Ilan Shklarsky & Eitan Shamir
The aim of this article is to add an air power perspective to the innovation field, with emphasis on the development of jet fighters. Contemporary theory has not adequately addressed air power-related significant innovation, a shortcoming this article addresses. Using in-depth qualitive research methodology with eight diverse case-studies in the Cold War period, we show that innovation of jet fighters was typically initiated in response to hegemonic tensions, immediate threats and organsational factors such as civil–military relations, bureaucratic politics, and air force innovation culture. Moreover, through a comparative analysis we argue that significant and successful air power innovation is achieved through proficiency and knowledge gained by constant learning of air power theory and bottom-up innovation mechanisms. Looking forward, this study may be significant for assisting military professionals in making better-informed decisions about the use of fifth-generation air power by implementing past lessons learned into contemporary theory and future plans.
Introduction
The presented work aims to add new perspectives to the area of military-related innovation. The field of military innovation is composed of various theories of why and how military organisations innovate. Yet, a broad framework for air power innovation is lacking. Theory explaining the variables influencing the development of significant air power innovations is contemporarily insufficient although it is a critical factor of military development. We aim to contribute to the innovation field by exploring airpower innovation with emphasis on the progress in the generations of jet fighters in a comprehensive historical perspective.
The term “innovation” typically refers to a new idea, device, or method and is part of the military force build-up phase. It is ultimately a change in operational praxis that produces a significant increase in military effectiveness, usually in peacetime and typically is a lengthy procedure. The “leap” of a generation in jet fighters is a significant and disruptive advancement and is a central characteristic in categorising jet fighters. The aerial generation categories were basically created in order to define major technology leaps in the development of jet fighters. A generational shift occurs when a technological innovation cannot be incorporated into an existing aircraft through upgrades – called in the literature as incremental innovation.Footnote1 This type of innovation requires a new-generation jet fighter, or radical innovation.Footnote2 Therefore, it is an adequate basis to analyse air power innovation.
Through systematic comparisons of eight diverse case-studies, we show that gradual long-term hegemonic tensions, regional tensions, and immediate threats, are perhaps most influential for driving innovation. As expected, the sense of urgency is a key driver for innovation. Nevertheless, this can in fact act as an impediment to innovation in numerous respects causing a blindness among senior officials to all that is not the “main problem.” The second variable – technology, serves as a driving factor only when a technological breakthrough is introduced, as was observed in half of the case-studies. Organisational influences, composed of civil–military relations, bureaucratic politics, and air force innovation culture, are surprisingly extremely significant for initiating innovation, and one noteworthy organisational factor of the three is in fact sufficient to initiate such developments. Air power theory, seemingly, is not a dominant driving factor, but indeed shapes the process. Moreover, we show that knowledge is vital and is perhaps one of the finest tools for air force innovation. Air power theory – history, existing literature, capabilities, and technology are areas that require in-depth comprehension for the air power professional, and these areas are generally improved where effective bottom-up mechanisms for innovation exist.
Methodology
We use qualitative research methods and in-depth comparisons based on eight historical case-studies. We explore the four classic jet fighter generations (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th), examining two diverse case studies for each generation. The case-studies are analysed and evaluated by parameters suitable for innovation theory in a goal to portray a comprehensive picture for scholars and military professionals. The parameters used to evaluate the air power innovative process in jet fighters are: (1) threats from current, or potential, adversaries and competition for hegemony; (2) response to technological advancements; (3) organisational influences; and (4) air power theory. Evaluated by a high-low score, the four parameters are assessed on their influence in driving significant innovation in air power.
“Threats and hegemony” is a variable consisting of both gradual long-term tensions and immediate threats. In the analysis of military affairs in the Cold War era, in which ideological differences led to conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs, one must respect and analyse the hegemonic race for world order. “Technology,” the second parameter is a key factor that impacts innovation. The continuous development, and technological improvements, are in part due to the battle of wits consisting of new devices and other inventions to encounter them. Looking across the last century, it seems that the application of air power has changed dramatically as a result of technological advances. The third parameter is “organisational influences” and consists of three sub-areas: civil–military relations, bureaucratic politics, and innovation culture. First, civil–military relations express the unified or divided relations between military leaders, political leaders, and the public. In these relations, we may also examine industry-military interactions, and/or political-military interactions. Second, bureaucratic politics examine the relationship amongst the military services within a state and the competition between branches of the same military service (inter-service, or intra-service models of military innovation). Specifically, in this study, the focus is placed on the competition between the agencies, and/or within them alongside the level of governmental centralisation. Third, air force innovation culture is essentially one aspect of military culture. “Air power theory” is the fourth parameter and is defined as a supposition, or a system of ideas, intended to explain the use of air power.
The eight case studies were chosen for their diversity, unique attributes, and maximum comparison possibilities. Each generation is composed of two case studies, one of US-led innovation and the second of another world actor. This enables a chronological US-led comparison on one side, and a broad comparison between different actors on the other. Additionally, we analyse innovation initiated by self-manufacturers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union and innovation initiated by dependent innovators, such as India and Israel. Essentially, the case-studies were chosen because they are each unique and significantly different that the others. The first-generation case-studies focus on two of the world’s first operational jet fighters – the American F-86 (“Sabre”) and the Soviet MiG-15 (Mikoyan-Gurevich – “Fagot”), in transition from the era of the propeller-driven airplane to the era of the turbojet. The second-generation case-studies examine the American F-105’s (“Thunderchief”) and the Indian MiG-21 (“Fishbed”). The third-generation case-studies focus on the American F-4 (“Phantom II”) – and the Iraqi MiG-23 (“Flogger”). The fourth-generation case-studies present the fighters optimised against the new bloc of Soviet fighters and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) Systems – the American F-15’s (“Eagle”) and the Israeli F-16 (“Falcon”). Whilst most of the chosen cases examined are trivial, the Indian MiG-21 and Iraqi MiG-23 require elaboration. They were chosen for their diversity and unique state characteristics in a task to appreciate the various elements impacting the complete process in different actors. The Indian Air Force for its reliance on both Western and Eastern suppliers and its distinctive culture and the Iraqi Air Force for its centralised government and regional ambitions.
