Dr. Surendra Kumar Yadawa
1. Introduction
The decade from the global financial crisis (2008) to COVID-19 has seen a transformation of the new world order. This era of global uncertainty entails a different story and greater expectations for middle powers like India, Brazil, Germany, and South Africa on the path to becoming leading powers.
Consequently, India has to redefine relationships with different powers while considering of its interests. It also requires a new approach to dealing with its neighbours. The changing order—during the Cold War, it was largely bipolar and then briefly unipolar after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but now there is an emerging multipolarity. India the largest democracy in the world holds together as a single nation, manifests successes, achieved against the odds and deserves greater role in the Security Council of the United Nations.
It is India’s long-term record as a stable, multicultural democracy that lies behind its claims for a place (Guha, 2012). International Monetary Fund (IMF) report says India is set to be the world’s fastest-growing economy in 2023. Its GDP is expected to expand by 6.1%, well ahead of the emerging market average of 4% and five times the pace of the world’s average of 1.2%. India’s young consumers occupy pride of place in the growth forecasts of many Fortune 500 companies. This year, India will simultaneously hold the presidencies of the G-20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—a symbolic satisfaction for its efforts to be seen as a leading, rather than balancing, power on the global stage (Vaishnav, 2023, April 14). India is projected to be the fastest-growing large economy as well, at 5.9% this year. As PM Narendra Modi said recently, “India’s time has arrived.” India has the potential to be admired for not just the quantity of its growth but also the quality of its values. And that would truly be an incredible India (Zakaria, 2023, April 28). Introduction:
The current century has witnessed a profound transformation in the geopolitical landscape, marked by the gradual shift from a unipolar to a multi-polar world order. “Either way, whether it is the West or the rest that poses the greater challenge to the existing order, its basic elements will likely outlast American hegemony” Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). This new configuration of power centers, comprising a diverse array of regional powers, has significantly altered the dynamics of international relations and diplomacy. As traditional global hegemons’ influence wanes, emerging regional powers have found themselves presented with unique opportunities and challenges to shape the course of world affairs. Among these influential actors, India stands prominently as a key player in the ever-changing geopolitical chessboard. Moreover, a shift in the balance of power at the global level, with China and other major powers assuming a stronger stance in the international politics. At the same time, the international order, largely shaped by the West after II world war, has come under pressure (Keukeleire & Delreux 2022).
The transformation of the international system has allowed regional powers like India to assert themselves on the global stage, fostering a new environment that allows for greater manoeuvrability and influence. As New Delhi grapples with the complexities of this multipolar world, it faces both unprecedented opportunities and daunting challenges in defining and executing its foreign policy objectives. However, the emergence of multiple centres of power presents a complex set of challenges. This paper seeks to identify the key challenges that New Delhi must confront while pursuing its foreign policy objectives in a multipolar world. Balancing divergent interests, managing geopolitical rivalries, and addressing regional and global security concerns are some of the critical challenges that India must grapple with. By analysing the nuances of this dynamic global landscape, the paper seeks to shed light on the strategic choices and diplomatic approaches New Delhi can employ to maximise its influence.
1.1 Research Objective
The article evaluates Indian foreign policy in light of the changing multi-polar world order, its effects on regional powers, and the shifting global order. The study also examines the decision-making process in New Delhi, the opportunities and challenges it faces, and the effects on India’s foreign policy, regional dynamics, and the global order.
1.2 Research QuestionsWhat key factors influence India’s approach and policy initiatives to navigate multipolarity and how do India’s geopolitical positioning and regional dynamics impact its strategy to deal with regional powers?
How does India’s economic growth and development agenda align with its approach to multipolarity, and what role does it play in shaping its strategic decisions?
What are the implications of India’s relations with major global powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia?
How does India’s engagement with multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and regional organizations, contribute to its strategy for navigating multipolarity?
1.3 Research Methodology
This study analytically delineates India’s engagement with the United States, China, and other regional powers considering India’s approach to multipolarity. This also examines strategy, its rationale, and its implications for India’s position in the multipolar world.
