Hasan Alhasan & Viraj Solanki
In September 2023, seven countries and the European Union announced plans to create the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), negotiated on the margins of the G20 Summit in New Delhi. This is the latest in a series of initiatives led by the United States aimed at integrating partners in the Middle East and South Asia into a common geo-economic architecture, while also demonstrating that Washington is funding ambitious international infrastructure projects like China with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
IMEC partners – the EU, France, Germany, India, Italy, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the US – signed a memorandum of understanding at the G20 Summit stating that they will cooperate to establish two corridors, one connecting Europe to the Gulf and the other connecting the Gulf to India. The corridors will consist of rail links, electrical and data cables, and pipelines for exporting hydrogen. They will also connect with Israel and Jordan, though these countries did not sign the IMEC agreement.
Obstacles
The announcement seemed to suggest that negotiations over Saudi–Israeli normalisation had gathered momentum. But the start of the Hamas–Israel war on 7 October has pushed the issue off the agenda, and it will now be far more difficult to build new economic and political links between Israel and the Middle East. Relations between Israel and Jordan are particularly tense. In a sign of trouble ahead, participant countries failed to convene a meeting within 60 days to develop an IMEC ‘action plan’ as described in the G20 announcement. The war also caused the postponement of a minilateral meeting of the I2U2 – comprising India, Israel, the UAE and the US – that had been scheduled for October.
Beneath the surface, IMEC largely repackages pre-existing, troubled connectivity projects, and participant countries have not yet described how these projects will be financed. For example, the Israeli government announced one component of IMEC, Tracks for Regional Peace, in 2017, which would link Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia by rail to allow the movement of goods between the Israeli ports of Haifa and Ashdod and Saudi ports. Regional countries approved another component, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Railway, in 2009 to link the six regional states via a US$250 billion freight and passenger rail network. The project, originally scheduled for completion by 2018, is far behind schedule.
The UAE is also building a railway network linked to Saudi Arabia, but the international connection is not yet finished. It is slated for completion in 2024. Likewise, although Saudi Arabia’s rail network reaches its border with Jordan, the two countries do not yet have a functional rail connection. Multiple economic and political factors could cause further delays. For example, a protracted drop in oil prices could constrain GCC states’ fiscal capacity, as happened from 2016–20, or new conflicts could emerge between the Saudis and Emiratis or Jordanians.
Meanwhile, New Delhi has a poor record finishing projects related to regional connectivity and infrastructure – for example, in Africa, with Japan and with Sri Lanka – and its ability to play a meaningful role in IMEC is unclear. India has yet to propose a clear strategy for providing connectivity and infrastructure project alternatives and integrating further with its South Asian neighbours – six of which have joined the BRI. This raises questions about New Delhi’s ability to integrate meaningfully into connectivity frameworks and deliver on projects in the Middle East and Europe.
IMEC also excludes some countries that, geographically, seem like prime candidates for inclusion, such as Iraq, Oman and Turkiye. Muscat, for example, could have served as a transit point to Saudi Arabia in addition to the UAE. India has long been part of the International North–South Transit Corridor, with Oman as a member country, which will link India to Russia through Iran and the Central Asian republics.
IMEC as public diplomacy
Given these challenges, IMEC looks like a greater achievement for public diplomacy than for its promise to increase economic and transport connectivity. For India, joining IMEC allowed it to project the image that it is playing a substantial role in an initiative serving as a counterpoint to the BRI, and particularly the BRI-funded China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. New Delhi surely also approved of the project’s name, which suggests rhetorically that the new corridor will originate in India and flow west to Europe. The Arab states, meanwhile, have positioned themselves at the intersection of geo-economic competition as they navigate the emerging multipolar landscape.
Washington has thus far upheld the appearance that its alternative to the BRI, the Partnership on Global Infrastructure Investment, is delivering. There is some reputational risk involved over the long term, however, given that the US has repeatedly announced new trans-regional corridors and connectivity initiatives in recent years without a clear plan for overcoming serious geopolitical and financial obstacles.
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