Happymon Jacob
It has become commonplace to suggest that the war in Ukraine is only a Western fixation. According to this argument, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has galvanized the West and inspired concerted action in defense of a democratic country, but it has failed to resonate in many other parts of the world. The countries of the global South are by and large indifferent to the plight of Ukraine or merely annoyed by the inconvenience the war has caused their economies. Observers in the global South may astutely point to neglected conflicts raging in their necks of the woods, but their critics in the West see the fence-sitting and functional neutrality of democracies such as Brazil, India, and South Africa as tantamount to condoning Russian actions or rejecting liberal norms and values.
And yet those fence sitters are not simply waiting passively on the sidelines; many of them actively seek an end to the war. A raft of peace plans has come from countries in the global South in recent months, with separate initiatives advanced by Brazil, Indonesia, and a group of African countries, among others. Western observers tend to dismiss these proposals out of hand or not give them much attention, and both Russian and Ukrainian officials have rejected many aspects of the plans for conceding too much to the other side.
To be sure, conditions on the battlefield will need to change decisively before either Moscow or Kyiv is willing to enter meaningful negotiations toward ending the conflict. Russia and Ukraine have not reached a mutually hurting stalemate that would force them to the table. The discussions I have had during visits to Russia and Ukraine since the war began last year make it abundantly clear that neither side is currently seeking a cease-fire or a diplomatic end to war. Russia appears inclined toward a protracted war, believing that over the long term it has the upper hand. Although it might not be opposed to a cease-fire, the Kremlin will not give up captured territory. That is a nonstarter for Ukraine. The government in Kyiv, riding on immense popular support for its troops, believes the momentum is in its favor but that without more major battlefield victories, Ukraine will only be negotiating from a position of weakness.
But short of a final resolution, diplomacy can still help limit and blunt the devastation of the war and its knock-on effects for the global economy. Global South countries that have not taken clear sides in the war are better placed than Western countries or China to serve as neutral arbiters in trying to build a diplomatic process that can help curb the excesses of the war and lay the foundations of a cease-fire or peace agreement.
India, as a significant power that has been assiduously courted by both Russia and Ukraine since the start of the war, has a role to play here. New Delhi’s refusal to overtly condemn the Russian invasion has allowed it to maintain its historical ties with Moscow. But it has also in the past year warmed to Ukraine. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of the G-7 summit in Japan in late May, he assured him that India would do “everything it can” to help end the war.
By staking out a role as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, India can facilitate much-needed conversations between the warring parties, moderate the humanitarian impact of the conflict, and help alleviate the economic damage the war has wreaked on the global South. India should not overestimate what it can accomplish, but neither should it be afraid of styling itself as an arbiter and asserting its ideas in a conflict so far from home.
INDIA THE ARBITER
The meeting between Modi and Zelensky marked a notable shift in India’s approach toward Ukraine. Over the past several months, New Delhi has been taking steps that indicate it has finally begun dealing with Ukraine in earnest, including facilitating conversations between Zelensky’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, and Modi’s national security adviser, Ajit Doval, about bilateral relations and Ukraine’s ten-point peace plan. Previously, India’s maintenance of strong ties with Russia—including expanded energy purchases—following the invasion had won global attention and provoked Western impatience. Now, India is taking a different tack. Albeit subtle, this change is a product of several factors, including Modi’s desire to present himself as a global statesman heading into general elections in 2024, growing Indian concern about Chinese ambitions, the concurrent need to cater to Western sensibilities, and the imperative of balancing rivals that is central to the Indian strategic tradition.
It is not surprising that a non-Western power should take such an interest in the Ukrainian conflict. So far, the most meaningful agreements concluded between Russia and Ukraine during the war have been brokered by Turkey: the now-scrapped deals on shipping much-needed grain and agricultural products through the Black Sea. Initiatives backed by Western countries that are Ukraine’s close allies and supporters or by Russia’s benefactor China will inevitably be greeted with suspicion. India has a unique opportunity to get involved precisely because it has not condemned Russia and continues to maintain ties with Moscow. A little over a week after meeting Zelensky, Modi called Putin to urge “dialogue and diplomacy” in ending the war. At the last G-20 summit in Indonesia, India helped the group’s members, including adversaries Russia and the United States, come to an agreement on the language of the official declaration issued at the end of the meeting. As Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, the Indian foreign minister, pointed out: “India would not have been able to valuably mediate and help ease the situation if it had done what the West wanted it to do during the early stages of the war.”
In September, India will host the next G-20 summit. It can further underscore its capacity for leadership by suggesting and guiding modest diplomatic exchanges between Russia, Ukraine, and their partners. Big proposals to end the war—as have been offered by a number of countries, including Brazil, China, and Indonesia—are unlikely to be taken seriously at this stage. But India can bring the adversaries to the table in pursuit of more tentative agreements and understandings.
New Delhi has finally begun dealing with Ukraine in earnest.
New Delhi could encourage and facilitate dialogue between the parties on a range of lower order issues. During my recent conversations and discussions with officials and members of the strategic community in New Delhi and Kyiv, a number of useful ideas emerged with the potential for practical application. For one, India could host high-level meetings between opponents. New Delhi was the venue this March for the first meeting since the outbreak of the war between Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Similarly, in the run-up to this year’s G-20 summit, New Delhi could actively encourage more meetings of this kind in India among various actors. Although New Delhi is unlikely to invite Ukrainian participation at the G-20 itself (Ukraine is not a member), the summit could become an occasion for “chance meetings,” “run-ins,” sideline meetings, or even more official parlays among leaders from Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. New Delhi could offer the gentle coaxing of a neutral but interested matchmaker.
