Natasha Hall
In 1979, then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat famously declared that the only thing that would lead Egypt to war again was water, specifically the Nile River. Egypt’s dominance over the Nile—which still accounts for 97 percent of the country’s fresh water—has gone unchallenged, and in the hands of his successors, President Sadat’s saber-rattling has remained just that. But times are changing. At the headwaters of the Blue Nile, Ethiopia unilaterally moved ahead with the construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt described the dam as an existential threat. Nevertheless, Sadat’s prediction remains an unlikely outcome, especially when interference in neighbors’ internal politics may achieve the same ends.
Though Egyptian officials threatened to bomb the dam in the past, analysts believe that destroying it would be militarily and politically infeasible now that it is complete and nearly full. However, interfering in any of the protracted disputes along the Blue Nile Basin would run shy of an official declaration of war on water but could effectively weaken a state’s ability to develop water usage and infrastructure development. Indeed, Nile riparian states have long made such allegations. In a 2011 interview, the late Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi accused Egypt of supporting Ethiopia’s rebels and enemies to destabilize the government. In 2016, Ethiopian officials again accused Egypt of sponsoring anti-government protests and armed rebellions.
Nile Basin
Photo: Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)
Sudan is, politically and geographically, stuck in the middle of Egypt and Ethiopia’s dispute and could serve as a mediator, but Sudan is embroiled in its own conflict. As two Sudanese generals fight for power at the confluence of the two branches of the Nile River in Khartoum, Egypt’s role in the conflict may hinge on the winner’s position on the GERD. Intervening in Sudan’s ongoing conflict to win an ally in Sudan on issues such as the GERD is not out of the question. Egypt’s former foreign minister Nabil Fahmy said his country seeks “stability, security and sustainability for the Sudanese which serves our national interests.” But Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi also seeks a government with a foreign policy consistent with Egypt’s, particularly on the GERD.
Egypt long regarded Sudan as an indispensable ally in its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD. But in 2020, then civilian Sudanese prime minister Abdalla Hamdok veered toward Ethiopia’s position. The Sisi government looked to the United States to mediate a solution. When that did not work, Egypt turned to others with large investments in Ethiopia to use their economic weight to force the administration of Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed back to the negotiating table. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and China were unwilling to use their economic leverage to help Egypt. In mid-July 2020, around the time of the first filling of the dam, Egypt began actively courting Sudan once again to gain allies in the dispute.
It was good timing. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the face of Sudan’s military establishment and Egyptian ally, had challenged Prime Minister Hamdok’s civilian administration, and Sudan’s position on the GERD shifted back to Egypt. By 2021, an Ethiopian diplomat even accused Sudan and Egypt of ganging up on Ethiopia with joint military drills called the “Guardians of the Nile.” But in January 2023, General Burhan changed his stance, publicly showing full support for Ethiopia’s project. Three months later, peace broke down in Sudan as General Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) violently battled for power.
Some international stakeholders in the outcome of Sudan’s conflict were choosing sides, including Egypt. Egypt already sent warplanes and pilots to back General Burhan, and a Sudanese army official claimed that an Egyptian jet fighter destroyed an RSF ammunition depot in April. However, Cairo’s continued support for Burhan may hinge on his willingness to meet Egypt’s position on the Nile or serve as a mediator. It is unclear if such methods will benefit Egypt over the long run.
Provocative rhetoric and covert operations may garner some quick political wins, but these methods may simply thwart vital water management negotiations. To retaliate for Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolian Project, a series of dams that threaten the water flow of the Euphrates River into Syria, the Syrian government provided support and sanctuary to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) to conduct raids on Turkey until 1998. In the meantime, Syria failed to confront its own water usage, triggering mass internal displacement during drought years. And, in the end, Turkey moved forward with the dams. Today, Ankara consistently fails to meet its water-sharing obligations to Syria.
Consistent water management and diplomacy will be key, both within and across borders, to decrease tensions and instability in Nile Basin countries. Over 285 million people living in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt are depending on it, and further conflict and displacement are inevitable without it.
Egyptian, Sudanese, and Ethiopian allies could reinvigorate the Nile Basin Initiative, an intergovernmental forum for the sustainable management and development of Nile Basin water and related resources for win-win benefits. Issue linkages connecting agreements on the GERD to trade or Ethiopian access to Red Sea ports could be one avenue to get Ethiopia back to the negotiating table. Aid and investment that supports more sustainable irrigation methods and water infrastructure for Sudan and Egypt could further dampen future conflict and instability.
However, improving cooperation on water sharing and management is easier said than done even if it makes sense from a scientific perspective. As the ancient Greek chronicler Thucydides’ famously asserted, nations mainly fight over “fear, honor, and interest.” Access to water is a point of pride and, lack of it, a catalyst for extreme anxiety. With a population that increases by one million people every six months and predicted water shortages by 2025, President Sisi’s political future depends on his ability to weather converging economic and water crises. For the Ethiopian prime minister, the dam is a matter of national dignity and unity. There is widespread support for the dam even in this conflicted country.
Unless international stakeholders prioritize these negotiations, these leaders may not return to negotiations until they have exhausted all other options—from veiled threats to covert operations. In the meantime, those options will further frustrate efforts to manage water sustainably and increase the potential for conflict.
Natasha Hall is a senior fellow with the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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