Sustaining the Japan–ROK rapprochement

Matthieu Lebreton

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Japan and South Korea have significantly improved their relations in recent months and are attempting to align their regional strategies. Yet there is still room for greater South Korean integration into multilateral groupings to stabilise the trajectory of the rapprochement.

Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) reached a low point in 2019, when diplomatic and public disagreements bled into economic and military ties, triggering a tit-for-tat imposition of trade restrictions and bringing an end to bilateral military information-sharing. Since then, China’s economic coercion, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a heightened North Korean threat have combined to spur ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol to overcome the many differences with his democratic neighbour; in March 2023 he began a diplomatic push to improve relations with Japan by meeting his counterpart Kishida Fumio in Tokyo. Such a rapprochement has important implications for the security of both countries as well as for the stability of a trilateral relationship that includes the United States. Sustaining the momentum, however, may be a significant challenge.

Political and strategic alignment

Seoul’s rapprochement with Tokyo coincides with its efforts to improve relations with Washington. It also builds on the security overlap between Seoul’s first Indo-Pacific strategy, called the Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, and Japan’s new National Security Strategy, which were both released in December 2022. Seoul’s strategy differs from the Southeast Asia-focused New Southern Policy of Yoon’s predecessor, Moon Jae-in, by expanding the scope of South Korea’s engagement to the whole region and beyond. Two ‘core lines of effort’ focus on expanding networks of security cooperation and, importantly, building stronger economic-security networks. The latter in particular aligns Seoul’s regional vision with Tokyo’s. Furthermore, each country’s strategy document lists the other country as a key partner for Indo-Pacific policy coordination.

Japan and the ROK’s shared interests, particularly with regard to concerns about the geopolitical threats from North Korea and China, suggest potential for further collaboration between the two in the region’s proliferating groupings, both established and new. Japan’s invitation to President Yoon to attend the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023 could therefore herald a productive trend in strategically important areas. NATO’s deepening of ties with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the ROK, as reported in June, also offer opportunities for closer Japan–ROK security cooperation.

The QuadThe Quad grouping, including Australia, India, Japan and the US, may also serve as a forum for boosting Japan–ROK ties. South Korea is primed to be added to the Quad’s working group on critical and emerging technologies, which has achieved tangible progress after the Quad launched its Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative to ‘map capacity, identify vulnerabilities, and bolster supply-chain security for semiconductors and their vital components’. The working group’s goals align with the part of Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy that is focused on supply-chain resilience for critical technologies.

South Korea’s propensity for innovation in emerging technologies – and its key role in the semiconductor supply chain – would make it a valuable member of the group. Seoul already has a Semiconductor Partnership Dialogue with the US and is part of the Chip 4 Alliance with Japan, Taiwan and the US. Already, business leaders from Japan and South Korea have announced that the mutual fund recently created to strengthen the two countries’ warming ties will be used for semiconductor and energy-cooperation initiatives. And in a promising move, the ROK’s Samsung has announced it will build a new US$222 million chip research facility in Yokohama with subsidies from the Japanese government.

CPTPPOn the economic front, Japan would benefit from the accession of the ROK into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The United Kingdom’s impending accession to the free-trade agreement has paved the way for other middle powers, such as South Korea, to follow. The CPTPP’s high standards on physical and digital trade as well as intellectual property align with South Korea’s strong background in technology and trade. Estimates indicate that South Korea could gain US$86 billion annually should it join the group. For Japan, having South Korea and soon the UK in the bloc would bolster the group’s ability to serve as a counterweight to the China-dominated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, particularly in areas such as economic governance and rules formation.

Despite many signs of progress, the trajectory of the thaw in relations remains uncertain. Much will depend on the continued personal commitment of Yoon and Kishida to improving relations. A change of government in Tokyo or Seoul could set things on a new course or slow cooperation. Notably, Yoon’s domestic political position is weak. As of mid-2023, his poll ratings hovered around 30%, with just under 70% disapproving of his performance. Yoon’s rapprochement with Japan also divides ROK public opinion, with around 60% of those questioned in March opposing the president’s attempts to resolve the issue of reparations for those subjected to forced labour during Japan’s colonisation of the Korean Peninsula in the early part of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, a poll taken in the same month in Japan found that 57.1% of respondents supported Yoon’s solution to the forced-labour issue.

Yoon’s People Power Party lacks a majority in parliament. A victory for the opposition Democratic Party of Korea in the ROK’s April 2024 parliamentary election would further constrain Yoon’s room for political manoeuvre over the remainder of his term, which ends in 2027. However, there would be relatively few political costs should Yoon seek to deepen South Korea’s involvement in regional multilateral groups, and – given Tokyo’s support for these efforts – this is likely what he will attempt to do.