Missile threats are more than just theoretical — here are realistic solutions

BILL GREENWALT and ROGER KODAT

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A threat-representative ICBM target launches from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands March 25, 2019. It was successfully intercepted by two long-range Ground-based Interceptors launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., in the first salvo test of GBIs. (DVDS)

The missile barrages hitting Ukraine daily have shown a spotlight on the very real need for coordinated, integrated missile defense. In an attempt to get their hands around the threat, the National Academy of Public Administration launched a large review of how the US develops and acquires missile defense systems. Two of the reviews authors, William Greenwalt and Roger Kodat, lay out their findings below.

For the past 17 months, a wide variety of ordnance from ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, manned bombers, and unmanned aerial systems have terrorized the civilian population of Ukrainian cities and towns, the kind of sustained bombardment not seen since the London Blitz of World War Two. Catastrophic losses have only been prevented by the kludging together of an eclectic integrated Ukrainian air, missile, and counter-drone defensive system.

As the need for such defenses becomes a constant in warfare, a congressionally directed panel of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) has reviewed how the United States develops and acquires capabilities to defend its own forces and homeland from the threat of four segments of weapons: ballistic missiles, hypersonic systems, cruise missiles, and uncrewed aircraft systems. Unfortunately, the panel’s conclusions are clear: there is much that needs to be done.

The global missile threat environment is growing both in scale and speed. Russia’s prolific missile deployment in its invasion of Ukraine, the meteoric rise in China’s ability to project its military presence, North Korea’s active rocket testing program, and Iran’s ability to accumulate enough requisite material to build a nuclear weapon underscore a rapidly increasing and lethal missile threat environment.

In the past few years, there has been a demonstrable shift in what the US faces in terms of both the variety and advanced capabilities of missiles aimed at the homeland and US forces worldwide. An adversary aiming to cripple American military and industrial capacities could unleash a wide variety of missile types from various locations—land, sea, and space. Aided by thousands of sensors, the dedicated men and women responsible for identifying, tracking, and eliminating these threats will have little time to determine and integrate successful countermeasures.

While these threats may be readily known, the NAPA panel’s recent report, Integration of Missile Defense, breaks new ground in warning that our nation’s adversaries are developing their missile technologies at such a rapid pace that current governance and acquisition structures and processes could prevent the US Department of Defense from meeting these threats with equal speed and agility.

This report is the product of a one-year unclassified study designed to clarify DoD component roles and responsibilities to advance missile defense with respect to requirements, acquisition (including research and development), and operational sustainment. As such, NAPA’s research focused on topics connected with public administration and opportunities to enhance the managerial performance of DoD’s core missile defense functions.

The panel report stresses that the DoD would benefit from a missile defense integrator organization with the responsibility or the necessary authorities, budget, and talent to acquire capabilities to defend against the four missile threat types currently arrayed against us. Crewed aircraft delivery systems used for many of these threats add a further level of siloed managerial complexity to the equation. The report’s findings underscore DoD’s 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR), which highlighted the growth of the air and missile threat to the US homeland, deployed forces, and Allies and partners. The NAPA report and the MDR provide complementary strategic guidance on the way forward to improve missile defense capabilities.

Presently, DoD missile defense roles and responsibilities—from requirements-setting, through acquisition, to operational sustainment—are fragmented and are not clearly documented. Thus, the panel report’s use of analytical grids to outline component roles and responsibilities is an important contribution to advance a more integrated missile defense. That said, the grids reveal a complicated and confusing patchwork that needs to be addressed. NAPA’s report urges DoD to provide periodic updates to Congress on future changes to these roles and responsibilities.

In an interview with Breaking Defense, senior MoD R&D official Col. Nir Weingold explained Jerusalem’s push into the nation’s tech industry, and its collaboration with the US.

Considering the accelerated pace of technological advancements, especially with uncrewed aircraft deployed with enhanced missile delivery capabilities, the panel report also urges DoD to protect and revitalize nonstandard acquisition flexibilities afforded to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) more than twenty years ago. These authorities were subsequently scaled back as DoD harmonized acquisition approaches among its various components. The same flexibilities the MDA once enjoyed in acquiring ballistic missiles and hypersonic systems should also be applied to more rapidly developing countermeasures to address cruise missile and uncrewed aircraft system threats.

Finally, it is essential to create an integrator organization, or to appoint an existing DoD office, to serve as an enterprise-level missile defense coordinator to improve speed and agility, coordination, and clarity and unity of purpose. The current piecemeal approach of managing the missile defense acquisition enterprise, notwithstanding efforts to ensure good communication across components, could be more optimal.

This was illustrated during a May 9th Senate Armed Services hearing focusing on missile defense when Sen. Angus King, I-ME, asked four senior DoD witnesses whom he could approach to pose questions about the nation’s missile defense. In response, it is clear there is not one single organization or leader to receive a congressional inquiry and address it with a view to encompassing the full expanse of the missile defense enterprise. That leadership is needed, and whatever organization is tasked to perform such a mission should be helmed by a four-star leader.

As we are seeing in Ukraine, missile threats are now more than just theoretical. Missile defense is a matter of national survival, and it is imperative for DoD and Congress to review, revise, and optimize our nation’s approach to developing, acquiring, and fielding defense capabilities to effectively counter these threats.

William Greenwalt, former Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Industrial Policy at DoD and a NAPA Fellow, chaired the NAPA panel on DOD’s governance and execution of its missile defense function while Roger Kodat served as the study’s Senior Project Director.