The Indian government could also support semiofficial Track 1.5 talks and unofficial Track 2 conversations among senior interlocutors from Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and Europe to discuss the current state and evolution of the war, its implications, and the potential ways it will end. Such discussions would help build some degree of mutual trust and understanding, the prerequisite for any future peace deal. India could officially or unofficially host or encourage such discussions. The sheer lack of significant conversations in this vein is deeply perplexing (a meeting earlier this year between Lavrov and a number of U.S. scholars and former officials was a rare exception). What is even more disconcerting is the reluctance of the world’s peacemaking powerhouse, the EU, to apply its experience with peace building and conflict resolution to its own conflict with Russia. India, on the other hand, has a tradition of engaging in dialogue with its adversaries even in the midst of war, as it did during the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan. Its ability to engage with Pakistan and China, with whom India has fought wars and has adversarial relationships, also highlights a desire to avoid rigid, Cold War–like ideological enmity with those adversaries.
In consultation with partners, New Delhi could also identify important issues that Ukrainian and Russian officials might address for the purpose of building confidence and to provide relief to civilians affected by the war. Both sides could be interested in discussing issues such as the humane treatment of prisoners, identifying and implementing (along with the International Atomic Energy Association, or the IAEA) restrictions on military targeting around nuclear power plants, discouraging the use of cluster bombs, evacuating civilians from areas of intense fighting, and arranging temporary local cease-fires to protect civilians.
India can try to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used in the war.
Indian officials have on several occasions highlighted the impact of the war on national economies and food security, and on the global South in general. Russia’s war on Ukraine led to spikes in food and energy prices, triggered inflation, weakened national currencies, and drained international attention away from the economic turmoil in many countries in the global South that were still reeling from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s unfortunate recent decision not to renew the Turkish-brokered grain deal, which has once again triggered food security concerns around the world, is an opportunity for New Delhi to insist on the importance of food security. New Delhi could persuade Moscow to renew the deal, leveraging both its strong economic relationship with Russia, which has only grown since the beginning of the war, and the goodwill it enjoys in Moscow. In early June, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink encouraged India to do precisely that. “India’s leaders,” she said, “have a unique voice to stand up for developing countries and encourage the continuation and the expansion of the Black Sea Grain Initiative to ensure people around the world can access food they desperately need.”
India, as a nuclear power, can also try to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used in any form in this conflict. New Delhi has been a consistent advocate of the nonuse of nuclear weapons, including smaller tactical nuclear weapons, and a strong believer in the nuclear taboo. India should call on all parties involved to ensure that no side introduces tactical nuclear weapons into the war, even if such a proposition might not impress Russia.
To get the ball rolling, New Delhi should appoint a special envoy to convene the various parties to the conflict and undertake efforts such as those outlined above. It could also join the initiatives advanced by various states and international organizations, such as Brazil, Turkey, and the IAEA, to develop a peace plan or at least aspects of one to end the war in Ukraine. But it should act quickly to capitalize on the growing warmth between Modi and Zelensky and the attention India will receive as the host of the upcoming G-20 summit. Once the war ends or the parties agree to a cease-fire, India could also consider assuming a larger role in peacekeeping efforts between the two countries, given its extensive experience in peacekeeping operations around the world, a prospect that officials in Kyiv are likely to welcome, judging from my conversations there. In this way, India could play a supporting role in maintaining the future of European security.
MUCH TO GAIN, LITTLE TO LOSE
It is indisputably in India’s interest to try to stake out such a role. At the broadest level, these actions would allow the Modi government to remind the world that India is an important power. India seeks to establish itself as a pole in a multipolar international system, and intervening in this way in the war in Ukraine would underscore its ability to help maintain global order. This is all the more important for India at a time when its neighbor and rival China has also sought to style itself as an international peacemaker. By working toward securing an uneasy détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has shown itself to be a major geopolitical force, something India has yet to demonstrate.
China has advanced its own peace plan for ending the war in Ukraine, although officials in Kyiv and the West do not take it seriously. But China’s bid to mediate has allowed it to cultivate goodwill in Russia, Ukraine, and Europe, with Ukrainians and their Western allies hoping that China will be willing to support the eventual reconstruction of the devastated country. This will only boost China’s geopolitical standing. The longer the war drags on, the more it increases Russian dependence on China—and further limits Russia’s ability and willingness to help New Delhi in its rivalry with Beijing. That should provide a strong incentive for Indian officials to risk upsetting Russia by nudging it to defuse hostilities. New Delhi does not want the war to leave Russia battered and weak but, rather, wants to preserve a strong Russia that can reinforce multipolarity in Asia and hold off Chinese hegemony.
The Ukraine war will eventually end. In the meantime, countries must attempt to temper the intensity of the violence, prepare the ground for more strategic conversations, and build trust for future cease-fires and an eventual peace agreement. New Delhi’s efforts could, at best, blunt the most devastating impacts of the war; at worst, they would make little difference. But Indian officials would be making a mistake if they did nothing when they and the world have so much to gain.
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