RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 14, 2023

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark

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US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on October 13 that the new Russian offensive operations near Lyman and Avdiivka “did not come as a surprise.”[1] Kirby stated that the US is confident that Ukrainian forces will repel these Russian attacks.[2] Kirby also reported that Russian forces appear to be using human wave tactics, wherein the Russian military uses masses of poorly trained and equipped Russian soldiers to attempt to advance - the same practice Russian forces used during their failed winter offensive in winter 2023.[3] ISW has additionally observed Russian forces using higher than usual numbers of armored vehicles in ongoing operations.[4] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov similarly reported on October 12 that Ukrainian forces knew about and prepared for the Russian attack near Avdiivka and that Russian forces did not form sufficient reserves to attack along the entire frontline, but only in certain sectors.[5] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian mines are slowing Russian advances near Avdiivka, indicating Ukrainian prior preparations for the attack.[6]

The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities. Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of the waste heap north of Avdiivka.[7] Additional geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Avdiivka.[8] Some Russian sources claimed on October 13 and 14 that Ukrainian defensive fortifications pose a significant challenge to Russian advances around Avdiivka.[9] Some Russian sources indicated that Russian problems with medical support are also impeding Russian advances in the Avdiivka area. One Russian source claimed on October 12 that there is a shortage of surgeons in occupied Horlivka and Donetsk City near Avdiivka and called on Russian doctors to travel to the front to help treat wounded Russian soldiers.[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun similarly stated on October 14 that the majority of Russian casualties in the Avdiivka direction are due to low-quality medical treatment and local hospitals reaching capacity.[11]

Other Russian milbloggers continued to praise Russian offensive efforts on October 13 and 14 and reiterated the Kremlin’s desired narrative that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is over.[12] One Russian milblogger warned that Russian officials and sources have likely dismissed the Ukrainian counteroffensive too quickly and noted that it is too early to determine if the Russian attacks near Avdiivka will develop into an organized offensive operation.[13]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Marinka (just west of Donetsk City).[14] Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack Russian positions on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) towards Rivne (24km southwest of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[16]

The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main drydock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol. Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Professor Nikolai Muru tugboat and the Pavel Derzhavin patrol ship on October 13 and stated that the BSF has redeployed vessels from Sevastopol to Kerch, Feodosia, and Novorossiysk (in mainland Russia).[17] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces continue to use the Sevastopol base because there are not enough piers to accommodate vessels at other ports, however.[18] The BSF‘s headquarters and main facilities including a dry dock are located in Sevastopol, and the Russian navy therefore must send some vessels for repairs within range of Ukrainian strikes.[19] The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on October 14 that the BSF has likely increased its defensive and reactive posture after multiple Ukrainian strikes on BSF assets in August and September 2023.[20]

Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating.[21] Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the corresponding degree as well as a statement recognizing the ICC’s jurisdiction on October 14 following the Armenian parliament‘s vote to ratify the statute on October 3.[22] Ratifying the Rome Statute notably legally obliges Armenia to arrest Putin on behalf of the ICC, which issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest on March 17, 2023, for illegally deporting Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.[23] Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute comes one day after Putin boasted about the strength of Russia-Armenia relations during the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Member States.[24]

Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week. Politico reported on October 13 that anonymous US officials stated that a “small number” of Ukrainian pilots will begin F-16 fighter jet training next week at Morris Air National Guard Base in Arizona after having completed English language training at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas.[25] One US official reportedly stated that the training may be accelerated due to Ukrainian forces’ urgent need for F-16 fighter jets.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses.
• The Russian information space remains divided on the prospects of Russian successes near Avdiivka and on current Ukrainian capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 14 and advanced west of Donetsk City.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will maintain some vessels at its main Sevastopol naval base amid Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels, as the Russian Navy’s main dry dock on the Black Sea is in Sevastopol.
• Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating.
• Ukrainian forces will reportedly begin training on F-16 fighter jets in the US next week.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Relatives of Russian mobilized men and recruited prisoners continue to complain that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command are mistreating troops on the frontlines – especially on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian federal subjects and occupied areas in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on October 14 that Russian forces have intensified their offensive operations in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction in recent days but that Ukrainian forces were prepared and are defending.[26] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces had previously suffered losses and spent two months resting and reconstituting before first resuming offensive operations near Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast (20km southwest of Svatove) then later attacking in the Kupyansk direction. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces ultimately aim to encircle Kupyansk and cross the Oskil River.

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 14 and marginally advanced southwest of Svatove. Geolocated footage published on October 13 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced along a road east of Makiivka, Luhansk Oblast.[27] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced over one kilometer into Ukrainian-held territory and captured 10 Ukrainian positions on the Lyman Pershyi-Orlyanka line (12km northeast to 20km east of Kupyansk) in the past few days.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (19km southeast of Kupyansk), and Kyslivka (21km southeast of Kupyansk) in Kharkiv Oblast and near Makiivka and Torske (14km west of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast.[29] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 237th Tank Regiment (both of 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Western Military District [WMD]) are trying to break through Ukrainian positions on the Nevske-Novovodyane (18km northwest to 16km southwest of Svatove) and Ploshchanka-Makiivka (16km northwest to 20km southwest of Kreminna) lines.[30] Mashovets also reported that the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 331st Airborne Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are operating in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).