The four innovation variables were evaluated on qualitive terms and scored on a low-high influence basis. The influence is measured by the significance of the observations found in each examined variable and by their cause and effect on innovation (direct/indirect). Using numerous academic and official resources, each variable is examined and compared to the additional three variables, with emphasis on the jet fighter’s development period.
Contemporary theory
Military innovation
Military innovation is “a major change that is institutionalised in new doctrine, a new organisational structure and/or a new technology.”Footnote3 For the past three centuries, the innovation field developed a range of theories of why and how military organisations innovate. There is an ongoing debate structured into four contending schools of thought: (1) civil–military conflict; (2) intra-service conflict; (3) inter-service conflict; (4) organisational culture. The first three frameworks view conflicts in decisive relationships – between civilian and military leaders, between services and within them, whilst incremental innovation results from suppressing such conflicts.Footnote4 Advocates of the civil–military relations framework focus on civilian intervention and examine the relationships between military and civilian leaders. The intra-service model shows that military innovation can be facilitated internally – within the service. The third school of thought stresses that inter-service competition may accelerate military innovation, and the fourth school explains military innovation through differences in strategic and organisational structures.Footnote5 Regarding the latter, Dmitry Adamski studied the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations and concludes that military innovation; although based on technology, doctrine, and structural adaptation, needs a strategic culture that evokes theoretical military thought.Footnote6
According to a RAND research report completed by Grissom, Lee, and Mueller through an assessment of six historical cases of the United States Air Force; innovation or an apparent failure to innovate, five major theories exist within the scope of their research.Footnote7 First, military organisations innovate in response to threats from potential adversaries. Second, innovation occurs in response to technological advancements. Third, bureaucratic politics is the main factor affecting innovation. Fourth, military culture is a major incentive that frames the way militaries innovate, and finally, day-by-day operational adaptation is a relatively new subfield in innovation studies. Barry Posen also highlights threats as a driving factor for innovation. He integrates seemingly contradicting propositions of structural realist theory (balance of power) and organisational theory, arguing that external threats and civilian intervention are primary determinants of military innovation. In respect to the balance of power in the external environment, states that are highly insecure or have revisionist political aims, have strong incentives to innovate.Footnote8 But also, the society/military relationship helps to determine both military effectiveness and innovation.Footnote9
For an innovation to be worthy, it is required to be effective. This raises an important question that has been previously asked and disputed. In a book published in 1991, Stephen Rosen tried to answer when and why military organisations make major innovations in the way they fight and whether they are “doomed to always fight the last war.”Footnote10 Initially, it is necessary to define what is effective innovation. It is in fact a situation in which a strategic problem is identified regularly in peacetime, a time and cost-effective solution is introduced, and eventually, the offered solution creates positive and improved results. This of course is not a simple task since political forces often drive procurement decisions and they can easily contradict what the logical path for innovation might dictate.
Successful innovation requires mechanisms to identify continuously, analyse, and prioritise national strategic problems and they must always search for innovative solutions, an urge that should be rooted in the air force culture. Azar Gat states that “The real problem is to identify the precise nature of the expected changes in war, devise concrete programmes of transformation in the organisation and doctrine of the armed forces, and determine the optimal mix of hardware to be developed and procured.”Footnote11 Identifying strategic problems calls for special mechanisms and is occasionally the essential starting point for significant innovation.Footnote12 Moreover, a strong and independent military industry, constantly working to research, develop, and improve contemporary technology, is likewise essential for military innovation. Such an industry must regularly search for new technologies, concepts, designs, and game-changing opportunities. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a constant interchange of ideas between the former and the latter, amongst military industry and the air service, can in fact connect adequate technological developments to analysed aerial strategic problems.
Stephen Johnson states that “Part of the credit for US technical and economic superiority must be given to the interaction of Air Force officers with civilian scientists, engineers, and managers.”Footnote13 Essentially, co-operation is critical, and Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross contend that ideally, the linkages between the defence innovation and military systems should be broad and deep. According to this argument, the key aspects within the defence innovation system that would be most closely tied with military entities include factors related to determining threat assessments and how they define war-fighter requirements at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.Footnote14
Driving factors and innovation
Threats and hegemony serve as the first variable. Scholars previously recognised the importance of external threats in explaining military emulation and effectiveness. Evan Laksmana argues that a high threat level to state survivability tends to come from the external environment, while threat diversity can be measured by either the number of specific future opponents, or the nature and number of security issues of concern or both.Footnote15 Furthermore, most disruptive innovations have come about because of the perception of an operational or strategic problem that required more than a conventional solution.Footnote16 Hegemonic tensions in the Cold War are additionally vital to comprehend and are strongly connected to threats. They may persuade innovation and an actor may seek to emulate an adversary’s capabilities or create an asymmetric capability to offset a threat. The relative power struggles, in a structural realist perspective are vital.
