Brian Waidelich and George Pollitt
Unique insights on the latest PRC military maritime capabilities and trends from two brilliant, cutting-edge researchers, based on one of the very best papers delivered at CMSI’s April 2023 “Chinese Undersea Warfare” conference!
Brian Waidelich is a Research Scientist at CNA’s Indo-Pacific Security Affairs program. His research focuses on PLA organization and Indo-Pacific maritime and space security issues. Brian received a Master of Arts in Asian studies from Georgetown University and Bachelors of Arts in Chinese and English from George Mason University. He has also studied at the Nanjing University of Science and Technology.
A former Air Force navigator, George Pollitt began work in mine countermeasures (MCM) in 1971 as Technical Agent for the Mine Neutralization Vehicle System at the Naval Ship Engineering Center. He programmed MCM tactical decision aids for OPERATION END SWEEP, the clearing of mines in Haiphong, and developed MCM tactics in Panama City, FL before transferring to the Commander Mine Warfare (COMINEWARCOM) Staff, where he worked as an MCM analyst, Advisor for Research and Analysis, and Technical Director. He participated in OPERATION EARNEST WILL, the Tanker War, testing systems in the Persian Gulf to enable warships to detect mines, and he analyzed the DESERT STORM Clean-Up Operation on scene for Commander Middle Eastern Forces. At the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, he led studies on MCM platforms and systems and the Maritime 9-11 Study. Most recently he evaluated the MK 18 Mine hunting UUV system as the Independent Test and Evaluation Agent. George has an ME in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Florida and a BS in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Central Florida.
Summary
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made incremental progress in its mine countermeasures (MCM) program in recent years. The PLAN’s current inventory of about 60 MCM ships and craft includes classes of minehunters and minesweepers mostly commissioned in the past decade as well as unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and remotely operated vehicles with demonstrated explosive neutralization capability. Despite the addition of these advanced MCM platforms and equipment, experts affiliated with the PLAN and China’s mine warfare development laboratory have serious reservations about the PLAN’s current ability to respond to the full range of likely threats posed by naval mines in future contingencies. The PLAN’s MCM forces are currently organized for operations near China’s coastline, but writings by Chinese military and civilian experts contend that to safeguard Beijing’s expanding overseas interests, the PLAN must develop MCM capabilities for operations far beyond the First Island Chain. PLAN and civilian mine warfare experts have proposed various solutions for offsetting perceived shortcomings in the PLAN’s MCM program, including the development of autonomous USVs and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), deployment of modularized MCM mission packages on ships such as destroyers and frigates, and mobilization of civilian assets such as ships and helicopters in support of MCM operations. Although there appears to have been little to no adoption of these proposed solutions to date, the PLAN recognizes MCM as one of its biggest challenges, and one can expect the PLAN to continue making measured progress in its MCM program in the years ahead.
Introduction
This report provides an overview of Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities, with a focus on related naval platforms and equipment, civil-military integration, and training activities. This report updates previous Western research on PLAN MCM, with an eye toward developments since 2010.1
The detection and neutralization of adversary naval mines is an important capability for all maritime powers, and China is no exception. Minefields deprive enemy ships of freedom of maneuver and eliminate their mobility. The laying of mines, or even the suspicion that mines have been laid in a strategic waterway such as a harbor or strait, can be enough to deter a country lacking in MCM capability from transiting that waterway. It is more difficult to clear mines than to lay mines, and mines are significantly cheaper per unit than the enemy combatants they threaten to cripple or destroy. To retain freedom of maneuver, it is imperative for maritime powers to develop MCM capability to ensure the safe passage of their commercial shipping and naval forces, especially during crisis and conflict.
In this report, we argue that the PLAN recognizes the importance of modernizing and expanding its MCM capability to operate in both “near seas” and “far seas” environments, but that evidence to date shows they have made limited progress toward this goal, possibly due to competition for resources with other naval warfare communities. We find that most or all of the PLAN’s current inventory of about 60 dedicated mine warfare ships and craft, as well as MCM equipment including remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), is likely intended for operations within the First Island Chain. We also note People’s Republic of China (PRC) interest in using civilian platforms to augment its MCM capability, although there is little evidence of recent training or investments in this area. We found that the PLAN currently maintains an inventory of remotely-controlled mine sweeping USVs but appears to lack minehunting UUVs, despite the fact that PRC shipbuilders are clearly capable of building related platforms.
