Keith B. Payne & Michaela Dodge
Introduction
Extending deterrence to help assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security is a long-standing goal of U.S. policy. Allied confidence in the U.S. extended deterrent and the assurance that it provides is key to: 1) maintaining alliances that are the critical U.S. advantage over the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC); and, 2) sustaining U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
Yet, PRC, Russian, and North Korean strategies are aimed at defeating U.S. extended deterrence commitments to allies and undercutting U.S. assurance goals—and thereby destroying the cohesion of U.S. alliances. To do so, Russia and China now include regional nuclear first use threats in their respective bids to defeat U.S. extended deterrence and assurance efforts.[1] Russian regional nuclear first use threats have become increasingly explicit and stark while its non-nuclear forces are underperforming—leading some knowledgeable commentators to suggest that Russia ultimately will employ nuclear weapons in Ukraine.[2] Equally disturbing is the fact that opponents’ nuclear employment could, according to then-Commander of Strategic Command, ADM Charles Richard upset all U.S. operational planning.[3] These realities are extremely distressing for allies in jeopardy and dependent on the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence for their security.
Extending deterrence and assuring allies requires differing approaches among allies that take into account their varied security positions and perceptions. Allies face varying threat conditions and certainly have mixed threat perceptions that shape their views of the requirements for deterrence and assurance. When considering the requirements for deterrence and assurance, the United States cannot calculate its capabilities and policies based on the “easy” task of deterring attacks on allies who face the least apparent risk and have the lowest level of threat perception—and thus least need assurance. U.S. capabilities and policies must be adequate to deter and assure the “hard” cases, including those allies who are particular targets of revanchist Russia, China and/or North Korea. For Russia, that appears to include those allies who, in the past, were part of the Soviet Union or its imperium. The need to “tailor” deterrence according to the specific needs of the threat context has become a fully recognized requirement for U.S. policy, on a bipartisan basis.[4] The need to tailor assurance according to an ally’s particular context is equally valid, including the needs of the “hard” cases.
Understandable allied concerns about an increasingly severe threat context, including concern about Sino-Russian cooperation,[5] have led to several different, even contradictory responses which call into question the continuing viability of the U.S. system of alliances and U.S. nonproliferation goals. PRC, Russian, and North Korean aggressiveness, for example, has compelled some countries that have been long-time neutrals to seek membership in NATO (e.g., Sweden, and Finland), but to restrict their roles in extended nuclear deterrence so as to have “good neighbor relations” with Russia;[6] others appear increasingly interested in acquiring independent nuclear capabilities or, conversely, endorsing nuclear disarmament as their response to nuclear threats. Still other allies manifest some inclination to placate Russia or China and, correspondingly, distance themselves from the United States. These varied responses to the increasing threat context are emerging simultaneously and threaten the cohesion alliances depend upon.
Washington faces ongoing, unprecedented challenges in understanding, shaping and meeting extended deterrence and assurance requirements in its bid to sustain its alliance system. The United States must recognize and address the emerging requirements to sustain assurance and extended deterrence in an unprecedented threat context, including materially closing emerging “gaps” in its deterrence posture. It must adapt its approach to extended deterrence and assurance and effectively communicate the credibility of that deterrent to allies who are in diverse threat contexts and hold equally diverse threat perceptions. Failing to do so could easily lead to the unraveling of the alliance system that Washington has sustained at great cost over generations. Failure in this could also drive a cascade of nuclear proliferation that overturns the decades-long U.S. policy goal of preventing nuclear proliferation as some allies feel compelled to find independent means of deterrence.
The point here, that there is a great need for a fundamental reconsideration of how to apply deterrence in a new threat context, is not overstated. In 2017—following increasingly egregious behavior by Russia and China—Gen. Kevin Chilton, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, noted a continuing lack of attention to the general subject:
Unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War…there has been a dearth of attention paid to the rationale for the nuclear deterrent. The underlying principles and rationale for the deterrent have not gone away, but we have stopped educating, thinking, and debating, with informed underpinnings, the necessity and role of the US nuclear deterrent in today’s world. Even more concerning has been the lack of informed debate on the subject. We have raised three generations of Air Force officers who may not have been exposed to the most fundamental and yet relevant arguments surrounding deterrence….[7]
Similarly, ADM Richard has observed that: “Even our operational deterrence expertise is just not what it was at the end of the Cold War. So we have to reinvigorate this intellectual effort. And we can start by rewriting deterrence theory, I’ll tell you we’re furiously doing that out at STRATCOM.”[8] This is an important undertaking. It should, nevertheless, be noted that the fundamental thinking and rethinking of the nuclear deterrence theory underlying U.S. policy has been done largely outside of serving government circles, civilian or military,[9] for some seemingly enduring reasons.