Technological advancements, make up the second variable and may certainly persuade significant innovations. However, military innovation is not to be equated with, or reduced to, technological innovation solely. At times, technological advancement may be the introduced innovation itself, but in other instances, new capabilities produce novel instruments of war. Dougherty explains that “The technology reached a ‘tipping point,’ where steady progress finally made practical a capability that military stakeholders already desired or anticipated.”Footnote17
Inner and outer organisational influences shape and at times drive air power innovation – the third variable in the innovation section of this study. In this work, these influences are composed of civil–military relations, bureaucratic politics, and air force innovation culture. First, whether civil–military relations are unified, or divided, largely depends on the degree of disagreement between political and military leaders over key strategic and operational defence policies. In general, civil–military relations consist of industry–military interactions, and/or political–military interactions. Posen argues that civilians intervene to induce innovation directly, or by utilising military mavericks.Footnote18 The interaction between civil–military relations and threats shape peacetime innovation through the following key activities: strategic assessment, military selection and training, officer selection and appointments, and military education and training.Footnote19 Bureaucratic politics examine the relationship between the military branches within a state and the competition between the same military service.Footnote20 Rosen suggests that sometimes, competition may occur within a branch when respected senior military officers formulate and implement a successful strategy for gaining political control over their service on behalf of a novel way of war.Footnote21 Additionally, he shows that the more hierarchical and centralised the organisation is, the greater the impact of innovation is likely to be.Footnote22 Air force innovation culture is essentially the aspect of military culture that is most important for innovation. Bottom-up or top–bottom innovation reflects the direction and flow of the process and essentially, successful development can in fact be seen using either method. Bottom-up innovation typically began as “lessons learned” initiatives evaluating tactical engagements or implementation of war-fighting concepts. Top-down means the process under which the political and military leadership initiated the innovation policies is downward from the strategic to the tactical level. Here, senior leaders (civilian or military) are the agents of innovation where they recognise the need to adapt, formulate a new way of warfare, and find ways to implement that vision.Footnote23
Finally, the fourth innovation driver examined in this study is air power theory. Air power theory impacts innovation and influences the ideas advocated and methods adopted in an air force. Furthermore, military theory is most valuable when it is used to analyse and critically assess all the components and elements of warfare.Footnote24 The knowledge of air power history, capabilities, unique attributes, strategy, and tactics together make up air power theory. It encompasses a wide range of areas including why people use airpower, the desired political and military objectives they ask it to achieve, the perceptions of those who apply airpower, the type of conflict in which it participates and the capabilities that it possesses.Footnote25 In his analysis of air power theory, for instance, Meilinger concluded that historically, air power has been recognised as an inherently strategic weapon in ways that surface forces are not. Ultimately, air power has always been viewed as a powerful offensive weapon. Other air theorists have continually stressed the importance of achieving air superiority as rapidly as possible. These assumptions, for example, if understood one way or another could in fact change the innovative path an air force may choose. The task of the air professional is to make sense of the various conflicting theories and concepts noted above and translate them into a workable plan.Footnote26
Jet fighters generations
Airplanes advanced markedly in the twentieth century. By 1944, piston-powered aircraft were becoming obsolete and as flight speed rose above Mach 0.70, propeller efficiency decreased. The first jet fighters – The German “Messerschmitt” 262 and British Gloster “Meteor” were introduced in 1944 followed by the American P-80 in 1945.Footnote27 Ultimately, from the invention of the airplane until 1946, the normative airplane had been a straight-wing propeller-driven design. From 1947 onwards, it was a turbojet sweptwing turbojet-driven one.Footnote28
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the continuous evolution in air power: high-efficiency engines, after-burners that enabled supersonic flight, and enhanced high performance in jet fighters. The advance in jet fighters, specifically the leap in fighter generations, is a unique example of military innovation. Nevertheless, the definition of jet fighter generations has long been subject to debate. Most agree that the generations break down along similar lines. These generational groups allow the researcher to address technological advances common to a particular age in history, and also enable comparison to aircraft manufactured by other nations. The traditional definitions for jet fighters are used in our research.Footnote29
The generation categories were created in order to define major technology leaps in the historical development of jet fighters. Ultimately, a generational shift occurs when a technological innovation cannot be incorporated into an existing aircraft through upgrades. Historically, the notion of aircraft generations is a term that applies to only jet rather than propeller-driven fighter aircraft, appeared in the 1990s and according to the Australian Department of Defense, “attempted to make sense of the leaps in performance that jet fighter aircraft brought about through major advances in aircraft design, avionics, and weapon systems.”Footnote30 Potentially, it is either one major advancement, or a few minor ones, that create the substantial improvements that cause the leap in performance. Occasionally, competition between manufacturers also influences the shift to a new generation. Although some disagreements exist, below is the most widely used definition of aircraft generations.
Generation 1: the first jet-powered aircraft designed toward the end of the Second World War with a jet engine enabling a revolutionary advance in speed over its piston-engine predecessors. Some first-generation jets were equipped with swept wings that allowed transonic speeds to be reached (F-86, German Me 262, MiG-15, etc.); Generation 2: increased engine thrust with afterburner enabling flight in supersonic speeds alongside advanced weapons and sensors, first guided air-to-air missiles and radar on board (F-104/5/6, MiG-21, etc.); Generation 3: multi-role aircraft with advanced avionics, first precision munitions, radars capable of tracking targets at longer ranges with semi-active radar-guided missiles that enabled beyond visual range (BVR) engagements, radar warning receivers, and chaff and flares to defeat enemy threat systems (F-4; MiG-23; etc.); Generation 4: aircraft developed between the end of the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War (comprise the vast majority of the current American fighter inventory) and include fighters with sophisticated avionics, improved precision, enhanced radar, and improved manoeuvrability (F-15, F-16, Mirage 2000, MiG-29, etc.). Generation 5: all-aspect stealth with internal weapons, extreme agility, network-centric, fully integrated avionics, and some or full super-cruise (F-22, F-35, Su-57, Ju-20, etc.).
Results
Threats and hegemony
In all eight case-studies, threats and hegemonic competition significantly persuaded innovation of a new-generation jet fighter (see Table 1). Apparently, for air power, it is a highly important innovation driver. The hegemonic contest for global power directly followed the Second World War. This led the Soviets on one side, and the Americans on the other, to become highly ambitious to explore new technological advantages for their benefit by the late 1940s. The delicate, yet significant, balance of political world hegemonic powers was in fact a key accelerator in military innovation following the Second World War. In the case of the first-generation American F-86, the new and growing Cold War with the Soviet Union provided the major focus for potential war plans in the United States and shifted the strategic emphasis toward air power-dominated nuclear war. The Soviet Union was not only pursuing an aggressive course in Europe, but developing new weapons, including jet aircraft such as the MiG-15. In the case of the innovative first-generation Soviet MiG-15, as hostilities rose between the United States and the Soviet Union, so did the arms race between the two powers.
Table 1. “Threats and Hegemony” – Influence on driving innovation.
By the 1950s, advanced Soviet air-defence systems substantially challenged the US Air Force in Korea, persuading the latter to develop enhanced aircraft capable of dealing with such threats. Also, when the US lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons, the concept of massive retaliation took centre stage, attempting to deter conflicts through the threat of atomic annihilation. These circumstances led to the development of the second-generation F-105. In India, the already tense relations between India and Pakistan degraded and war seemed imminent by 1965. On the regional level, India tried to strengthen its stance in response due to growing regional pressures and as result of the 1962 war. Globally, the 1965 war engaged the United States and the Soviet Union in ways that determined the course for subsequent superpower involvement in the region and India was required to decide which path to choose. Eventually, chosen was the Soviet second-generation MiG-21.
