraine.