Project Syndicate: A pivotal moment in the emergence of “soft power” – a term you coined – as a widely accepted foreign-policy concept occurred in 2007, when then-Chinese President Hu Jintao told the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that the country must develop it. Chinese officials then contacted you privately to seek advice on how to go about it. To what extent did China heed your advice, particularly with regard to the developing world, and is that changing under Xi Jinping?
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.: Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction, rather than coercion or payment. China derives soft power from its traditional culture, its impressive economic performance, and its aid programs. But it has at least two liabilities that are undermining its ability to generate soft power.
First, China lacks an open civil society – a key source of attractiveness – owing to the CPC’s insistence on maintaining tight control over people’s lives and opportunities for independent voluntary association. Second, China maintains – and stokes – tensions and conflicts with its neighbors, often over territorial issues. A Confucius Institute in New Delhi can do nothing to boost China’s attractiveness if Chinese troops are killing Indian soldiers on their disputed Himalayan border.
PS: Last October, you examined the “deep, intermediate, and immediate causes” of the Ukraine War, and emphasized that having all the ingredients for a bonfire does not guarantee that there will be one. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, fears of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan – and, potentially, a war between China and the United States – have intensified. Recognizing that “there is no single future, but rather a range of futures with different probabilities which our actions can affect,” what are the most likely “deep, intermediate, and immediate causes” of a conflict over Taiwan?
JSN: The deep causes of a potential war over Taiwan lie in the Chinese Civil War (1927-49). Communist forces defeated the Kuomintang-led Nationalist government on the mainland, but did not capture Taiwan, which the CPC regards as a renegade province. US President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong settled on the “one China” formula to defer resolution of the conflict. To uphold this status quo, the US has attempted not only to deter China from using force, but also to deter Taiwan from provoking China by issuing a formal declaration of independence.
The intermediate causes are the increase of Chinese military strength in the region, and the growing sense of national identity among the population in Taiwan. The immediate cause – the spark that ignites the Taiwan tinderbox – could be some unexpected event that spurs China to act, such as a blockade in which a Chinese ship is sunk. I don’t think the Russian invasion of Ukraine changed this calculus much.
PS: “If the Sino-American relationship was a card game,” you wrote in March, “one could say that America and its longstanding allies have been dealt a good hand, especially in light of China’s growing economic, demographic, and political challenges.” Nonetheless, you worry that “partisan politics” in the US is “creating a hysteria” that will prevent the implementation of America’s “winning strategy.” How have domestic politics distorted America’s China policy – one of very few areas of bipartisan agreement – and what political risks do you think are likely to materialize in the future, particularly as the US gears up for its next presidential election?
JSN: Intense competition in US domestic politics has spurred a constant escalation in the demonization of China and talk of a new cold war. While the US-China rivalry cannot be ignored, demonization is a poor guide for strategy.
The US and China are far more interdependent than the US and the Soviet Union were during the Cold War, with their ties spanning the economy, climate, and health. A clear-eyed strategy would take that into account. For example, it may make sense to ban Chinese companies from sensitive communications, but it does not follow that we should ban Chinese solar panels.
PS: “Ukraine shows that soft power is still relevant,” you noted recently. But, for the European Union, the Ukraine war has highlighted the importance of military “hard power.” Is the EU on track to develop a balanced “smart power” strategy that combines hard and soft components?
JSN: Smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft power in an effective strategy in which they reinforce each other. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, I would tell my European friends that, while I admired their soft power, they needed to combine it with more hard power. Vladimir Putin seems inadvertently to have fixed that problem.
PS: The idea of soft power stemmed from your efforts to challenge the view, which was gaining traction in the 1980s, that the US was in decline. Since the turn of the century, the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China’s emergence as a major power, and Russia’s challenge to NATO and the West have revived that narrative. Is this time different?
JSN: Since the US became the preeminent global power in 1945, there have been a number of phases when it was believed to be in decline. Perceptions of the US are cyclical. Our attractiveness dropped after the invasion of Iraq, but rose again during Barack Obama’s presidency. Polls show a similar drop during the Donald Trump years, with Joe Biden’s victory in 2020 bringing another rise. I think such cycles will continue.
PS: In your 2020 book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, you establish a scorecard for each president’s ethical decisions. Biden has just announced that he will seek re-election next year. How would you rate his performance so far?
JSN: The only honest grade is an “incomplete.” On the negative side, the withdrawal from Afghanistan was clumsily handled, and he has failed to articulate a convincing trade policy for Asia. On the positive side, he has restored confidence in our alliances, rejoined international institutions, taken climate change seriously, and handled the Ukraine situation well. The pluses far outweigh the minuses so far, but his final grade is yet to come.
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