By the 1960s, the American third-generation F-4’s supersonic speeds were necessary to overcome competing Soviet designs. Moreover, the powerful radar and advanced beyond visual range missiles were compulsory for eliminating threats from a great distance in order to avoid close enemy encounters. Entering service in 1961, the F-4 was impacted by a critically fragile period of the Cold War, when the two superpowers came closest to nuclear conflict. In Iraq’s case, procurement of the MiG-23 was part of a political ideology for regional Iraqi hegemony in the Arab world, shaped by the hegemonic tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In more recent years, fourth-generation F-15s were developed as a result of direct threats in Southeast Asia, with concerns of future worries that were already in production in Soviet factories such as the MiG-25. It was also part of a systematic attempt to leverage new technologies and develop new equipment to counter Soviet numerical superiority, particularly after the Soviets engaged in a major modernisation effort during the 1970s. In Israel, in the early 1980s, tensions around the Northern border, the dense advanced Syrian Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles (SAM) network, and the Iraqi nuclear threat all posed a clear challenge to Israel’s security. These threats alongside external big powers’ influence in various direct and indirect ways, persuaded the Israelis to acquire the fourth-generation F-16.
Technology
Technology was a driving factor only when a technological breakthrough was found and introduced – enabling innovation (see Table 2). This was the case with the first-generation jet fighters, both with swept-wings configurations and improved engine thrust. The F-86 was possible due to the flight research data seized from the German aerodynamicists at the end of the Second World War and similarly, the MiG-15 was developed with the assistance of German aircraft designers in Soviet-occupied territory.
Table 2. “Technology” – Influence on driving innovation.
The introduction of the second-generation aircraft was generally less dramatic. The F-105’s novel technology is indeed defined as second-generation, but it was not a game-changer, and certainly was not a key driver for innovation of the jet fighter. Increased engine thrust with an afterburner enabling flight in supersonic speeds, a doppler navigation system, mono-pulse radar for all-weather terrain attributed to the Century Series American aircraft, all of which were second-generation aircraft, by definition. However, there was not one single technological characteristic that acted as the key element for production. For the Indian Air Force, technology and specific capabilities were not the core parameters in the decision concerning which aircraft was to be purchased by India. The MiG-21F was a basic design not yet developed into the potent fighter of later years. It was a short-range interceptor with provision for two K-13 air-to-air missiles and a 30 mm integral cannon. For India, more important than a specific technology was a licence for local manufacturing.
The F-4 was a unique technology-led third-generation jet fighter. With speeds up to Mach 2.5, radar and infra-red missiles to replace guns, a long-range airborne radar to detect enemy aircraft, and in-flight refuelling to extend range, it seems that the innovators and developers of the aircraft were in pursuit of a significant change in air warfare. In the 1950s, it was believed that the F-4 was the way of the future: capable of detecting, tracking, and shooting down manoeuvring targets at great distances before the targets even realised they were being hunted. This of course turned out to be an enormous mistake as F-4 pilots would find themselves with no gun and no way to take a shot at their adversaries in close combat. In distinction, the Iraqi MiG-23 is a case in which technology itself was not central, and no technical information was available prior to the purchase. More important than a single and certain capability, was the fundamental requirement for a modern technological air force.
Fourth-generation aircraft were significantly improved technologically in comparison to previous generations. It is evident that the technological leap in the fourth generation was uniquely significant and impacted by several additional elements such as advanced air-to-air missiles, and air-to-ground munitions. In the F-15’s case, newly introduced technology was a fundamental starting point that affected the development; and specifically, energy and radar technologies. In the F-16’s case, the United States Lightweight Fighter Program, initiated in the late 1960s by a group of officers and defence analysts known as the “Fighter Mafia”, introduced new lightweight materials and improved engine design, enabling a substantial shift in efficiency. Even though the F-16’s technology was significant for development indeed, it was not the key factor in Israel’s procurement of the new jet fighter. Like other non-manufacturer states, more important than a single and certain capability was the fundamental necessity for a modern and sophisticated air force capable of dealing with the constant threats surrounding Israel. Even though the capabilities eventually enabled Operation Opera in Iraq and Operation Mole Cricket 19, other drivers were more significant in the process.
Organisational influences
Inner and outer organisational influences shape and at times drive air power innovation (see Table 3). These influences, in the definition of this study, are composed of civil–military relations, bureaucratic politics, and air force innovation culture. These factors, whether independently and/or jointly, had significant effect on the air power innovation procedures in all observed case-studies; but one, a significant finding indeed. It is perceptible that one significant organisational factor is in fact typically sufficient to initiate such innovation, and apparently, nearly no novel fighters were developed, or acquired, without noteworthy organisational influences.
Table 3. “Organisational Influences” – Influence on driving innovation.
For the first-generation F-86, the post-war United States aircraft industry that had mushroomed during the war had not yet found a peacetime market to serve, impacting fundamental civil–military relations. Inter-service bureaucratic relations were significant due to the formation of the newly independent US Air Force and reduced post-war defence budgets. Also, even though innovation mechanisms had not yet matured, an independent air force was the first step towards significant air force innovation. In the Soviet Union during the same period, a unique culture affected all aspects of life. The dictatorship’s centralisation process under Stalin led to a diverse rising culture in comparison to the West, even though the civil–military system did in fact experience competition amongst potential manufacturers, demonstrating the ability to concentrate on certain goals for innovation in a centralised system, including the development of the first-generation MiG-15. Nevertheless, a lack of bottom-up military research and development significantly challenged this competition between security agencies and services.
