KRIS OSBORN
China’s emerging Core Operational Concept is described as “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare,” … a blend ot networking, AI, precision weaponry and joint operations all supporting what the People’s Liberation Army refers to as a “system-of-systems” approach.
Sound familiar? Interestingly, this PRC concept was fully articulated and unveiled to a certain extent in 2021, according to the Pentagon’s most recently published annual China Report, which describes the Chinese concept as specifically aimed at finding and countering US vulnerabilities.
“MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, what the PLA calls the “network information system-of-systems,” to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities,” states the Pentagon annual China report to Congress, called Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
Certainly upon initial examination with a mind to the Pentagon’s current thinking, the Chinese concept almost fully mirrors, replicates or simply “copies” the US military’s Joint All Domain Command and Control effort. The Chinese concept also appears to be a "several-years-behind" effort to copy the many US military Multi-Domain Task Forces which have for years been integrating land-sea-air operations into a joint warfare fighting conceptual paradigm.
So in a recent or immediate sense, the emphasis on networking, AI and multi-domain operational concepts could be seen as a transparent effort to simply “replicate” US modernization initiatives. An added variable to this is a concept of history to an extent, given the US Army introduced the “system-of-systems” idea as far back as 20-years ago as the foundation of its Future Combat Systems effort.
Following the ambitious yet ultimately ill-fated Army FCS program, which actually proved a number of key breakthroughs and successes of relevance today, the US Military has spent years working to solidify various versions of multi-domain interoperability and "system-of-systems" networking. Following years of joint networking attempts, both technologically and conceptual, the Pentagon is now arguably breaking through with networking in an unprecedented way. The Pentagon’s JADC2 is now being implemented as an effective integration or merging of the Army’s “Project Convergence” success, Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management Systems and Navy Project Overmatch. Each of the services has made breakthrough progress in developing the interfaces and technical infrastructure to better connect forces to one another in real time across domains. Now the merit of JADC2 is that it accomplishes this across the services through the use of gateways and common standards.
It would seem apparent that the PLA has taken notice of the Pentagon’s multi-domain networking process and seems, at least in concept, to emulate it completely through its "Multi-Domain Precision Warfare" concept. The Pentagon report explains the PLA’s approach in terms of “intelligentized” warfare, a kind of information-based warfighting approach drawing upon AI, joint-service connectivity and the ability to achieve new levels of precision targeting. Not only are the PLA concepts of operation analogous if not identical to the US, but even the language used to describe the approach closely mirrors terms used by the Pentagon.
The most pressing question would seem to be the success with which this Chinese networking vision has achieved or come close to achieving operational success. The Pentagon’s China report addresses this by explaining that indeed the PLA is employing training techniques aimed at further pursuing its multi-domain vision.
“MDPW (Multi-Domain Precision Warfare) is meant to sit atop an “operational conceptual system-of-systems,” suggesting the PLA will develop additional subordinate operational concepts and use simulations, war games, and exercises to test, evaluate, and improve these future-oriented operational concepts,” the Pentagon report states.
Specifically, the DoD China report points to Chinese efforts to train and test amphibious operations drawing upon “multi-dimensional assaults” with close air support and manned-unmanned teaming. It would make sense if China were looking to strengthen any ability to support its amphibious surface forces from the air, given that the PLA has no F-35B equivalent. China does not have a vertical-take-off 5th-generation aircraft able to operate from amphibious assault ships, something which presents the PLA with a clear deficit compared to the US Navy, as America-class amphibs are capable of deploying with as many as 15 F-35Bs.
“PLAA training events and reports in PRC media show that support to amphibious operations, multi-dimensional assaults, developing close air support tactics, and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) are now a standard part of training. Training in 2022 also included numerous examples of helicopters executing nighttime flight operations, over water maneuver, and ultra-low altitude flying,” the Pentagon report claims.
There are many other areas where China is seeking to achieve a US-military like joint connectivity or rapid-multi-domain targeting, something explored in detail in the Pentagon’s China reports as well. The DoD text explains that the PLA is making a specific effort to improve reconnaissance and command and control for the specific purpose of improving targeting for its Over-the-Horizon Anti-Ship-Cruise missiles. This would make sense, particularly upon considering the PLA’s highly touted DF-26 anti-ship missile reportedly capable of traveling 2,000 nautical miles to a target. Should some portion of this be accurate, or even close to accurate, it will not mean much in an operational sense unless the PLA has sufficient guidance systems and targeting precision for its DF-26. Can it track and hit moving targets? Can it change course in flight? What kind of precision guidance can it draw upon to exact its intended effect? Chinese government-backed newspapers regularly discuss these so-called “carrier-killer” missiles and cite reportedly successful tests … However, the exact extent to which China’s anti-ship-missiles are truly precise and capable of achieving and maintaining a target “track” on US Navy warships may remain somewhat of an open question. Accordingly, it therefore does not seem at all surprising that, as the Pentagon report claims, the Chinese are now making a specific push to improve its reconnaissance and targeting for its ASCMs.
The PLAN recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability to realize their full potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is investing in joint reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting information to surface and subsurface launch platforms.
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