Russia's war against Ukraine has put the recapitalisation of European land forces high on the agenda for NATO's European allies. This study examines the emerging plans and implementation challenges of select European land forces. Progress thus far has been mixed. While some positive steps have already been taken, major challenges persist and it is uncertain whether the current momentum will be maintained.Executive SummaryThe prospect of major land warfare involving NATO forces has returned to Europe. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has provided a wake-up call in European capitals. Before then, many held the view that major land forces and land manoeuvre capabilities, including heavy armoured formations, would not be a dominant feature of future conflict. This view persisted even after Russia seized Crimea in early 2014 and subsequently fomented and supported separatist activity in Eastern Ukraine. After decades of downsizing capabilities, some European armies drew up plans after 2014 to once again build forces for major land operations; they continued, however, to fall short in many areas important for high-intensity war.
The June 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid saw allies agree on a new Strategic Concept. This not only identified Russia as ´the most significant and direct threat to allies´ security´, but also provided a mandate to improve NATO´s deterrence and defence posture. NATO´s New Force Model (NFM) is intended to provide a larger pool of high-readiness forces than envisaged under the NATO Response Force (NRF). The recapitalisation of European land forces is now high on the agenda for NATO´s European allies.
However, an important question is whether European allies are more serious now, in regard to the investments needed to develop more capable and integrated land forces, than they were after Ukraine was first invaded in 2014. To help answer this question, this paper assesses important elements of the emerging plans and capability developments in key European ground forces. It focuses on those allies most likely to be directly affected by a contingency on NATO´s northern and eastern flanks. The paper identifies strengths and shortfalls in the development of European land warfare capability, and looks at the implications for the NFM. It recognises that any high-intensity conflict in Europe will likely be a multi-domain fight; this is the eventuality for which Europe’s future land forces need to prepare.
Our analysis provides a mixed picture. Positive steps include: The recognition by European land forces of weaknesses. These include operational overstretch, limited training and ageing equipment. Many of these factors combine to erode combat readiness from the levels that NATO defence plans and the NFM will demand. This recognition has led to debate on how to activate and/or build-up reserve components and regenerate combat mass, with this also spurred by the reality of combat attrition in Ukraine. Furthermore, European land forces are aware of the need to improve defence infrastructure, such as training areas, and address industrial production needs, for instance in terms of refilling stockpiles.
More procurements are the most readily apparent means countries have pursued to try and boost readiness deficits and strengthen capability. While some procurement plans pre-date 2022, there is now greater focus on heavy manoeuvre capabilities, such as in Poland. Additionally, medium-weight formations are being developed in a number of states, potentially improving strategic and operational mobility.
Current and planned investments in rocket artillery and surface-to-surface strike should deliver systems capable of engaging targets at longer range than before, such as forces in the rear and enemy logistics and headquarters. Fully benefiting from these systems, however, depends also on improved training and integration with intelligence and command and control capabilities.
Ground-based air defence (GBAD) has long been an area of relative weakness for European armed forces. Investments have picked up here also. GBAD could protect a range of potential targets, from civilian and industrial sites to headquarters, as well as mobile forces. However, allies will need to carefully con¬sider interoperability and integration requirements, while the war in Ukraine is a reminder that muni¬tions requirements for GBAD can be substantial dur¬ing high-intensity war.
However, implementation has been modest and several challenges lie ahead:There is general support for the NFM at the political-strategic level, but there remains uncertainty over how much alignment there will be in practice between national policy and capability development plans and NATO planning, particularly concerning regional commands such as Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE) in Szczecin, Poland. Moreover, it is unclear whether all nations perceive the threat in the same way. For instance, differing threat assessments concerning Russia may lead nations to develop different land modernisation plans. Frontline states will base their planning on worst-case assessments, but the same might not be true for European allies further away. Also, it will be important for European land forces and political leaders to maintain focus on these capability requirements, even if the intensity of fighting in Ukraine abates.
NATO members should make contributions to the NFM clear and declare their land contributions before or at the upcoming Vilnius Summit in July 2023. This will help strengthen allied cohesion, enhance deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, publicly tie governments to these commitments, and also facilitate better planning. Moreover, current limitations within nations should not stop innovative ideas: some could opt to make a two-phase offer at the summit, committing some forces now and indicating what they will commit once new capabilities come online.
At present, apart from a select few allies, Europe’s land forces are not increasing in size. National plans are a key factor behind this. Nonetheless, recruitment and retention will remain challenging for most without either significantly improved ‘offers’ to personnel, or innovations in force design, or perhaps even the (re)introduction of conscription. Meanwhile, a larger force will have a significant budgetary impact and – without sustained budget increases or the use of other funding mechanisms – will likely reduce the ability to invest in other critical areas.
The size of the commitments required by the NFM’s three tiers means that forces fielded at-scale will need to be multinational by design. Multinationality, however, brings its own difficulties, with some nations historically showing greater confidence in some partners than others. Furthermore, with nations often bringing national caveats and rules of engagement to operations, more multinationality may add more risk.
As European land forces seek to quickly improve readiness, allies, and NATO itself, need to scrutinise evaluation standards. For instance, are current national and NATO evaluation standards realistic and optimised to produce uniform combat capability across the Alliance? If not, do readiness benchmarks for personnel, organisations and also equipment storage need to be refined?
European land forces will need to obtain the optimum balance between a focus on manoeuvre formations, and combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). At present, CSS remains a national responsibility and none of the NATO corps HQs have any organic combat support. So, should CS and CSS be assigned to the NATO corps-level? If they prefer to keep those functions at the national level, allies must consider that under current circumstances they would struggle to rapidly deploy and sustain land forces forward by air, land and sea.
Some European land forces have ambitious development plans, but it is unclear if funding levels will enable their full implementation. Even if funding increases, land forces will face difficult financial trade-offs between more personnel, weapons systems, stockpiles, logistics and digitisation. This tension is currently exacerbated by the large volume of, equipment and ammunition provided to Ukraine.
European land forces have, again, acknowledged the need to respond to Russia's threat. The pressure to do so appears greater than in 2014, and some positive steps have already been taken. However, it remains to be seen whether the momentum can be sustained. German leadership will be key in driving European land-warfare capability development in order to meet NFM objectives, not least because of Berlin's stated ambition to provide the core of European conventional capability.
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