By the 1950s, the US military-industry relations were unique, negatively affected by the Korean War during and succeeding it, influencing rapid disorganised production, often with hundreds of changes following the initial design, and with no coherent planned path. Moreover, US Air Force correspondence disclosed criticism in respect to innovation mechanisms and the lack of direction during relevant years. Nevertheless, the American bureaucratic system was devoted to winning and a decentralised governmental bureaucracy influenced inter-service competition, somewhat affecting the development of the F-105. In the case of foreign military sales, bureaucratic politics may be central for understanding a country’s innovation procedures. With India’s procurement of the Soviet second-generation MiG-21, the strategic and operational decision concerning which aircraft was required for the Air Force was decided with only slight military involvement, leaning more on economic and civilian aspects, and affected highly by the quest for self-reliance and licence production of any aircraft acquired. Though civil–military relations were constructive in the eyes of the Indian Air Force, mostly through personal high-level relationships, the general role of the armed forces in the new nation was limited sharply and control over the armed forces was lodged in the over-centralised civilian cabinet.
In the 1960s, the American civilian fatigue from wars in Asia was evident. The election of John F. Kennedy brought a change in military policy, emphasising the use of budget for national aims alongside the “Flexible Response” doctrine. In industry, domestic competition amongst rival developers noticeably influenced the development of the third-generation F-4. In order to satisfy several independent customers, the development of a multi-purpose and flexible jet fighter was a success. Nevertheless, inter-service competition and co-operation were critical in the procedure. Foremost, this point portrays the process in the United States Armed Forces; and specifically in the Air Force, where independence and relevance were in a constant state of improvement, affecting the service’s innovation mechanisms. Even in the Iraqi dictatorship’s procurement of the third-generation MiG-23, organisational influences were indeed important. Civil–military relations in Iraq, especially during Saddam’s rule, were extremely politically controlled. To protect himself from the military’s involvement in politics, Saddam embarked on a programme of politicisation in the armed forces, creating a delicate structure in which the military is tightly controlled to avoid a coup. Regionally, Saddam desired to become the key Arab leader and domestically, he wanted to satisfy the military in order to remain in power. In the uncompetitive bureaucratic system, intra-service and inter-service did not influence innovation and effective innovation mechanisms were nonexistent. Thus, it was the leader and his close allies that decided how and why innovation was to be initiated politically, whilst the agencies of the Iraqi system complied. This structure was highly significant in the innovation process.
Finally, in fourth-generation jet fighters the organisational factors were similarly extensive. In the case of the F-15, competition within industry was influential as an initial request was sent to 13 manufacturers for the initial F-X parametric design. In 1965, the US Navy and the Air Force both issued operational requirements for a new tactical fighter, and although McNamara ordered a joint review on the commonality issue, cross-branch competition led to a win-win path for both services with the development of the F-15 and F-14 accordingly. Within the Air Force, intra-service unity improved the service’s position in the debates between multi-purpose and air superiority advocates. Finally, modification was seen in several parameters; in addition to initiatives such as Air Force Major John Boyd’s on the working level, and Lt. General Arthur Agan’s on the commanding level, an improvement in modernisation mechanisms and bottom-up Air Force initiatives affected the overall innovation process. In respect to the Israeli civil–military relations, the Yom-Kippur was traumatic and remains so in contemporary Israeli discourse. Furthermore, Israeli industry has gone to great lengths to improve its own local capabilities to manufacture armaments, affecting procurement. Regarding bureaucracy, although competition within the Israeli Defense Forces was generally minor, the F-16 was unanimously rejected by the “Chadish” research group, but advocated by General Peled who insisted that the F-16 was the better option for Israel’s needs. His decision was approved, ultimately reflecting a centralised bureaucracy that was indeed critical in the acquisition process. Innovation mechanisms were in a constant improvement process, and even though no real extensive thought or anticipation of future strategic trends existed, bottom-up initiatives and challenges within the service did exist alongside investments on research and development.
Air power theory
The fourth and final variable examined the response influenced by the assumptions and understandings of air power theory in relation to innovation of a new-generation jet fighter (see Table 4). Air power theory was not dominant in comparison to the previous variables. For the F-86, air power theory was not significant. In the US of 1949, strategic objectives of air power focused on elimination, or reduction, of the enemy’s power or power potential, affected significantly by the nuclear arms race, and by the atomic bomb debate. A “vertical” school focused on eliminating key systems and a “horizontal” tool focused on military and economic targets in cities. Even though tactical airmen regularly defended the essential elements of tactical warfare and argued it would be critical for all wars; nuclear or non-nuclear, Tactical Air Command (TAC) had been stripped of its units to become just an operational and planning headquarters. In the Soviet Union, in contrast, the first-generation MiG-15 was affected by the theoretical understandings by the end of the Second World War. By far, the clearest consensus on the use of Soviet air power was in respect to its employment in mass for decisive effects. MiG-15s in big numbers were key for mission success, via the destruction of enemy aircraft in aerial combat, or large air engagements and air attacks on enemy airfields. Theoretical and scientific military knowledge was quite central in Moscow’s discourse in general and the mass-strategy was already adopted by the end of the war in which Soviet air power deployed 11,530 operational aircraft for the final drive to defeat Nazi Germany.
Table 4. “Air Power Theory” – Influence on driving innovation.
In the 1950s, the years of the F-105’s development, the US Air Force’s emphasis was still on Strategic Air Command (SAC) and its long-range bombers and less on TAC and its tactical fighters. Apparently, the decision to develop a strong atomic intercontinental jet fighter was persuaded by air professionals through their understanding of the next war and airpower’s requirements. In some respects, this reliance on nuclear-led air theory, alongside a neglect of additional air power requirements, remained so up until the Vietnam War years. Even though nuclear war air power theory was indeed dominant for the development of a low-altitude nuclear striker, in reality the F-105 ended up fighting in a diverse low-intensity war in Vietnam. In another perspective, air power was not and is still not central to India’s defence strategy. The same generation’s MiG-21 was acquired, although utilisation of the aerial domain was not of primary importance for Indian military professionals and leaders. There was a strong Indian tendency to delay the consideration of the use of force with the strong reluctance of India’s political and military leadership to use its offensive air power, with anticipation to coexist peacefully with their neighbors.