2. Historical Context
India’s foreign policy and its traditional approach to non-alignment during the Cold War era were shaped by various historical factors. These factors include India’s colonial past, its quest for strategic autonomy, and its commitment to global peace and stability. Instead of joining any of the two blocs, India along with many of the then newly independent colonies established the Non-Aligned Movement (Ranjan, Amit. 2022). India’s long history of colonization by the British Empire greatly influenced its foreign policy outlook. The experience of being ruled by a foreign power for nearly 200 years fostered a strong sense of nationalism and self-determination among Indian leaders. The struggle for independence and the subsequent process of decolonization shaped India’s approach to international relations. India’s colonial past instilled a deep aversion to external interference and a commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity. This historical context played a significant role in shaping India’s foreign policy decision-making, fostering a desire for autonomy and independence in its international engagements. BJP core ideology and promise of radically overturning this Nehruvian consensus are then taken up and empirically tested against three significant theatres of Indian foreign policy since 1998 – nuclear proliferation, relations with Pakistan and ties with the USA (Chaulia, 2002)
2.1 Quest for Strategic Autonomy
India’s quest for strategic autonomy was another important factor in shaping its foreign policy during the Cold War era. India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, sought to establish itself as a leader of the newly independent countries of the Global South. Nehru envisioned a world order where countries could maintain their independence and pursue their own development paths free from alignment with the superpowers. India’s desire for strategic autonomy led to the formulation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The NAM aimed to provide a platform for developing countries to promote their collective interests and resist the pressures of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. India, along with other like-minded nations, advocated for a policy of non-alignment, which meant avoiding formal alliances and maintaining equidistance from both superpowers.
2.2 Commitment to Global Peace and Stability
India’s commitment to global peace and stability also played a crucial role in shaping its foreign policy during the Cold War era. India’s leaders believed in the principles of peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. As a country that had undergone a long and arduous struggle for independence, India empathized with the aspirations of other nations seeking freedom from colonial rule. India actively supported the decolonization process and advocated for the rights of self-determination for all nations. India also played a prominent role in peacekeeping operations under the United Nations, demonstrating its commitment to maintaining global peace and stability. The deployment of Indian troops in various conflict zones around the world highlighted India’s dedication to international peacekeeping efforts. In summary, India’s foreign policy and its traditional approach to non-alignment during the Cold War era were shaped by historical factors such as its colonial past, quest for strategic autonomy, and commitment to global peace and stability. These factors influenced India’s decision-making and positioned it as a champion of independence, non-alignment, and peaceful coexistence on the global stage.
2.3 Changing Global Dynamics
The balance of economic power among nations has been shifting over the years. Emerging economies, like China, Brazil, South Africa, and India, have been gaining influence and challenging the dominance of traditional economic powers, such as the United States and the European Union. These changes can lead to new alliances, trade patterns, and geopolitical strategies. Rapid technological advancements continue to revolutionise various industries and societies worldwide. Developments in artificial intelligence, automation, renewable energy, and biotechnology can alter labour markets, economic structures, and military capabilities. Climate change poses significant challenges and affects global dynamics. Rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and resource scarcity can exacerbate existing tensions, force migration, and impact economies. International cooperation and competition over resources and environmental issues will likely increase. Power struggles between nations may intensify due to the changing global landscape.
Existing rivalries, like the one between the United States and China, and new geopolitical tensions may shape alliances and conflicts. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the interconnectedness of global health systems and economies. The emergence of new infectious diseases and health crises can reshape international cooperation and health policies. Examine the emerging multipolar world order characterised by the rise of multiple power centres, including the United States, China, Russia, and regional players (Turner, S. 2009). Analyse the challenges and opportunities posed by this multipolar environment for India’s foreign policy objectives, national security concerns, and economic interests. The emerging multipolar world order, characterised by the rise of multiple power centres such as the United States, China, Russia, and regional players, presents both challenges and opportunities for India’s foreign policy objectives, national security concerns, and economic interests. Let’s analyse these aspects:
3. Emerging of a new order-multipolarity
On many fronts including demography, technology, economy, geopolitics, and others, the world is passing through a period of profound upheaval. The paradigms of global politics are changing, with new standards clearly emerging in geopolitics–financially and strategically (Wiseman, 2023, April 27). Further, these changes are occurring on account of deteriorating US fiscal fundamentals and the use of the dollar as a tool of diplomatic pressure is becoming counterproductive. Consequently, many nations are looking for an alternative exchange of currency. Russia and China are preferring Yuan in place of Dollar in bilateral trade.
