A US decision to transfer jet-engine technology to India will bolster the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy while also presenting an unprecedented test of the strength of US–India ties.In June 2023, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first state visit to the United States, Washington announced its decision to share GE Aerospace’s proven F-414 jet-engine technology with India. The deal is the latest and boldest attempt by the two countries to build a China-focused strategic partnership that is also consistent with India’s longstanding refusal of formal alliances. This new arrangement will likely bring the US and India closer strategically – indeed, the decades-long life-cycle for many kinds of military equipment is sure to strengthen institutional ties between the respective armed forces and defence industries. Much will depend, however, on the manner of the deal’s implementation, particularly which parts of the US jet-engine design are eventually transferred to India and how this will affect India’s overall inventory of strategic capabilities.
Resuming defence coordinationFor a generation, US–India diplomacy has sought to overcome a stop-start pattern of defence cooperation, a consequence of the United States’ high-technology sanctions against India imposed after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Washington later replaced these with softer export controls related to India’s non-aligned status and its acquisition of nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In 2014, New Delhi launched a high-profile ‘made in India’ campaign, later complemented by Modi’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat (‘self-reliant India’) policy seeking indigenous production. In the defence sector, India loosened foreign-investment and joint-venture rules but since 2016, in practice, it has slowed large new purchases of off-the-shelf military equipment. This undermined the 2012 US–India Defence Technology Trade Initiative that sought to promote co-development and production of systems including the Javelin anti-tank guided missile. Since 2020, however, China’s assertiveness in disputed border areas with India, and across the region more broadly, has reactivated US–India defence-cooperation efforts.
A robust agenda for cooperationSince 2021, American and Indian leaders have leant on their national-security advisors, Jake Sullivan and Ajit Doval, respectively, to initiate and arbitrate inter-departmental policies. Both sides have sought to expand the scope of strategic cooperation, including on civilian and dual-use technologies and on co-development of next-generation technologies, which will mitigate the effects of the United States’ export-control policies, which remain in place. These steps, taken over the last 18 months, enabled Modi’s state visit in June to set a new and higher watermark for US–India ties
The joint statement released in June summarised the mechanisms that have been established to promote long-term mutual investments, which included the launch of an interagency Strategic Trade Dialogue and unprecedented public-private partnerships in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, advanced telecommunications, quantum computing and civilian space technology. The first meeting of the trade dialogue occurred days after the release of the joint statement.
Under an agreement publicised during the visit, GE Aerospace will supply, via an 80% technology transfer, state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited with the F-414 engine to be used in the next variant of India’s light multirole aircraft. The joint statement said that the ‘trailblazing’ agreement ‘will enable greater transfer of US jet engine technology than ever before’. This mirrors the co-production arrangement between the US and its treaty ally, South Korea, for the same engine.
Several other plans underscore the step-change that has occurred between the US and India: India will buy 31 General Atomics MQ-9B combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones; the two countries are at work institutionalising additional defence-specific initiatives such as the Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap, as well as agreements on ship repairs, space research and development and creation of a joint academic and startup network. As members of the Quad group of countries, which India will lead in 2024, New Delhi and Washington could seek to better use information-sharing platforms to enhance theirs and others’ regional maritime domain awareness.
Implementation to 2024In 2020, the visit to India by US president Donald Trump emphasised politics over deliverables. Now, however, with so many defence-issues agreed, the credibility of both administrations will be tested as they seek to implement the items agreed. India noted that Modi’s Washington welcome exceeded expectations. For both sides the subtext of the trip – including the high official rhetoric and the ceremony of it – showed support for New Delhi in the face of US and international criticism regarding India’s relationship with Russia and its position towards the war in Ukraine.
In defence-cooperation terms, both sides must manage expectations about implementation. Cost negotiations aside, it will be challenging for India to manage higher engagement with the US via ongoing procurement contracts in the face of its continuing defence entanglement with Russia. It also faces economic challenges related to defence acquisition: despite annual growth rates exceeding 6%, inflation remains higher and the rupee weaker than the government would like. Moreover, the politics of sustaining engagement in both capitals could become more difficult as both leaders face voters in 2024. Important personnel changes will probably occur no matter the outcome of the elections, and the fact is that the US has higher priorities in terms of foreign-policy and defence than India.
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