With the introduction of third-generation fighters in the 1960s, air power theory was generally shifting into new areas, yet was an insignificant driver in both case-studies. In the US, TAC’s role gradually increased and there were some broad areas of consensus that shaped the development of the F-4, such as air superiority’s growing importance. Nevertheless, theorists had not developed a TAC-oriented air power theory in the years leading up to the Vietnam War and strategic forces remained the dominant concern of the Air Force and its senior leaders. In Iraq, air power theory had not evolved into a relevant, contemporary theory for utilising force, and thus did not noticeably affect Iraq’s innovation in the case of the MiG-23. The Iraqi Air Force’s combat experience and expertise had been limited, and it appears that air power was not seen as a key element in the Iraqi military, and the centralised-politicised bureaucracy did not enable effective learning procedures in the service.
By the 1970s and early 1980s, the gradual evolution of tactical air power theory reached the point at which it became significant in driving innovation. Towards the end of the Vietnam War, the air superiority lesson was learned and became a key mission– strongly influencing the innovation of the fourth-generation F-15 in the United States. Up until these crucial years, it was in the realm of air superiority that the US Air Force showed the most glaring weaknesses in doctrine and prewar preparations, and the paradigm of massive nuclear war with the Soviet Union, provided the sole guiding light in the 1950s and 1960s. Although improvement was evident, some areas were still neglected – for instance, the US Air Force’s consideration of the potential use of conventional tactical air power up until the Gulf war was insufficient. Similarly, in Israel, a gradual theoretical change influenced innovation of the F-16. In general, the Israeli Defense Forces were focused more on, here and now, and less on developing fundamental military theory for future wars. Nevertheless, the reality and lessons learned from the Yom-Kippur War forced air power professionals to comprehend gradually that air superiority is significantly more challenging to achieve than anticipated and is in fact dependent on several additional crucial factors, and must be engaged as a broad comprehensive plan, and thus the fourth-generation F-16 was part of this plan.
Innovation: a new air power perspective
Driving innovation
Overwhelmingly, the two driving factors that were most-significant are: (1) threats and hegemony, and (2) organisational influences. This finding was true for all types of actors: Western/Eastern, super-powers/regional-powers, and independent manufacturers/dependent states. The additional two variables that were generally less conclusive are: (3) technology, and (4) air power theory.
The realist school of thought contends that military organisations innovate in response to threats from potential rivals,Footnote31 a point strengthened in this study. In the technological age, swift changes in, and redresses of, the balance of power due to innovation have become the rule.Footnote32 The threats and hegemony variable, consisting of both gradual long-term tensions and immediate threats, rests on the realistic perspective that explains the security and defence policies of actors. Through this analysis, the global balance of power amongst actors is a crucial and key catalyser for military innovation, a finding observed in all case-studies examined. From the delicate, yet significant, balance of political world hegemonic powers following the Second World War, through the direct threats in Southeast Asia, to the dense advanced Syrian Soviet-built SAM network, advancement in jet fighter generations during the Cold War was directly linked to global and regional power distribution, together with direct and indirect threats between adversaries.
Inner and outer organisational influences shape and at times drive air power innovation, a point well understood in other studies.Footnote33 Apparently, with air power, the inner-political dynamics of the state-system are main drivers of significant developments. This is possibly a result of the extensive financial and logistical resources involved in the development and acquisition of aerial capabilities. The variable is composed of civil–military relations, bureaucratic politics, and air force innovative culture, but it is evident that one influential factor out of the three may be enough to initiate disruptive advances in air power. In the Soviet centralised dictatorship, the civil–military system experienced politisation of the military, vitally influencing innovation. In the United States, 1960s bureaucratic politics were characterised by cross-service competition and co-operation, also driving innovation. In India, unchallenged dominance by the political leaders. alongside close personal civil–military relationships, were critically important in the state’s acquisition process. Whether it is civilian intervention in order to induce innovation directly as Posen argues, a unified civil–military relations whilst dealing with a high-level external threat, competition between branches of the same military service, or unique air force innovation mechanisms, organisational factors are critical.Footnote34
In a piece on tactical aviation, Thomas McCabe stated that when the potential opposition is catching up, the obvious counter is; and historically has been, a technological leap forward.Footnote35 This study evaluated technological innovations which is why it is obvious that technology is relevant. Yet, emphasising the technological role in the procedure is imperative. In half of the observed cases, technology drove innovation, but in the other half, it was merely part of the development. Like the chicken–egg metaphor, a technological advancement may be the introduced innovation, or the enabler of a novel development. Significance as a driving variable is high when “The technology reached a ‘tipping point,’ where steady progress finally made practical a capability that military stakeholders already desired or anticipated.”Footnote36 The F-86 was the first American aircraft to take advantage of flight research data seized from the German aerodynamicists at the end of the Second World War, and it was the first US swept wing fighter ever produced. Likewise, an astonishing technological leap in energy and radar technologies, developed through theoretical and doctrinal discourse, spurred innovation of the F-15. For technology to be a driving factor of new-generation fighters, it is required to be: (1) a precedential idea and/or method that challenges the basic known technological concepts; (2) impossible to be incorporated into an existing aircraft through upgrades; and, (3) available for development and production through the existing mechanisms in industry. Such were the circumstances in all the technological-driven innovations examined.
Air power theory-driven innovation is ultimately an innovative response influenced by the assumptions and understandings of air power theory. It is valid to argue that air power theory, the final variable, is rather amorphic and could in fact be a shaping factor just as well as a driving one. Nevertheless, in evaluation as a driving factor, it is evident that in half of the cases observed, air power theory did in fact play a significant role in the initiation of new jet fighters. These were influenced by the ideas advocated and methods adopted by military professionals. In the development of the F-15, aerial superiority concepts adopted in the US Air Force were key parameters that eventually became the new-generation jet fighter. From this standpoint, threats, hegemonic tensions, technology, and organisational influences were significant catalysers, but it was also air power theory advocated by air force officers that persuaded new solutions to the period’s challenges. Fundamentally, all the variables are mutually affected by one another. Moreover, it is a question of whether innovations drive air power theory or vice versa; it seems that they are in fact interconnected. The role of air power theory is better understood in an analysis of the F-105’s development in the years when air power was clearly designated towards nuclear attacks. The F-105 was developed under this designation, but eventually adapted successfully to low-intensity conflict in the skies of Vietnam. In the years of the fighter’s development, various tactical air power theory concepts were neglected, and air power was SAC-oriented, eventually leading to the development of a fighter designed for missions never flown. Air power theory is perhaps not a main driver of innovation, but it is crucial in the process and impacts proficiency significantly.