Over the past decade, several emerging economies have grown more quickly than developed ones, changing the distribution of income globally in their favour. China has the second-largest economy in the world, behind the United States and ahead of Japan (Wade, 2011). Francis Fukuyama argues that populist nationalism is not a threat to ‘democracy’ if democracy simply means majorities for certain policies. It’s a threat to the liberal order, which is protected through the rule of law, and through constitutions that prevent abusive use of political power. (Fukuyama, 2018, August,14).
3.1 The global economic landscape
The global economic landscape is changing, and the economic centre of gravity is shifting from the West to the East. Mike Pence, an American politician said on February 16, 2019 “We cannot ensure the defense of the West if our allies grow dependent on the East.” Emmanuel Macron argued “Take India, Russia, and China for example. They have a lot more political inspiration than Europeans today. They take a logical approach to the world, they have a genuine philosophy, a resourcefulness that we have to a certain extent lost. And so, all of that has a major impact on us and reshuffles the cards” (The Munich Report 2020).
In April 2022, Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank, gave a speech titled “A new global map: European resilience in a changing world”, she acknowledged the West did not have a monopoly on power. Despite that the West is losing power relatively, she observed, many Western policymakers are against proposals for wider power redistribution in global governance. (Hashem, 2022) On April 5, 2023, Macron urged China’s President Xi Jinping to help negotiate an end to the War in Ukraine (The Wall Street Journal 2023).
3.2 War of Currency
Moreover, the contemporary multipolar world not a single nation or group of nations is leading the charge to address global issues. In other words, new emerging powers have replaced the status quo. New paradigms are emerging, and old paradigms are disappearing. The efforts by Russia and China that the yuan overtake the US dollar as the most traded currency in Russia are in progress. Russian President Vladimir Putin has hinted that his country wants to use the yuan in trade with other countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Importantly, India is actively promoting its currency in trade; 18 countries have agreed to use the rupee in bilateral trade, with more countries expected to join the group (Bhattacherjee, K. 2023, March 14). China and Brazil have decided to phase out the dollar in their trade and use their own currencies. Saudi Arabia has publicly stated that it is ready to conduct its trade, including energy, in currencies other than the dollar. On June 5, 2019, Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with Putin at the Kremlin, China and Russia have agreed to use the dollar in their bilateral trade.
3.3 The world economic order consists of ‘three major poles’
The current world economic order consists of three major poles, the United States, China, and the European Union. The EU as a regional bloc, not a country, is also an important world player, although it is aligned with the US in terms of NATO and committed to expanding NATO with possible new memberships of Sweden and Finland. The United Kingdom is now permanently separated from the European Union and the European Union is looking weak. Post-Elizabethan Britain faces further decline. On the other hand, India has overtaken it as the world’s fifth leading economy. Under these circumstances, even as integration is promoted in Europe, it is not clear that the EU can fulfil its ambition of becoming a global power.
4. The multipolarity and regional order
The global financial crisis, COVID-19, and the Ukraine war are catalysts of trends that have been in motion since World War II. Surprisingly, those who have dominated the world order since World War II seem unable to think pragmatically about a new world order. They think in terms of a zero-sum game that cannot move in the right direction. Multipolarity is revealing new power realities in various places. Significantly, geoeconomic and geopolitical realignments are taking place in various parts of the world due to the emerging power of nations like China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. The Middle East and North Africa are undoubtedly where this is the case. Arab countries are diversifying their strategic alliances in light of changing interests and the reality of power relations.
The Arabs are finding that their interests and strategic objectives increasingly align with multiple nations not limited to the West and the US. To gauge the decline of US influence in the Arab region, one needs to understand China’s active role in resolving regional conflicts (in Yemen and Syria). The Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement under China is certainly a clear signal that the US is not the single dominant player in a region of now-fluid alliances and partnerships. However, is not leave a vacuum. American influence is being replaced by the collective efforts of nations in the region to restructure the regional order and deepen strategic partnerships with countries such as China, Russia, and India. The age of Western hegemony is over. Whether or not America itself declines, the post-war liberal international order underpinned by US military, economic and ideological primacy and supported by global institutions serving its power and purpose, is coming to an end (Acharya, A. 2018).
4.1 Confront of visions for the region:
No longer a single power can be dominated by the Arabs, some US and West policymakers are still focusing on the region as subject to unipolarity, Arab leaders do not want any single power or group of nations to have a monopoly on regional affairs. Not limiting our partnerships to the US or the West, but expanding them to emerging powers such as China, Russia, and India. “The 21st century is touted to be the Asian age, belonging to China and India. Cold war and growing impacts of globalization are making India redefine its position and role at the regional and the global level” (Bava, 2007).
