The Ukrainian Advance South

MICK RYAN

Source Link

Successful offense has long been very difficult, and it has normally required both demanding preparations and a permissive defender. But it offers decisive outcomes when conditions allow it, and such conditions recur with enough frequency to suggest that its demands are worth meeting.

Stephen Biddle, Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver

In the past 48 hours, there have been multiple reports about Ukrainian progress in its southern campaign. In particular, reporting has centered on the advance of Ukrainian ground forces south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast. This is excellent news, although we must acknowledge the Ukrainian lives this has cost to achieve.

Notwithstanding this achievement, there is still some way to go before Ukrainian ground forces are able to make an operational breakthrough and advance to their southern seacoast.

In this post I wanted to explore in a little more detail the kinds of challenges that the Ukrainian ground forces are facing in the south, and what the West might be able to do in the short and medium terms to improve the ability of the Ukrainian armed forces to advance through the very complex defensive zones established by the Russians.

A crucial challenge is that the techniques and technologies of clearing minefields and breaching obstacles on the battlefield have not evolved over the past half century. This must change.

The Breach and Breakthrough Conundrum

I have previously explored the Russian defensive scheme in the south, and this has been mapped and reported on for months now. Last week, I explored the major challenges the Ukrainian ground forces were facing in their operations to rapid breach and breakthrough these Russian defences. A quick summary of these is below:

Challenge 1. The Russian Obstacle Plan. The sheer scale and number of mines and obstacles is daunting. It is one thing to look at it on a satellite map or overlay, but it is another to physically have to get through it. The Russian obstacle design is much more complex, and deadly, than anything experienced by any military in nearly 80 years. It is tens of kilometres deep, which will break up or slow down even the most competent combined arms teams and separate them from their logistic support.

Challenge 2. Observation is pervasive. In my article Breach and Breakthrough, I described how obstacles need to be covered by ‘observation and fires’. This war has seen a steady intensification of sensors, analysis and dissemination of intelligence through a new-era meshed civil-military framework. This is unprecedented in warfare and was something that was not present when modern obstacle breaching doctrine was developed several decades ago. I will return to this topic shortly.

Challenge 3. Fires. Whether it is artillery, longer range rockets, attack rotary and fixed wing aircraft, loitering munitions, scatterable mines or electronic warfare, covering obstacles with fires is much simpler if there is a dense and connected sensor network. Which is clearly what the Russians have done in the 6-7 months they had to prepare their defence of the south.

Challenge 4. Russian reserves. In accordance with their defensive doctrine, the Russians have designed and implemented a defensive regime which has both static and mobile elements. The mobile elements will include artillery batteries which move depending on where Ukraine might be attacking, and to enhance their survivability. But another important element will be reserves. These will be held just behind the main defensive positions as well as areas well to the rear.

Challenge 5. This is hard. Combined arms obstacle breaches are the most difficult activity to plan and execute of any military activity, in any domain. Nothing comes close to the number of moving parts on the ground and in the air. They are excruciatingly slow to conduct and result in high casualties.

So, the Ukrainians and many other observers of this war have a reasonably clear picture of the challenges involved in advancing south to the sea.

Old Doctrine and Old Technology

While there has been a necessary infusion of new western tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems and a range of munitions, there has not been as much attention paid to the mobility support systems that enable all of these things to advance through Russian defences. There have been some armoured engineer vehicles provided as well as breaching equipment and munitions.

However, the doctrine and the technologies being used by the Ukrainians to break in, penetrate and break through Russian defences is generally older than any of the soldiers participating in the Ukrainian counter offensives.