Taking War Seriously

Michael Miklaucic

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220905-N-TP544-1001 BALTIC SEA (Sep. 4, 2022) U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft fly over the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), during a maneuvering exercise with partner and allied ships in the Baltic Sea, Sep. 4, 2022. The Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group and embarked 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, under the command and control of Task Force 61/2, is on a scheduled deployment in the U.S. Naval Forces Europe area of operations, employed by U.S. Sixth Fleet to defend U.S., allied and partner interests. (U.S. Navy photo by MC3 Taylor Parker)

When Russian infantry divisions charged into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with armor and air support, the countries of the Transatlantic Alliance were shocked, dismayed, and utterly unprepared. Well, not all of them; the cold north including Finland and the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had been warning all along of the existential threat seething in the east. To this day the states of the Baltic Sea region are the ones that are taking the threat of war with Russia seriously.

Just a decade ago few could foresee a major land war on the European continent. Most European nations had dismantled their Cold War security architecture in search of the ever-elusive peace dividend. With very few exceptions armed forces had atrophied. Russia’s 2007 cyberattack against Estonia and 2008 war with the Republic of Georgia confirmed the suspicions of Finland and the Baltic states but did not really upset the cocktail-circuit elite at defense-Davos in Munich let alone at Davos itself. While Russia’s 2014 occupation and annexation of Crimea sent shock waves throughout Europe defense budgets barely budged. Only Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine last year seemed to shock leaders out of their complacency.

But as the war lumbers into its second year the self-styled defenders of the liberal, rules-based world are slouching toward inertia. The war goes on, Ukrainians die, and the country is pounded into dust; yet growing populations are asking, “Why do we care if this war goes on? Why is this my war? Why should we spend so much on Ukraine?” Even national leaders ask, “Would it be so bad if Russia won?”

It would be very bad. It would be Putin’s reward for armed aggression against a sovereign neighbor and a signal that armed force is the arbiter of sovereignty. This war neither began, nor will it end in Ukraine because it is not about territory or resources, but about the permissible uses of power in the world. A Russian victory won through unprovoked armed aggression should remind us of the Baltics in 1940, Eastern Europe in 1945, Hungary 1956, Prague 1968, and Afghanistan 1979. Permitting Russia to “win” by rewarding it territory seized from Ukraine tells the world that armed aggression is not only permissible behavior but effective statecraft.

Finland never fell under the spell of the peace dividend. Its long history and long border with Russia inform a brutally realistic appreciation of the Russian menace and insight into Putin’s motivations. The same is true of the small Baltic states that endured generations of Russian, then Nazi, then Soviet oppression. Finland never demobilized and today can raise a ready and trained fighting force of nearly 300,000. To further bolster its defense against Russia it recently joined the NATO alliance after 70 years of non-alignment. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are among the seven NATO countries that met NATOs 2 percent of GDP defense spending target in 2022, and all three have embraced the concept of “total” or “comprehensive” defense. Even Sweden—the “moral superpower”—has abandonned over 200 years of non-alignment to apply for membership in NATO, has reinstated mandatory military conscription, and established a Psychological Defense Agency to counter Russian information warfare.

What is “total” or “comprehensive” defense? It is a concept developed most notably in Sweden during the Cold War according to which national security is the shared responsibility of every Swedish person, company, agency, or other entity. Each has an assigned and practiced role in repelling an attack on the homeland or in resistance if occupied by an adversary. The Finnish version—Comprehensive defense—envisions a whole-of-society defense of the homeland, and includes universal military conscription, national security education in secondary schools, and annual national security symposia bringing together leaders from all social sectors, led by the military.

Since re-gaining their independence in 1991 the three small Baltic states have been the most prescient in recognizing the Russian menace. They are the most vocal and uncompromising in their reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine arguing forcefully and often against European complacency and hesitation that Russia is an existential enemy of the democratic world and must be not only resisted but defeated. Vulnerable to a fait accompli of Russian armed occupation due to their proximity and overmatched armed forces they have persuaded NATO that the line against autocracy must be held at their eastern borders, not giving up a single inch of NATO territory. With decades of experience and keen understanding of Russia’s influence campaigns they have developed powerful antibodies to resist insidious Russian attacks in the gray zone of information warfare.

Collectively the states of the Baltic Sea region have tremendously solidified NATOs northern flank which will be further strengthened when Sweden enters the Alliance. They have infused a lethargic alliance with a renewed sense of urgency. By embracing the total or comprehensive defense concept they are inculcating within their respective populations the commitment and understanding that national security is everyone’s duty and that everyone has a role and responsibilities. They are leading the way showing that the best way to secure peace is to prepare for war.