This is the reason for seeking membership in organizations such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, etc.). Arab countries with and South Africa), and its New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai. Strategically, it is not true that the Arabs do not want to continue their relationship with the US and the Western powers. However, Arab nations want to build up relations with countries based on mutual interests and benefits.
The Arab world’s future strategic direction will help determine how the game of great power competition plays out and how it contributes to shaping international and regional dynamics. The Arabs are strategically, demographically, and geographically well-positioned to emerge as a pole of global influence. The Arab world is a decisive player in the balance of power. The changing nature of the present is no less than the change in global governance. The change accelerated only after the global financial crisis (2008). The major shift got a further boost after the COVID-19 and Ukraine crises. The war in Ukraine demonstrates a battle between those who support privileges and the status quo and others who call for equality and fairness in the distribution of power. The process of global multipolarity is seen as Russia striving for its global role and relevance, India’s carefully crafted strategic autonomy, the resurgence of the Arabs, and political awakening in other areas.
Germany and France are increasingly taking decisions independently to protect their national interests. Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholtz made a one-day visit to China, the first European leader to visit since the COVID pandemic, drawing criticism from the US and his own party. The consequences of the Asian tilt of world capitalism and the eventual overcoming of the legacy of the colonial world order are especially evident in the growing solidarity and expansion of BRIC. Asia’s shift from the rich trans-Atlantic democracies to the centre of economic gravity has helped define China’s rise within the network of bilateral trading relations, with ASEAN. Asian countries in terms of population such as China, India and Indonesia support large domestic markets. The Ukraine war and Russia’s annexation of the eastern states of Crimea and Donbas have reduced Russia’s chances of occupying a powerful pole in the multipolar order. The liberal world order did expand and strengthen with the economic liberalisation in China and India, and with the end of the cold war. And while the champions of that order celebrated its expansion, they still assumed that its main challenge would come from the rising powers (Acharya, 2017).
5. India navigates in the emerging multiport order
China must be a competitor as well as an inspiration in shaping India to be a global player. The international and regional scenarios are very volatile. India should not allow events to come upon us; it is better to anticipate and analyse them in advance. Since the 1949 revolution, communist nationalism, and economic rise, our understanding of China has been inadequate. India missed the importance of the UN Security Council seat. China’s arrival on the global stage as a superpower has repercussions in terms of several strategic challenges. The US-China dynamic as an emerging new world order is a major challenge for India’s policymakers. The era of globalisation that facilitated the dramatic rise of China has probably come to an end, when anyone learns the complex dynamics of the world economic order, only then can India execute strategic policies in a new order. The world started to take notice of India’s rise when New Delhi signed a nuclear pact with the US in July 2005, but that breakthrough is only one dimension of the transformation of Indian foreign policy that has taken place since the end of the Cold War (Mohan, 2006).
5.1 The choice before US and West
Today the West acknowledges India’s potential to match China, with depth and skills, over the long term. Shyam Saran cautions that India must be careful of the economic chasm which makes China less sensitive to India’s interests and exhibits a lower threshold of tolerance towards India. But an aspirational India should pursue a similar economic course, creating a knowledge and technological ecosystem that promotes quick innovation and assimilation. India must painstakingly pursue this rationale, which has been adopted by the majority of developed nations.
India is the only country which has the civilizational depth, population, significant managerial, technical, and entrepreneurial skills to compete with China – and more, sustainably and over the long term (Saran, 2022). China is one of India’s toughest strategic challenges. Consequently, the bilateral push-and-move over the border has years of twists and turns. Following the liberal perspective, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao decided to target administrative management of the border over a political solution. India’s strategy against a much stronger opponent, as diplomatic efforts focused on convincing China that any misadventure would result in full-scale war will affect long-term relations (Menon, S. 2018).