We argue that through this article’s methodological examination of air power theory, the importance of expertise is portrayed. Knowledge is vital and is perhaps one of the finest tools for air force innovation. Air power theory: history, existing literature, doctrine, capabilities, and technology are all areas that require in-depth comprehension for the air power professional. This knowledge is required to deal with the precise nature of expected changes in future war, is a fundamental necessity to identify, analyse, and prioritise an air force’s contemporary strategic problems, and is made up of the essential principles for steering defence industry in the desired direction in a goal to enable relevant solutions once strategic problems are evident. This knowledge is a must for assisting defence industry in its constant work to research, develop, and improve contemporary technology in adequate paths.
Air power theory and air force innovation culture, a vital organisational factor, are connected. Effective air force innovation culture may strengthen proficiency and improve knowledge. The cause for this is clear once the mechanisms required in air force cultures for effective innovation are understood. The case-studies demonstrate that bottom-up air force innovation culture and adequate mechanisms for innovation are two vital attributes that compose effective innovation culture in air forces. Adequate mechanisms permit young personnel to express their ideas through available procedures on one side and are characterised by openness for criticism among senior officers on the other side. Defined by Meir Finkel as “conceptual and doctrinal flexibility,” this occurs when senior civilian officials and military officers create an organisational atmosphere that encourages lower-ranking commanders to broach ideas that challenge official doctrine.Footnote37 Once compared to air power theory of the same period, innovation culture, and air power theory are indeed mutually influential.
The argument is: air power theory and air force innovation mechanisms are correlated. Furthermore, out of the four examined driving factors, they are directly controlled by the air force and that are possible to modify. If effective mechanisms exist, air power theory is typically improved. Since the goal of innovation is persistent improvement, and since this is achieved through constant learning and interchange of ideas, it is clear how these two variables are interconnected (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The variables impacting innovation and the role of proficiency.
A comparative analysis
This study’s research methodology enables a comprehensive comparison amongst different actors. Out of the eight examined cases, four focused on innovations in the United States, one looked at innovation in the Soviet Union and three cases observed innovation of non-manufacturers states, i.e. India, Israel, and Iraq. This diversity enabled the gathering of satisfactory data for the comparison of different innovation concepts between (1) various states with different defence policies; (2) Soviet, as opposed to American, developments; and, (3) self-manufactures as opposed to foreign procurements. Certainly, different cultures and perceptions lead to diverse concepts of innovation. Diverse cultures develop diverse war paradigms, and this in due course influences innovation in various ways.
The Soviet Union was undoubtfully unique. As a central element of their national strategy during the 30 years until the collapse in 1989, the Soviets have persistently upgraded their military forces, and relied on them to guard and advance their interests throughout the world.Footnote38 However, this Cold War critical balance of powers was evidently a key factor for innovation worldwide, for all actors. The diversity is more clearly seen in the cultural and structural aspects. Innovation of the MiG-15 portrays three key organisational elements that are attributed to Soviet innovation. First, it was initiated by German aircraft designers in Soviet-occupied territory. In pursuit of technology, the Soviet Union’s strategic culture, as early as the Bolshevik era, tended to base itself on Western scientific inventions, and Soviet military thinkers tended to adopt ideas from other countries, especially Western. The Soviet model of innovation was arguably one of KGB-led innovation: industrial espionage and operations aimed at smuggling computers and technical know-how from the West, which Soviet scientists then reversed-engineered. Furthermore, innovation in air power was pre-eminently influenced by aerodynamicists in the Soviet system, which at times neglected all additional factors. Second, the development of the MiG-15 was led, among additional factors, by air power theory absorbed in the Second World War and is in correlation to Adamsky and Bjerga’s argument that “Whereas in the American and Israeli cases the cultivation of the technological seeds preceded the maturation of the conceptual ones, in the Soviet case theoretical activity preceded technological procurement and combat experience.”Footnote39 The Soviet knowledge-based culture was indeed a strength, but the lack of corresponding advanced technology kept them behind. Third, although the Soviet system was centralised and extremely challenging for innovation, it indeed demonstrated abilities to concentrate successfully on certain patriotic goals. Even though it may be easier to implement new ideas in a tightly controlled autocracy, the lack of pluralism may at times be counter-productive. Nevertheless, in the top–bottom tightly controlled mode of innovation, the Soviet design bureaux were quite unique, i.e. they were broadly autonomous, and at times, quite competitive entities.
In the United States, air power-related innovation was distinct and American-led technology has always been a critical factor. Advanced technology is what enabled far-reaching US policies on one hand, and it continuously demanded forthcoming significant additional advancements on the other hand, air power being critical to this requirement. This connection between the US military and technology innovation has not been accidental. The Department of Defense is and has historically been firmly embedded in the US national innovation system, including enjoying historically close relationships with academic research institutions and partnerships with leading defence technology firms.Footnote40 Immediately following the Second World War in which air power played a significant and crucial part, the air power role in military affairs grew substantially. In 1947, the US Army Air Corps was separated from the Army and was established as an independent branch, marking a vital moment in US air power and affecting inner-innovation mechanisms. With assistance of the previous analysed case-studies, three points are evident in US air power innovation, in respect to driving and shaping factors. First, technology, and self-reliance on technology development are perhaps key aspects. Second, competition, industrial and inter-service, is central in this process. Third, USAF innovation mechanisms were in a constant state of improvement from its initial establishment. The F-15 well describes these three factors: energy and radar technology were key in development; request proposals were sent to 13 manufacturers for the initial F-X parametric design; and the Air Force was in the process of modification and saw both conceptual and organisational transition, affecting bottom-up innovation significantly.