The data analyzed for this report was drawn primarily from Chinese-language technical journal and newspaper articles published between 2010 and 2022. Priority was given to articles authored by individuals with credible ties to China’s MCM program, namely authors with institutional affiliations to the PLAN and to the state-owned China State Shipbuilding Corporation’s (CSSC) No. 710 Research Institute, China’s mine warfare development laboratory.2 As with any analysis of PLA capabilities based on publicly available writings, this report presents a partial and likely incomplete picture of the initiatives underway in China’s MCM development, some of which may be classified or otherwise deemed too sensitive for public disclosure.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section one examines PRC military and civilian authors’ views of the naval mine threat environment and motivations for expanding the PLAN’s MCM capability outside the First Island Chain. The second section lays out what is currently known from publicly available sources on the PLAN’s current MCM capability (platforms, equipment, etc.) as well as capabilities it may be developing based on evidence from PRC writings. In the third section, we discuss PRC views on incorporating civilian platforms such as ships, helicopters, and UUVs into MCM operations and the types of tasks those civilian platforms could potentially undertake. The fourth section offers a brief overview of MCM training exercises carried out within the PLAN and with foreign militaries. The final section summarizes observed progress in the PLAN’s MCM capability since 2010 and compares the differing approaches to MCM in the PLAN and U.S. Navy. … … …
Conclusion
The PLAN’s General View of MCM
PRC military and civilian authors offer rather bleak assessments of the PLAN’s existing capability to neutralize enemy mine threats, particularly as the PLAN operates at greater distances from mainland China. As Hu Ce, an author from the No. 710 Research Institute put it, a naval blockade could stress the PLAN’s existing MCM capability to the point that “the survivability and operations of the Chinese Navy’s forces would be seriously challenged” and that “the national economy and even the strategic overall situation could be affected” (emphasis added).67 A senior engineer from the PLAN’s Yichang Area Military Representative Office, emphasized the near seas-centric role of existing PLAN MCM forces, stressing that they are “seriously inadequate [for] supporting mid- and far seas protection operations.”68
Despite PRC authors’ self-acknowledged shortcomings, a comparison with past Western analyses of PLAN MCM capability demonstrates that the PLAN has in some respects made progress in fielding more advanced MCM platforms and equipment. PRC military and civilian subject matter experts have also advocated for advancements in a variety of unmanned MCM capabilities and the integration of civilian assets, although little or no evidence of progress in these areas has been observed in publicly available sources. We summarize related developments since 2010 in Table 2 below.
Autonomous Platforms
There is much advocacy in PRC writings for the integration of military or civilian autonomous platforms, including USVs and UUVs, for MCM operations. Apart from the PLAN’s existing Wonang-class remotely-controlled craft, however, we saw no evidence of the PLAN fielding such platforms for MCM purposes or bringing analogous civilian platforms in for demonstrations or training exercises.
Conventional Minehunting
The press has noted that Chinese MCM ships are not modern ships made from fiberglass, as are Western MCM ships, and that emphasis has been placed on mine sweeping over mine hunting. With China’s technical skill in automation and with the emphasis in PRC writings on increasing the use of unmanned platforms throughout the force, it seems plausible that in the future the PLAN may skip further development of conventional minehunting and go directly to highly automated unmanned minehunting.
Range of Operations
What is publicly known about the capabilities and ranges of PLAN MCM ships and craft, coupled with accounts of their shortcomings by PRC authors, suggests that current MCM craft must operate relatively close to mainland bases. They may lack the ability to achieve full coverage of waters within the First Island Chain.
Organic MCM
One PRC author claims it is especially important for the PLAN to have “organic MCM” capabilities for “far-seas missions,” i.e., for PLAN missions outside the First Island Chain in which dedicated MCM platforms are less likely to be available. As they pointed out, during far-seas operations, specialized MCM forces are usually unavailable, so forces must “save themselves” by relying on their own capabilities to counter naval mines.69 However, it has not been explicitly stated in the literature that the PLAN has been developing systems for organic MCM for ships in the far seas. PRC media reviewed for this report did show examples of PLAN destroyers or frigates conducting MCM training, but this was limited to relatively simple fires against floating mines.
Use of Civilian Assets
PRC writings portray MCM support missions as a natural avenue of civil-military cooperation that builds upon decades of past practice. However, the writings did not reference recent examples of the actual use or training in the use of non-PLAN platforms. A logical civil-military cooperation for MCM would be to use fishing craft to perform MCM functions, as the British did in World War I. Civilian ships are available that could tend multiple unmanned systems as mother ships, but PRC civilian and military authors have not stated any intention of using mother ships, military or otherwise, for mine countermeasures. PLA-affiliated authors have noted that few civilian ships to date have been built to national defense standards. There are advocates within the Chinese MCM community for using civilian helicopters; but again, PRC writings have not mentioned any intention to use them.
Training
The spotty and often vague nature of PRC media reporting on PLAN training makes it difficult to generalize about PLAN MCM forces’ levels of capability and readiness. What is clear from PRC subject matter experts’ writings is that they find the state of training to be less than ideal and believe that improvements need to be made. One such area for improvement is simulation training, in which organizations throughout the PLA have been making investments in recent years.70 As one PLAN engineer argued, better MCM simulation training is necessary given the increasingly high costs and risks of conducting training with modern MCM assets and high-tech naval mines.71 Despite the advocacy, it is unclear whether PLAN leaders have the budget or inclination to build such training systems for MCM forces. Although the PLA as a whole continues to enjoy annual budget increases—7.2 percent in 2023—decision-makers are also likely facing hard budgetary choices as they commission more advanced capabilities, like aircraft carriers, and seek to use monetary incentives to improve retention and professionalism of the force.
Comparison with the U.S. Navy
Some parallels exist between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy in their attitudes toward mine warfare. In both cases, MCM is at the bottom of the priority list for assignments and careers. As a PLAN ditty begins, “if you get on a ship, don’t get on a minesweeping ship.”72 In both services, there are advocates for needed MCM capabilities, but little action is taken beyond the building of hulls.69
The main contrast between the U.S. Navy and PLAN is in the placement of their MCM assets: the U.S. Navy stations its MCM assets forward to protect the fleet, whereas the PLAN stations its assets at home to protect waters within the First Island Chain. This could change in the future as the PLA develops its existing base in Djibouti and expands its military footprint in other countries. Another difference between the two militaries is that the PLAN recognizes MCM as one of its major challenges—with some authors calling it the greatest challenge—whereas the U.S. Navy seems relatively unconcerned, especially in terms of protecting CONUS ports.
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