5.2 China has an edge
In the geopolitical competition with India in South Asia, China has scored more success in creating an opportunity between India and the smaller states that were traditionally close to New Delhi due to geography and cultural factors (Mosca, M. 2020). However, even here the relationships in South Asian states have benefitted from the India–China-managed rivalry. The political psychology of Sino-Indian relations and of the roles of those two countries in the world understanding of contemporary world politics and to the approach of two of Asia’s rising powers to one another and to the global order. (Miller, 2020). The main reason for smaller nations’ strategic manoeuvring is the absence of a balance of power between China and India, which has enabled the smaller states to play off each other. India has been pursuing a mix of diplomatic engagement, limited hard balancing, and soft balancing policies towards China. India’s policy suggests a wait-and-watch approach, sending a message to the other powers that benign actions will create responses while aggressive measures may result in hard balances (Paul, 2019).
5.3 Geopolitics and India
The past international opportunities and forthcoming strategies require historical shifts. Indian geopolitical position has made it strategically important to hold a key position. The growing recourse of unilateral measures by the major powers poses one of the gravest challenges to contemporary multilateralism which is acore principle of international cooperation and is essential to create a supportive external environment. India has been proactive in using multilateralism to meet its objectives. Menon (2021) finds India as central to Asia’s geopolitics and yet also set apart from it is a major contribution to our understanding of this great, rising power in this Asian century. In the process, India has contributed significantly to the rapid transformation of world order, driven by its ambitious socio-economic development programmes, which are steered by its international trade demands. The fact that this trade accounts for as much as 40 per cent of India’s gross domestic product (GDP) underscores the critical importance of the interlinkage between India’s aspirations need for international cooperation through multilateralism.
A nation’s hard power is defined by the ability to alter the behaviour of others to get what you want. Soft power is the ability to achieve this through ‘attraction’ rather than ‘coercion’ (hard power). Without, in any way, impeding or limiting the development of a nation’s hard power, it is very much visible that strategizing soft power projection by India should be prioritized as the pathway of primary foreign policy.
5.4 Opportunities and Struggle for Power
International politics may face difficulties in today’s multipolar world with its rivals, power imbalances, and value collisions. India’s participation in any alliance for power tussling along with the traditional non-alignment position However, once the rivalry between its two main poles could no longer be restrained, others were forced to choose one side. New Delhi cannot allow prejudices and assumptions to get in the way. Delhi’s dogmas now stand in the way of India’s progress. Our national policy cannot be static in a complex, evolving environment if we are to achieve even more constant goals. Some examples include the 1971 Bangladesh War, the 1991 Economic and Political Repositioning, the 1998 Nuclear Tests, and the 2005 India-US Nuclear Deal. In fact, India was only able to effect significant adjustments in its favour through a series of upheavals.
5.5 Non-alignment – End of an era
From 1946 to 1962, the first phase could be characterised as an era of non-alignment. In a bipolar world, India’s objective was to resist the constraining choices while protecting its sovereignty, rebuilding its economy, and consolidating its integrity. India’s goal was to lead Asia and Africa in a quest for a more equitable and just world order. “This was the heyday of Bandung and Belgrade, the peak of Third World solidarity. It also saw energetic Indian diplomacy everywhere, from Korea and Vietnam to Suez and Hungary. For a few years, our position on the world stage seemed assured. The 1962 conflict with China not only brought this period to an end but did so in a manner that significantly damaged India’s standing.” (Jaishankar, S. 2020).
From 1962 to 1971, the second phase is a decade of realism and recovery. India adopted more pragmatic choices on security and political challenges. From 1971 to 1991, the third phase was one of the greater regional assertions. It began with the creation of Bangladesh and the paradigm shift towards India-Pakistan relations, but it came to an end with the IPKF misadventure in Sri Lanka. The fourth phase was marked by the fall of the USSR and the establishment of a unipolar world. It encouraged India to shift towards safeguarding strategic autonomy. The Look East Policy has changed the Indian approach to world affairs, like engagement with Israel. This fifth phase took a balancing act, resulting in the India-US nuclear deal, a better understanding of the West, and a common cause with China.
One has to acknowledge the ethos of India, that being a democratic polity, a pluralistic society, and a market economy, India can grow along with others, not separately. India has to overcome three burdens of the past: first, the partition of 1947 reduced India’s geo-political strength against China and created an enemy like Pakistan, second, a delayed economic reform delayed India’s growth story; and third, a prolonged wait in the exercise of the nuclear option lost strategic strength.