In military innovation the result is what matters, i.e. the product. The mechanisms are undoubtfully crucial, but they are ultimately enablers. Armed conflict has been rather common in the twentieth century and innovations were required to keep-up. This is one area where the Soviet and American systems differ – continuous improvement, and this does in fact depend on domestic mechanisms. The Soviet Union introduced the astonishing MiG-15 in the Korean War, a jet fighter just as capable as the US’s solution to the challenge, i.e. the F-86. But 20 years later, the MIG-25 did not match the F-15 and 30 years later, the MiG-29 did not match the F-16. Seemingly, the lack of Soviet domestic technology development was one factor that caused this difference. This is indeed one of the reasons why the Soviet military and its satellite states chose to shift their reliance towards dense SAM networks over the years, an area in which the West was generally less devoted to emulating.
Summarised in 1989 by a report that analysed the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s most fundamental national security objectives were the maintenance of its territorial integrity and the defence of the communist regime.Footnote41 From the outset of its industrialisation drive, the Soviet Union has used every device available to keep abreast of worldwide developments in technology, while simultaneously maintaining a policy of cultural and political isolation. From borrowing technology from imports on a massive scale, to the purchase of foreign patents and licences. Following the Second World War, this was sufficient since US innovation similarly relied on German knowledge. Nevertheless, an evaluation of the Cold War shows that Soviet technology was generally not on a par with that in the West. An assortment of aggregative measures was used by the CIA in 1969 for quantitative measurements such as labour productivity, factor productivity, and the value of capitol stock per worker, and this argued inferiority was seen in all numbers in the Soviet Union.Footnote42 In the same report it was stated that Soviet production technology was behind that of the West by at least five years. Principally, although Soviet industry produced high-performance fighters and interceptors, and even though a large domestic ability to develop capabilities through research was apparent since 1955, the average level of technology as of 1969 was far behind in every aspect in comparison to the United States.Footnote43 In the US on the other hand, the Vietnam War forced a rapid developmental pace for airpower technology.Footnote44 The technological industrial gap, it seems, influenced by domestic industry’s pursuit for constant self-enhancement, was a central reason for the inevitable difference in performance between US and Soviet fighters throughout the Cold War.
In contemporary warfare, the Russian/Chinese-American technological aviation gap is perhaps becoming less dramatic. Although sixth-generation jet fighters are in initial design in the United States, some scholars assess that a central reason for the plateau in manned tactical aviation technology in the twenty-first century is that we are approaching, if we have not already reached, the limits of what is immediately and affordably available for tactical combat aircraft.Footnote45 In the decades following the Gulf War, America’s competitor states have actively invested in innovative defence technologies of their own. Russia and China sought to modernise their military capabilities after the startling ease with which the United States defeated Iraqi forces during the Gulf War, and the fall of the Soviet Union contributed to a precipitous decline in US military spending. China invested massive efforts to become a key military global power and although Russia is behind in technology, its equivalence could be observed in the years to come. Meanwhile, the 2022 Ukraine crisis suggests otherwise.
Several clear differences surface when comparing innovation in self-reliant technological manufacturers such as the Soviet Union, or the United States, and innovation in dependent states such as Israel, India, and Iraq. First, for understandable reasons, hegemonic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union did not typically serve as a persuading factor in the calculation of the dependent states for their domestic innovation. Their ambitions are less global and more regional and essentially, non-manufacturer states initiated significant innovation as a result of direct threats from adversaries and regional power balances. For India, Chinese aggression and the Pakistani growing threats were both key direct factors significantly persuading the Indians to innovate and acquire novel aircraft. For Iraq, the first incentive for military innovation was in the late 1970s that caused a cloud of growing insecurity alongside Saddam’s pursuit for regional hegemony. For Israel, tensions around the Northern border, specifically the advanced Syrian Soviet-built SAM network, posed a clear challenge to Israel’s security and called for innovation.
The innovation process in dependent countries possesses alternative attributes. Even though technology may be an important persuader, acquiring the weapons does not require a strong and/or independent military industry. Additionally, the process may in fact occur abruptly and rapidly, immediately following a decision by commanders and is in correlation to the point previously argued by scholars, emphasising the need for rapid peacetime innovation in response to evolving strategic problems and threats.Footnote46 Also, innovation is not “tailor-made” in such circumstances, but is instead selected from the available options, at times in some compromise, because it is a process of procurement and not of development. Finally, in all three cases mentioned above, a specific technological factor was not a key driver for innovation. The three air forces were in pursuit of the general advancement of their air forces, for multiple reasons, but not a specific technological advance, or capability was in mind. The goal was a more fundamental one; to obtain an advanced air force capable of engaging potential adversaries.
Conclusion
Air power innovation is unique. We portrayed how gradual long-term hegemonic tensions, regional risks, and immediate threats, are most influential for initiating innovation in air power. Furthermore, the influence of technology depends on whether advancements have reached a “tipping point”. Organisational influences, composed of civil–military relations, bureaucratic politics, and air force innovation culture, are indeed substantial for initiating innovation, and one noteworthy organisational factor is in fact sufficient to initiate such developments. Air power theory, it seems, is not a dominant driving factor, but indeed shapes the process significantly by contributing to the overall innovation effectiveness.
Air power theory and air force innovation mechanisms are correlated and are the fundamentals for effective air power innovation. Furthermore, they are factors that are indeed possible to modify. If effective bottom-up innovation mechanisms exist, air power theory may advance significantly. These two elements create proficiency within the service that assists in the creation of noteworthy successful innovation in air power. Since the goal of innovation is persistent improvement, and since this is achieved through constant learning and interchange of ideas, it is clear how these two variables consistently cause enhanced results. In order to stay ahead technologically, specifically with the gradually closing Eastern-Western technological gap, these parameters are indeed required for future success.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Ilan Shklarsky
Ilan Shklarsky llan Shklarsky is a Lt. Col. in the IAF with expertise in air power, innovation, and adaptation studies. He recieved his PhD, “Air Power: Theoretical and Operational Adaptions Resulting from the 'Generations Advancements in Fighter Jets” from Bar-Ilan University.
Eitan Shamir
Eitan Shamir is a senior Lecturer at the Political Science Department, Bar Ilan University, and a Senior Research Associate with the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA Center). Prior to his academic position, he was in charge of the National Security Doctrine Department at the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, Prime Minister Office. Before joining the Ministry, he was a Senior Fellow at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies (CIMS) at the IDF General Headquarters. His research interest and publications focus on topics such as strategy, command, military innovation & reforms, and military culture.
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