Russia’s Axis of the Sanctioned

Hanna Notte

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At first glance, the war against Ukraine appears to be a disaster for Russia. With most of its soldiers tied up fighting Kyiv’s forces, Moscow is struggling to station troops abroad. Russia has also had to redeploy to Europe some weapons and military systems it had positioned in Asia and the Middle East. And Moscow’s military sales, already in decline, are now in greater peril. Sanctions have deterred traditional Russian clients from continuing with their purchases, and Russia’s poor military performance has dampened enthusiasm among prospective ones.

These constraints and problems are real. But if Western officials believe, as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in June, that the war in Ukraine is “greatly diminishing Russia’s power, its interests, and its influence,” they should think again: Russia still has significant international sway. Moscow maintains steady defense contracts with most of its legacy customers, such as India and Vietnam, which rely on Russia to maintain their systems. Russia has had to move most of its soldiers and material to Ukraine, but it still has permanent air and naval bases in Syria, giving the country direct access to the Mediterranean and allowing it to harass U.S. forces in the Middle East. The Moscow-led Wagner paramilitary company controls several bases in Libya, which serve as a logistics hub for its activities in the Sahel. Wagner is set to continue operating in one form or another, even after its former boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, was killed in a plane crash (likely orchestrated by Russian President Vladimir Putin). Moscow is also considering whether to use or establish additional bases in Africa.

In fact, for Russia, there’s an upside to newfound isolation: stronger, deeper defense cooperation with the many countries that are also hostile to the United States and Europe. This collection of countries—which stretches from Venezuela to North Korea—may not have much in common beyond shared enemies, and individually, none of them is especially powerful. But together, they can help the Kremlin sustain its war against Ukraine. They can also help other members further their own regional ambitions, increasing the odds of military conflict across the world.

Given these dangers, the United States can no longer afford to dismiss any of these countries as minor antagonists or bit players. Washington also cannot count on sanctions alone, no matter how comprehensive, to sap the influence of these states. Instead, the United States will have to reinvest in its own partnerships and alliances in order to balance against Russia’s axis. Otherwise, Washington will not be able to constrain these countries as they try to sow chaos in multiple parts of the world.

COALITION OF THE WILLING

When Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western countries moved quickly to isolate Russia from the global economy. They issued sweeping sanctions designed to cut Moscow off from U.S. and European technology. Europe, long dependent on Russian gas and oil, canceled new projects with Moscow and began pursuing energy contracts with other states. Washington froze hundreds of billions of dollars of Russian central bank assets, making it harder for Russian businesses to conduct international trade.

To some extent, these restrictions have worked. Russia’s economy has stagnated since the invasion began, and some of its factories have ground to a halt. Yet the restrictions have not been the body blow that Western officials hoped for—or anything near it. Western capitals like to believe that their actions have turned Russia into what they call a rogue state. But there are many such countries, and Russia is now a valuable partner to all of them.

Consider, for example, Russia’s weapons sector. Western sanctions have squeezed Moscow out of the higher-end arms market, but they have not put one of the world’s largest defense exporters out of business. Since the start of the war, Moscow has stepped up its provision of lower-end weapons—including older helicopters—to various countries. Myanmar accepted a delivery of Russian fighter jets last month. Mali, Togo, and Uganda all recently procured Russian combat helicopters. These states, along with the new military junta in Burkina Faso, have telegraphed their desire for deeper defense cooperation with Russia. At the Army-2023 military forum in Moscow, Russian officials aggressively advertised their country’s military drones to African customers, hoping to whet their appetite for systems that are affordable and that (unlike many other Russian weapons) have proven themselves on the Ukrainian battlefield. These African states are too poor for their potential purchases to be of much financial value to the Kremlin. But they will help Moscow cement its broader influence on the continent.

Russia’s dealings with Iran should be of even greater concern to U.S. and European officials. The two countries, united by their shared animosity toward Washington, are developing what could become a major defense partnership. Since last summer, Russia has relied on Iranian combat drones—first in an attempt to degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, and more recently to attack Ukrainian military targets. Iran has yet to provide Russia with missiles, but UN-imposed restrictions on such sales expire on October 18, and missile deliveries could quickly follow. Iran, meanwhile, has an extensive wish list of Russian arms, including fighter jets and air defense systems. Russia, reluctant to antagonize Arab states (with which it also cooperates), might not immediately meet all of Tehran’s asks, and it may keep some of its support secret. But there has been a flurry of Iranian-Russian military engagement, including Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s tour of an arms exhibition in Tehran in September. It would be surprising if Moscow did not send Iran at least some weapons.

Russia’s ties with North Korea could follow a similarly dangerous path. Moscow is already purchasing artillery shells and rockets from Kim Jong Un’s regime; in exchange, Putin might give North Korea material Pyongyang needs for its satellite and submarine programs. Kim and Putin did, after all, recently meet in Russia’s east, where they exchanged guns and rifles as presents. Russia has also stepped up its cooperation with Myanmar—a lesser pariah—in ways that go beyond selling it aircraft. Russian officials have been busy buying back weapon components from the country’s junta, and in exchange, Moscow has provided the state with diplomatic backing and antiterrorist training. Russia’s defense establishment may be ridiculed for its incompetence on the Ukrainian battlefield, but it is giving the militaries of rogue regimes worldwide a new look.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

At first, Russia’s new axis may not seem worth fretting about. Its members appear to be a collection of desperate, weak countries that pose little threat to the West. North Korea has nuclear weapons, but it is poor and far away from the United States. Iran can sporadically attack Washington’s Arab partners, but it is, at best, a regional power. The African members struggle with internal instability.

