Ukraine Proves, Once Again, That Our Idea of War Is All Wrong

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James M. Dubik

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U.S. and NATO military strategists are taught that the decisive part of a war resides in the major combat operations phase. America’s post-9/11 wars and the Ukraine War have proven that’s not so. Rather, using force during major combat operations, and after, together form the necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve the strategic political objectives of a war.

For the U.S. and other Ukraine allies this means a full commitment to supplying, on time, what the Ukrainian military needs to succeed in its counteroffensive. It also means an equal commitment to orchestrating all that is necessary to move from the end of major fighting through transitional stability to a durable political, economic and security situation in the region. Without both, neither Ukraine’s nor the allies’ strategic objectives will be realized.

The Zelenskyy administration’s aims of political sovereignty and territorial integrity allowing for self-determination and economic prosperity will not be accomplished merely by fighting to eject Russian troops from Ukrainian soil. It’s also in the allies’ strategic self-interest to continue to provide the aid and support to help Ukraine defeat Russia. The assistance that the U.S., NATO and other allies are providing helps to secure NATO’s borders, deters the war from escalating or widening, prevents an anarchical world in which illegal aggression becomes a norm, and sets conditions for holding Vladimir Putin and Russia accountable for the many heinous war crimes.

Winning in Ukraine is a form of deterrence from which both America and NATO will derive strategic benefit.

To attain Ukraine’s, America’s and NATO’s strategic political war aims, some form of international military force — that can create stability in the immediate post-major combat period, as well as establish the conditions for long-term security, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, economic and fiscal recovery — will be necessary for a good while after major fighting ends. This international stability force also will be necessary to separate forces and monitor Russia’s withdrawal, assure a proper environment exists to investigate and document the extensive and horrendous Russian war crimes, provide unimpeded movement for returning refugees and evacuees, allow for social/political reconstitution within Ukraine and the region, assist in demining, ameliorate the potential for corruption, and prevent Russia from using “deniable” forces like its special operations units, contractors and criminal gangs to foment instability.

A Ukrainian serviceman stands in front of a heavily damaged cultural center in Blagodatne, Donetsk region, on June 16, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images

The types of tasks described above are commonly misunderstood as “post-war” operations. But they are very much part of any war; they just occur after major fighting ends. The true measure of force’s utility, as Gen. Sir Rupert Smith reminds us in The Utility of Force, is “whether or not [the] death and destruction serve to achieve the … political purpose the force was intended to achieve.”