Ukrainian sources indicated that the Russian military command is committing elements of all three WMD armies to offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Lyman line. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army, 6th CAA, and 20th CAA are conducting offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Lyman line.[31] The presence of all three army-level formations subordinate to the WMD on this frontline indicates that Russian forces are conducting these offensive operations under a relatively cohesive and doctrinally sound command structure. The Russian military command is also continuing to replace some Central Military District (CMD) elements with elements of the newly formed 25th CAA. Mashovets assessed that the 25th CAA will likely replace elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD).[32] ISW previously assessed that the 25th CAA will likely replace elements of the 41st CAA (CMD) but that the 25th CAA is likely combat ineffective due to its rushed deployment.[33] Mashovets assessed that Russia will likely use elements of the 35th and 55th Motorized Rifle brigades (both of the 41st CAA) and possibly elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), 90th Tank Division, and 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA) to attack near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Terny (17km west of Kreminna), and Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[34]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and did not advance on October 14. Russian military officials claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Ivanivka, Synkivka, Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk), and Yampolivka; north of Serebryanka 12km southwest of Kreminna); and in the Serebryanske forest area.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Bakhmut on October 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assaults south of Bakhmut.[36] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces gained a foothold along the rail line near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that the intensity of fighting has slightly decreased along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka (7-13km southwest of Bakhmut) line.[38]

Russian forces continued assaults near Bakhmut on October 14 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[39] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have taken up positions east of an unspecified highway, potentially the T0513 highway, near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[40] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are regularly conducting assaults at night in the Bakhmut direction.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive actions near Avdiivka on October 14 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of a waste heap two kilometers northwest of Avdiivka.[42] Several Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed that Russian forces abandoned previously occupied positions on the waste heap for an unspecified reason on October 13.[43] Additional geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Avdiivka.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Berdychi (9km northwest of Avdiivka), Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka), Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), and in the Vodyane (6km west of Avdiivka) direction and attempted to advance along the route to Keramik (10km north of Avdiivka).[45] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims as of this report. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Tonenke (5km northwest of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Netaylove (14km southwest of Avdiivka).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also attacked near Kamianka, Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka), in the direction of Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka).[47] One Russian milblogger compared the challenge that Ukrainian minefields pose to Russian forces near Avdiivka as comparable to the challenge Russian minefields posed for Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[48] A Russian milblogger posted footage on October 13 claiming to show elements of the Russian 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) operating near Avdiivka.[49]

Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Marinka (just west of Donetsk City).[50]

Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Marinka on October 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Marinka.[51] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked near Novomykhailivka (12km southwest of Donetsk City) on October 13.[52] A Russian milblogger posted footage on October 14 claiming to show elements of the Russian 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) operating in the Marinka direction.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on October 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and east of Urozhaine (9km south of Velka Novosilka).[54] The Russian milblogger also claimed that positional battles are ongoing along the Hrusheva Gully north of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[55]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly advanced on October 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) marginally advanced east of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Staromayorske.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assault operations near Staromayorske.[58]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly made limited advances on October 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) towards Rivne (24km southwest of Orikhiv).[59] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv), Robotyne, and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[60] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing on the western outskirts of Verbove.[61]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to recapture lost positions near Robotyne.[62] Russian sources claimed on October 13 and 14 that Russian forces counterattacked near Verbove.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 14 that Russian forces counterattacked and pushed Ukrainian forces back along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line (20km southwest to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) but that fighting continues in the area.[64]

A Ukrainian military official reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Kherson Oblast and Snake Island. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on October 14 that Russian forces launched 30 guided aerial bombs mostly at Kherson Oblast and in the direction of Snake Island in the past day and targeted residential and agricultural areas.[65] Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are only conducting air strikes at night.

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 14 that Ukrainian forces attempted to land on islands in the Dnipro River. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces prevented four Ukrainian boats from landing on islands in the Dnipro River near Kozachi Laheri (23km east of Kherson City).[66] Russian sources claimed on October 14 that Ukrainian forces increased their maritime activity in the Dnipro River.[67]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct a drone strike on the eastern coast of the Black Sea in Russia. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian drones near Sochi on the coast of Krasnodar Krai.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Relatives of Russian mobilized men and recruited prisoners continue to complain that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command are mistreating troops on the frontlines – especially on the Kupyansk-Svatove line. Relatives of Russian servicemen from the Republic of Tatarstan issued a complaint claiming that the Russian military command is committing Russian mobilized personnel from the 2nd Battalion of the 1234th Regiment to assault operations, likely in the Svatove direction.[69] The relatives claimed that the battalion has been fighting in the Svatove direction for their second year and is suffering significant losses. The relatives demanded that elements of the battalion resume defensive tasks instead of engaging in offensive operations. Wives of mobilized servicemen of the 12th Guards Tank Regiment (4th Guards Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) claimed that the Russian military command placed 42 mobilized personnel into a basement on October 7 after their unit suffered 300 casualties during a failed assault in the Kupyansk direction.[70] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty‘s northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported that relatives of Russian prisoners who had joined Russian ”Storm Z” detachments complained that the Russian MoD is not returning the bodies of deceased ”Storm-Z” personnel and are refusing to provide any documents that would grant these personnel veteran status.[71]

A Russian milblogger amplified an alleged letter from an unidentified Russian serviceman who had claimed that the Russian military command had not resolved long-standing problems on the Kherson frontline.[72] The milblogger notably redacted the name of the serviceman’s unit and precise location in the letter, likely in an effort to self-censor and protect the servicemen or unit from punishment. The serviceman stated that his unit replaced motorized rifle elements from the Russian “24th” unit (the precise unit is likely intentionally unclear) and noted that commanders know about persistent issues in this direction. The serviceman noted that Russian forces struggle to provide each other coverage from Ukrainian FPV drones and struggle with a lack of normal communication with the Russian headquarters to direct artillery fire against Ukrainian targets. The serviceman added that his unit’s logistics routes are near the logistics routes of neighboring Russian units, which reveals Russian positions to Ukrainian forces. The servicemen noted that Russian forces in the Kherson direction are suffering significant losses due to these issues.