Youyou Zhou
Last September, Ukraine requested Western tanks from allies to push back against Russia’s invasion. At that time, Russia had not consolidated much of its hold on the territory it had taken. While allies debated whether or not they should send tanks, Russia began to dig in:
When Ukraine first requested Western tanks, satellite images show that Russia had only started to build fortifications.
By the time Ukraine finally received the tanks, half a year later, hundreds of miles of fortifications were visible from space.
Take the occupied city of Tokmak in Zaporizhzhia Oblast as an example: This is how the city looked in satellite imagery on Oct. 18, 2022.
Over the next two months, Russians set up barriers outside the major roads into the city. By Jan. 26, the entire city was surrounded by fortifications.
The pattern then repeated itself. Ukraine publicly asked for cluster munitions from the United States last winter, shortly after it had liberated the southern city of Kherson. The Biden administration delayed responding to the request. Meanwhile, this is what happened in occupied territory:
Dec. 8, 2022
When Ukraine requested U.S. cluster munitions, most of Russia’s new fortifications were concentrated near the front line.
July 6, 2023
Six months later, when Ukraine finally received the cluster munitions from the United States, Russia had fortified huge swaths of occupied eastern and southern Ukraine, along the border and throughout northern Crimea.
Without fear of Ukrainian-operated Western tanks or long-range missiles, Moscow’s soldiers were able to expand defenses close to the front line and deep within occupied territory.
These positions generally consist of trenches, anti-vehicle barriers and land mines. Michael Newton, who leads the land-mine-clearing operations in Ukraine for the HALO Trust, describes Russia’s mine-laying in occupied Ukrainian territory as taking place on an “industrial level.”
The network of fortifications consists of a primary defensive line and multiple layers of fallback positions. This means that not all of Russia’s trenches are manned, but they provide ready-made fighting positions aimed at stalling a Ukrainian advance.
Here are some illustrative examples:
Russia took the eastern Ukrainian city of Lysychansk in July 2022. New fortifications between the city and a nearby oil refinery underscore its importance to Russian forces.
Dec 19, 2022
Mar 14, 2023
Dec. 19, 2022
March 14, 2023
Dec. 19, 2022
March 14, 2023
Dec. 19, 2022
March 14, 2023
Located by the Black Sea, Berdyansk Airport is a base for Russian helicopters operating over occupied regions in southern Ukraine. Russian forces put up extensive barriers and trenches around it earlier this year.
Jan 8, 2023
Mar 14, 2023
Jan. 8, 2023
March 14, 2023
Closer to the front line, Russian forces constructed layers of fortifications along the 50 kilometers of highway that connect the occupied cities of Polohy and Tokmak.
Nov 14, 2022
May 3, 2023
Nov. 14, 2022
May 3, 2023
Nov. 14, 2022
May 3, 2023
Nov. 14, 2022
May 3, 2023
Even in Crimea, occupied by Russia since 2014, satellite images show new defenses along roads leading into the peninsula.
Oct 18, 2022
Feb 23, 2023
Oct. 18, 2022
Feb. 23, 2023
Oct. 18, 2022
Feb. 23, 2023
Oct. 18, 2022
Feb. 23, 2023
The pattern of delay is still in place. Ukraine has been asking for long-range missiles it would like to use to strike Russian command posts, staging areas and supply depots behind the front lines. The United States is once again dragging its feet.
Whether it is worries about escalation, or worries about supply shortages, the smart bet in Washington is that the long-range missiles, like the tanks and the cluster munitions before them, will ultimately be delivered.
If the last year of the conflict has shown anything, it’s that this kind of vacillation is costly. It not only squanders additional Ukrainian lives, but it also makes a protracted, grinding conflict more likely.
Ukraine’s allies have long recognized the frantic pace at which Russia has been building defenses in occupied territory. But this realization had little bearing on the speed of their own decision-making. That needs to change. Instead of uncomfortably looking on as Ukraine’s counteroffensive devolves into a slow war of attrition, Western leaders should become more proactive.
Ukraine needs our help, not our excuses.
About this story
The satellite images are from Copernicus Sentinel-2. Brady Africk, an open-source intelligence analyst who works for the American Enterprise Institute, analyzed the satellite imagery and provided the fortifications data, which does not include all fortifications in Ukraine; some defenses predate Russia’s full-scale invasion.
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