The Emerging Threat Context and its Implications for U.S. Alliances
In contrast to the immediate post-Cold War era, the United States is no longer an unparalleled global “hyperpower” with no great power foes of consequence. Now, the PRC and Russia are in a quasi-alliance dedicated to overthrowing of the rules-based liberal order led by the United States for seven decades;[10] they see a new global order as essential to the realization of goals they define as existential. This is an unprecedented threat condition for the United States and the alliance system it has established and sustained.
U.S. adversaries are making rapid progress modernizing and advancing their nuclear arsenals. North Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world, reportedly tested a solid-fueled long-range missile and its leader Kim Jong-Un is committed to expanding the country’s nuclear arsenal.[11] China’s nuclear and conventional arsenal continues to expand rapidly, including hundreds of additional new nuclear silos and nuclear warheads.[12] Russia’s war against Ukraine and associated nuclear threats against NATO allies have increased allied concerns about the credibility of U.S. assurance in the region, particularly in countries that are close to Russia’s borders and previously were a part of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. Moscow’s nuclear threats have resulted in a renewed focus on nuclear threats and extended deterrence in regional conflicts.[13]
According to the National Defense Strategy Commission, Russia and China “have been thinking creatively about how to employ nuclear weapons for deterrence and coercion.”[14] In particular, they seek to overcome U.S. extended nuclear deterrence strategies. Russia and China use nuclear threats (and possibly employment) as coercive tools to defeat traditional U.S. extended deterrence commitments and their non-strategic nuclear weapons give them a range of credible coercive options largely unavailable to the West.[15] Correspondingly, the Russian “theory of victory” appears to emphasize their coercive threatened employment to overcome U.S. extended deterrence and separate allies from the United States.[16]
Perhaps most fundamentally, the increasing threats to U.S. allies posed by these revanchist authoritarian states now demand that the United States reconsider: 1) the nature of, and requirements for extended nuclear deterrence and assurance given emerging threat conditions; 2) how to hedge the U.S. calculation of the nuclear and non-nuclear requirements for extended deterrence in an increasingly uncertain threat context; and, 3) how to communicate the credibility of extended deterrence to allies to support the goal of allied assurance.
To the extent that the United States does not address these questions and find a credible and convincing “story” in this regard, the future of the U.S alliance system is increasingly at risk. And, as noted above, if U.S. deterrence planning fails to prevent a limited, coercive nuclear strike, the operational consequences for U.S. forces could be disastrous in the war that follows.
Diverse Allied Responses to Emerging Threats
Allied responses to the increasing threat environment are varied and even contradictory. For example, a trend in some allied countries brought about by recent nuclear threat developments, and associated public pressures, is political interest in nuclear disarmament as the preferred solution to the problem. This same theme is reflected in statements by many U.S. commentators that periods of increasing threat are precisely when disarmament becomes more important,[17] and that arms control efforts should be the priority regardless of the international threat context.[18]
Several U.S. allies, including Australia for example, have now adopted “observer” status to the United Nation’s Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and have elected to “abstain” rather than oppose the treaty. Correspondingly, 56 former leaders of NATO countries signed an open letter praising the treaty, and encouraged the United States to pursue extensive nuclear “risk reduction” measures.[19] The Australian government reportedly is weighing whether to sign the Treaty—a step that would dramatically re-orient Australian security policy.[20] The Australian Prime Minister has referred to signing on to the nuclear ban treaty as “Labor at our best.”[21] Finland, while entering NATO and coming under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, declared that it would not allow nuclear weapons on its territory.[22] And, the May 2023 G-7 meeting in Japan included a focus on advancing nuclear disarmament.[23] As one commentator described it, “the Japanese leader sought to repeatedly infuse the summit with his ideas about a nuclear-free world.”[24] These types of developments reveal an underlying “anti-nuclear” sentiment among some allied governments and/or their publics at play simultaneously with doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrent. If this response is extended and enlarged, it would essentially eliminate the existing U.S. extended nuclear deterrence policy, particularly (but not only) undercutting NATO allied participation in NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy.
