MICK RYAN, AM
Over the weekend, the 500-day mark since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was reached. It has been 500 days of appalling Russian brutality, torture, murder and wanton destruction in Ukraine. At the same time, we have witnessed the resilience, courage and inventiveness of Ukrainian society and the various elements of their defence and national security apparatus.
One of the frameworks that I use when studying war generally, and the war in Ukraine in particular, is of war as a learning opportunity. It is an adaptation battle between the belligerents.
A central responsibility for the most senior leaders in any military, or national security, institution is providing the incentives for innovation during peace time, so that the good ideas, appropriate organisations and leading-edge technology can be combined to provide an advantage over adversaries in war. This, in turn, requires a cultural predisposition to learning and sharing lessons widely, accepting failure as an opportunity to learn, and a well-honed understanding of risk.
Throughout this war, learning and adaptation has occurred on both sides. The learning and adaptation that occurs in an enemy force, as it has with the Russians over the past 500 days, must also be the subject of close study. This is to ensure we understand where the enemy, in this case the Russians, might produce sources of advantage.
My last article that examined Russian adaptation was published back in April. In it I explored Russian tactical adaptations, as well as how these adaptations might be neutralised or minimised in the adaptation battle. As I wrote then:
Contrary to the ‘Russian are stupid’ stereotypes that have developed throughout the war in Ukraine, they have demonstrated an ability in some areas to learn and adapt. This isn’t a statement of admiration; far from it! It is however necessary, through military prudence, to understand where the Russian are adapting and to assume that they may continue to do so in the coming months. In understanding Russian adaptation, we can ensure Ukrainian forces understand tactical and operational risks, and that they are best prepared for the months ahead.
The Ukrainians, therefore, are dealing with an adaptive enemy. In response, they have undertaken a process of learning and adaptation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
My aim in this short series of articles is to look at Ukrainian adaptation at each level of war. In this first part of 500 Days of Learning, I will cover some aspects of Ukraine’s strategic level adaptation. Two subsequent articles will explore operational and tactical adaptation by the Ukrainians since the beginning of the Russian invasion.
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