But the effects of their cooperation will not be trivial—including for Kyiv. Although the weapons supplied by any one partner will unlikely prove decisive for Putin’s drive to subjugate Ukraine, they will make a dent in the aggregate. If Russia can tap into large stocks of North Korean ammunition, buy back enough tank and missile materials from Myanmar, and build a drone factory with Iranian help, Russia will have a far easier time sustaining its long war of attrition. Indeed, cooperation among the axis is already bolstering Russia’s war effort. According to an analysis by the Washington Institute, Venezuela’s state-owned airline—previously sanctioned by the United States for its involvement in Tehran’s illicit arms network—may be transporting Iranian arms and equipment to Russia.

Russia is not the only country that will benefit from this axis. Deeper cooperation could also give rise to broad defense ecosystems characterized not just by mutual material support but also by mutual instruction. Iranian officials, for instance, want to learn from their Russian counterparts about cyber-intelligence and artificial intelligence, whereas Moscow hopes to get Tehran’s advice on sanctions evasion and adapting civilian goods for military use. Pyongyang could get Russian support for its submarine program in exchange for even more weapons.

Any Russian assistance to Iran’s and North Korea’s ballistic missile and space programs—whether active or passive—would be especially empowering for both countries. This type of help from Russia could allow Iran to develop ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, should Tehran choose to do so. It could also generally embolden Iran, leading it to calculate that its regional adversaries will not dare attack it and its nuclear sites. Assistance from Russia may similarly enhance Kim’s appetite for risk, increasing the odds of military escalation on the Korean Peninsula. If Russia de facto accepts Iran as a near-nuclear state and North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state, it could push other countries to proliferate, as well.

These countries could also receive support from another external power: China. Although Beijing may not become a true member of Moscow’s axis, and although it adamantly proclaims it is impartial in the Ukraine war, Chinese officials already help Russia’s emerging network of countries. Beijing also helps Moscow itself. China, for example, maintains a significant defense industrial partnership with Russia, imports substantial quantities of arms from the country, facilitates its microchip trade, and occasionally conducts joint naval drills with the Russian armed forces. Beijing could offer more assistance to Moscow and other axis members in the years to come. China and Russia could even adopt a (tacit or overt) division of labor when it comes to which state aids which weaker partner.

But even if Beijing provides minimal outside support, any cooperation between Russia and axis countries will lead to high levels of synergy. Russian diplomacy, for example, might help Myanmar forge military ties with North Korea, something the junta wants to do. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger just signed a tripartite mutual defense pact, so Russian military cooperation with any one of these countries will likely benefit the others. The axis of the sanctioned will be more than the sum of its parts.

CLOSE RANKS

For the United States, handling this axis will not be easy. Washington will need to hedge against war in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula while continuing to expend resources defending Ukraine and deterring China from attacking Taiwan. These woes may be compounded by greater instability in Africa, as Wagner (in whatever post-Prigozhin incarnation) promotes a pro-Russian agenda in the states where it has influence. If African countries see Russia as a credible alternative security partner to Western states, Moscow’s sway across the continent might grow even further—especially given that the West’s presence on the continent is widely resented by locals. There is a reason why the Russian flag has become a popular symbol of support for military regimes across the Sahel.

To deal with these challenges, Western policymakers will need to think about Russia’s axis in holistic terms, rather than as a series of discrete partnerships. They will need to recognize the interconnections between different regions and understand that states they sanction and shun will work together, despite mutual mistrust. Western officials can start by realizing that further sanctions are unlikely to significantly slow or stop cooperation between Russia and its partners. These states are accustomed to operating under U.S. and European restrictions, and they will meet new sanctions with adaptation and improvisation.

Instead of implementing more restrictions, the best step the United States can take to combat antagonists is strengthening its own partnerships. Washington needs to help allies in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, which are the states most vulnerable to Russia’s axis. The more secure South Korea feels regarding North Korea, the more likely Seoul is to backfill orders from NATO countries that provide weapons to Ukraine. The more the United States helps Iran’s regional adversaries integrate their air and missile defenses, the more likely it is that Washington can stem nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

The United States has already laid the right foundations. It has, for example, facilitated Israeli military cooperation with other U.S. regional partners. It has also set up the Nuclear Consultative Group to discuss nuclear security and strategic issues with South Korean officials. But to manage allies’ insecurities, Washington will need sustained attention, not just isolated bursts of activity. At the same time, the United States needs to encourage diplomacy between its Middle East partners and Iran, and between South Korea and North Korea, where possible. In Washington’s effort to balance against Russia’s axis, credible threats and assurances must be part of the same coin.

Succeeding in these tasks will not be easy, especially when Washington’s attention is consumed by the war in Ukraine. But completing them is essential. Without such efforts, the axis of the sanctioned will only grow bigger and stronger, making it harder for the West to support Ukraine and defend its interests in other parts of the world.