Norway’s defence chief warns about his country’s military shortfalls and points to his priorities for investing extra defence funds, as Karl Dewey and Tom Waldwyn explain.The latest Military Advice document from Norway’s chief of defence, currently General Eirik Kristoffersen, is striking in its tone compared with earlier reports. Whereas previous documents have outlined a range of force structure options, this report, published on 7 June, provides a stark assessment of the armed forces’ deficiencies and weaknesses, with some notable calls for enhancements.
Worries and weaknessesKey to the general’s tone is the changed strategic circumstances he perceives in Norway’s neighbourhood, with an unpredictable and weakened Russia that sees the Arctic and High North as increasingly important. NATO’s presence is being strengthened with the accession of Finland, expected soon to be followed by Sweden. At the same time, this Alliance enlargement increases Norway’s significance as a likely reception area for NATO reinforcements. Kristoffersen also notes the growing potential of China as a factor in the region, with Moscow perhaps forced to make concessions to Beijing in the High North.
The document identifies three primary weaknesses of Norway’s military: inadequate air defence to cover both civilian and military infrastructure and forces, a lack of long-range fires and insufficient presence in maritime areas of interest. The report also highlights an overall lack of mass in the armed forces as well as weaknesses in personnel recruitment and retention, infrastructure, materiel stocks and IT. However, there appears to be some good budgetary news on the horizon.
At present, Norway spends approximately 1.35% of its GDP on defence. However, on 2 May 2023 – ahead of the release of the general’s report – the government announced plans to spend up to 2% of GDP on defence by 2026.
Although the route taken to achieve this commitment will depend on Norway’s economic performance, 2% of the county’s forecasted GDP puts Norwegian defence spending at NOK118.6 billion (USD11.28bn) by 2026. Compared with the 2023 defence budget of NOK75.8bn (USD7.2bn), the NOK42.8bn (USD4.0bn) uplift would represent an increase of 45% in real terms. This increased spending puts the Norwegian armed forces in a better position to meet the Military Advice document’s ‘highest ambition’, although the required budgetary increases of ‘approximately NOK8bn [USD754 million] per year in the period from 2025 to 2031’ will likely require Norwegian defence spending to exceed 2% of GDP by 2030.
The 2% announcement was possibly intended to pre-empt the publication of Kristoffersen’s report. The force reductions envisaged prior to the uplift would have meant the cancellation of plans for a fourth mechanised battalion, the disbanding of the Finnmark Land Command ‘in its current form’, a reduction in the size of the Home Guard, the retiring of the C-130J Hercules transport aircraft fleet without replacement and the scrapping or downsizing of much of the navy’s capability below frigate and submarine level, amongst other cuts.
Procurement prioritiesWhat, then, would the chief of defence like to spend any extra money on? His immediate priority is given to ‘eliminate weaknesses in the current structure’. This includes a focus on recruiting and retaining personnel; infrastructure and accommodation; IT and digitalising defence; and increasing materiel and ammunition stocks. These priorities are driven in large part by a projected drop in skilled personnel after 2028 that would have a significant impact on institutional knowledge and capability.
On the navy front, apart from wanting to buy six new Type 212CD submarines (rather than four) and at least four new frigates (but preferably six), the general wants to streamline the rest of the navy from seven classes of vessels to two. These would be divided into ‘large’ and ‘small’ vessels based on civilian shipbuilding standards, with modular packages of weaponry and sensors. The civilian-standard vessels plan does have merits, not least in better utilising Norway’s highly capable civilian offshore industry. However, there are risks if the vessels are not designed directly for defence purposes and, as the US Navy may admit, developing modular mission packages is often more difficult than originally envisaged.
Norway had already begun to shuffle its ground-based air defence (GBAD) capacity in part by transferring some medium-range National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems to the army and acquiring a mobile system based on the IRIS-T missile to be delivered from later this year. The chief of defence recommends expanding short- and medium-range GBAD so the armed forces can cover civilian and military areas at the same time, thus avoiding choices Ukraine has been forced to make in shifting air defences to support offensives or protect cities and power stations. The lack of protection against ballistic missiles and the threat of hypersonic cruise missiles has been highlighted in previous documents and it is likely that, if sufficient funding were available, the plan for a long-range system known as Project 7627 would be accelerated.
As with air defence, Norway had already identified a need for a long-range precision fire system and had intended to acquire a system, likely battery-sized, by the end of the decade under Project 1095. Kristoffersen’s report calls for the acquisition of a battalion-sized formation as well as the establishment of an artillery battalion in the Finnmark Land Command. Norwegian F-35s should be outfitted with active radar homing missiles, the document says, as well as the Joint Strike Missile.
Underlying the defence chief’s analysis is the assessment that the likelihood of conflict involving Norway has increased. The general’s judgements and advice, plus the promise of more funding, will be fed into the planning for Norway’s next Long-Term Defence Plan, expected next year and due to cover 2024–28.
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