The UK’s refreshed Defence Command Paper attempts to capture the immediate lessons of Russia’s war in Ukraine, which flag the need for greater speed and agility in technology acquisition and equipment upgrades.
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence’s redefining of its relationship with the defence industry is a key element of its refreshed Defence Command Paper (DCP), as it moves away from a long-held platform-centric focus. The document has been spurred by Russia’s war in Ukraine, but its message echoes themes of the almost 20-year-old UK Defence Industrial Strategy, underscoring that identifying needed changes is far simpler than implementing them.
Ukrainian impact The DCP, published on 18 July 2023, reasserts the Euro-Atlantic region as London’s immediate security concern, and the UK’s membership of NATO as fundamental to its approach. Implicit within the paper, which mentions Russia far more often than China and omits references to ‘Global Britain’, is a recalibration of the UK government’s previous Indo-Pacific tilt given the gravity of Moscow’s aggression.
The DCP complements the March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, itself an update from a 2021 version that focuses not so much on the nature of the change in the security environment, but its pace. Pace is a driving theme of the DCP, particularly regarding acquisitions and modifying in-service platforms and, by association, the ministry’s wider relationship with industry.
Ukraine’s ability to react to changing battlefield realities by quickly fielding new technologies and adapting existing ones, if often with external support, has convinced the DCP’s authors of the need to change how the Ministry of Defence does business with industry.
Ukraine, with Western help, has leaned heavily on technology companies, including smaller suppliers, to better combat Russian forces. It is little surprise then that support for small- and medium-sized enterprises leads off the DCP’s section on what it terms a ‘new alliance’ between defence and industry, including embracing the idea of tapping private capital to help start-ups become part of the country’s defence industry.
Spiralling or spinning The DCP calls for future procurements to adopt spiral development: the underlying thinking is that equipment can be fielded earlier even if it does not immediately meet the ultimate design objective, and then be upgraded to its full capability. The approach also should make further upgrades easier to pursue.
Ahead of the DCP’s release, UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces James Heappey, speaking at the Global Air & Space Chiefs’ Conference in London on 13 July, sketched an example of this approach using combat aircraft. None of the current generation of aircraft being acquired have quantum-computing capabilities, but all will eventually require them to remain relevant. ‘We have to be able to buy aircraft, design aircraft, where the moment that those computers are good to go you can rip out whatever’s in there and chuck in the quantum computer’, Heappey said, likening the looming technology transition to a ‘tanks versus cavalry’ moment.
As part of that approach, the UK government now says it wants to avoid ‘vendor lock-in’. That would mean a prime contractor holds that role only for a certain time and that upgrades could be undertaken by others. But prime contractors often rely on the long-term nature of their programmes to make their business case. If the government wants to take ownership of the intellectual property to potentially allow another contractor to provide upgrades, that could come with a potentially hefty upfront cost.
Munitions matter The government also pledged to spend another £2.5 billion on munitions stocks after the Ukraine war highlighted how quickly these can be depleted. In the long term, the DCP calls for further enhancements to the supply chain.
The document, moreover, acknowledges that the UK can’t go it alone. In some instances, London will have to rely on close partners and strengthen their industrial capacity so that its own needs can be met. In other cases, the paper states that Britain will have to work more closely with international partners when it comes to cutting edge capabilities. The document gives little indication, though, in which areas the UK will look beyond its borders to collaborate.
The DCP does provide explicit support for two areas which the UK has long said are core: complex weapons and uncrewed systems. They remain sovereign requirements and could see multi-year commitments to allow industry investment with the assurance of demand, the document states.
Flash to bang The DCP also sets an ambition to procure capabilities more quickly. With a few exceptions the ambition is that equipment purchases should go from initiation to fielding within five years. The DCP calls for even faster fielding of digital technology. These tools are supposed to be ready within three years, though the timeline still seems leisurely for the high pace of defence technology. Ukraine has demonstrated that some of its technologies only have a shelf life of around 12 weeks before Russia adapts and the equipment needs to change again.
Some of the more ambitious programmes, generally captured under the Government Major Projects Portfolio, will be exempted from an umbrella timeline. These programmes, however, often experience many of the largest and most costly delays.
The DCP reflects critical issues that the fighting in Ukraine has raised for the UK defence establishment. But much of the required implementation will require future assessment, likely through an integrated review of national-security ambitions. However, with the current government facing an election no later than January 2025, this ‘refresh’ may be out of date before much change can happen.
No comments:
Post a Comment