5.6 Vaccine Diplomacy
COVID-19 has allowed India to project innovation in pharmacy and engage in vaccine diplomacy. The Declaration of International Yoga Day is an achievement to demonstrate India’s traditional healthy lifestyle. India’s humanitarian intervention, especially in the form of UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo and Korea, served to cement its image as a helping hand and timely help to Turkey after a devastating earthquake earned praise altogether, and New Delhi’s “disaster diplomacy” served as potent tools for outreach to countries in need. We must remember thatChina has been winning without fighting, while the US is fighting without winning. It is even more about economic growth, political influence, and quality of life. As a result, America lost its famous optimism.
5.7 Strategic autonomy?
In a globalised world, strategic autonomy is secured through creating mutually beneficial relationships of interdependence. In an interdependent world, the fruit of economic growth and development is pursued when a nation is able to utilise the benefits of interdependence. Hence, the concepts of “autonomy” and “self-reliance” should be defined in the context of the economic interdependence of nations. India has the military capability to defend its territorial integrity and security; however, it will have to sustain higher rates of economic growth to be able to alter the strategic balance in Asia, and across the globe. It is not economic growth that holds the key to India’s global profile and power, but the nature of that growth process and the manner in which the economic challenges it faces decide the real power of the nation. Social and economic backwardness, inequalities and political uncertainty show the quality of economic development (Baru, 2016).
5.8 Neighbourhood First
Today, non-state security or non-traditional security as it is commonly referred is not entirely new thinking. It was given as much importance to India’s neighbourhood policy as more than a mere subset of its foreign policy. Ever since Indian Independence, the neighbourhood has always received prime attention from the leadership. In spite of challenges posed by legacy issues and concerns about its dominance as the dominant country in the region, this has been quite evident in the choice of seasoned diplomats to represent India in the neighbouring countries and the economic and political capital that India spends to maintain friendly relations with each of the countries. The ‘Neighbourhood First’ strategy is a logical extension of the approach to India’s neighbours. Foreign policy initiatives, defence preparedness, along with accurate and timely intelligence about external threats and challenges, technological prowess, and economic growth that invites foreign investment and promotes trade would be some of the main means for the preservation and enhancement of India’s national interests.
Indian foreign policy is remained reactive to the strategic environment rather than to strategic realities. Such a casual response to the structural imperatives gives little outcome when India is on the periphery of geopolitics. Sundaram (2022) says, “India’s quest for power must be viewed in geopolitical terms not as hubris, but as a long-term driver of its foreign and security policies. He reminds us that Asian geopolitical structures from Iran to Indonesia are interdependent, and that India’s agency in the past worked within this coexisting multiverse in the pursuit of its interests. Such an inheritance must lead to prioritizing connections rather than exclusion, prudential agency rather than geopolitical determinism, and an outcome orientation that brings prosperity to the masses rather than flaunting India’s ambitions for international prestige.” Michael (2013) argues why and how India has until now preferred bilateral negotiation processes and has used a multitude of multilateral organizations in order to push through its own self-interests.
It holds grave risks now when India seems poised to play a significant role in global politics. India must come to grips with its discomfort with the very notion of power, particularly its wariness of using hard power. India’s reluctance to accept a more sophisticated understanding of power, in general, and military power, in particular, will continue to undermine Indian foreign and security policy. By its very nature, India’s South Asia policy has to be extremely dynamic and nimble. Over the last few years, the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy has invested significant diplomatic capital in it. But the underlying factors that have traditionally framed India’s difficulties in getting its neighbourhood policy right remain as potent as ever (Pant, 2019).
6. Conclusion
The emerging world order is likely to go on the path of the balance of power as its operating principle, rather than collective security. China has never missed the role of the great disrupter, unlike Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN, its emergence cannot be accommodated in the liberal order. The ability of India and China to work together could determine a balance between many fronts. As S. Jaishankar says, “Asia is being shaped largely by the outlook of the UN, the power of China, the weight of Russia, the collectivism of ASEAN, the volatility of the Middle East, and the rise of India. In India’s engagement with the West, the shared values and the changes are underway.” (Jaishankar, 2020) The West and the US should accept that India’s growth is a strategic development for its larger interests of liberal world order. When it comes to China, the mantra of strategic maturity is at work between the two countries. India refers to its strategy as multi-aligned, but its systemic interactions stand in stark contrast to its scant involvement at the regional level. A strong multilateral framework has not yet been developed in Asia as well as the global level. India has to adopt multi-polarity in place of neutrality with the changing world without compromising on its strategic autonomy.
No comments:
Post a Comment