In addition, in the context of increasing nuclear threats and questions regarding U.S. credibility, some U.S. allies appear to be weighing an alternative that is directly contrary to nuclear disarmament, i.e., acquiring independent nuclear capabilities. Discussing the issue, an Australian expert noted that when “doubts have arisen about US commitments in the past, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and even Australia have toyed with their own nuclear weapons programs,” and that there “is no reason to assume they will not do so again.”[25]
North Korean (and Chinese) nuclear threats have renewed South Korean interest in the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea or independent South Korean nuclear weapons. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol recently stated that South Korea could potentially develop its own nuclear capabilities, and made a point of saying it could do that “pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities.”[26] These expressions of interest were the focus of an April 2023 summit in Washington with President Biden intended to address South Korean concerns regarding the U.S. extended deterrent. As a South Korean commentary described the resultant Washington Declaration, “Washington chose to preempt Seoul from developing its own nuclear weapons after the Yoon administration raised the need to ensure U.S. extended deterrence.”[27]
Whether the result of that April summit will be adequate to assure South Korea regarding the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent is questionable—apparent post-summit confusion and differences regarding the distinction between “nuclear sharing” and consultations suggest that it is not adequate.[28] A South Korean commentator’s sharp critique following the summit should limit optimism: “China must be amused at the melodramatic denouement of the Korea-U.S. summit. It’s time we said goodbye to nuclear pretensions and predilections. They only let us down without changing the actual security situation.”[29] Whether South Korea will be satisfied by the results of the summit undoubtedly will depend on the level of North Korean and Chinese belligerence in coming months—which, again, should limit optimism.
In a recent South Korean public poll, more than 70 percent of respondents support South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons or the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea.[30] Yet, Washington has definitively rejected both independent South Korean nuclear capabilities and the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to the peninsula.[31] This type of friction cannot be attributed simply to miscommunication; it reflects increasing doubts among some allies about the credibility of the existing U.S. “nuclear umbrella” in a worsening threat context. These doubts are most manifest in South Korean official expressions of possible interest in independent nuclear capabilities, but they are apparent elsewhere as well.
In Japan, the subject of an independent Japanese nuclear capability has moved from being a politically taboo topic to open public discussion.[32] In 2022, former Prime Minister Abe, said publicly that it may be time for Japan to host U.S. nuclear weapons, noting that had Ukraine retained nuclear capabilities, Russia may not have invaded.[33] This narrative follows from growing doubts about the credibility of the current U.S. nuclear posture. A noted Japanese commentator expressed concern that the current U.S. “narrative” and “nuclear posture” may be “insufficient” to deter regional nuclear use.[34] Whether or not to move independently in this regard is tied directly to the continuing credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. In February 2023, a Japanese defense study chaired by former military chief of staff Ryoichi Oriki reportedly suggested that “Japan ease its three nonnuclear principles that prohibit possessing, producing or allowing entry into Japan of nuclear weapons.”[35] This type of allied interest in independent nuclear capabilities will only increase if Russia, China and North Korea continue their aggressive behavior and expressed nuclear threats in Europe and Asia—which appears likely.
The assurance challenge is not confined to the Pacific theater. Polish President Andrzej Duda too stated that “The problem above all is that we [Poles] don’t have nuclear weapons” and that the topic of Polish participation in nuclear sharing is open.[36] His statements clearly indicate Poland’s concern about the continuing credibility of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” Those concerns appear to be increasing with the recent Russian decision to deploy nuclear weapons to Poland’s border by stationing them in Belarus.[37]
Finally, and perhaps most pernicious is the obvious trend among some allies and partners to hedge their geopolitical bets by “cozying up” to America’s foes and distancing themselves from Washington, as most recently was demonstrated in statements by French President Macron and the European Commission’s leadership.[38] According to Macron, “strategic autonomy” must now be Europe’s organizing principle,[39] and the French ambassador reportedly advised Canada to begin distancing itself from the United States, and that Ottawa must choose between the United States and Europe.[40] This trend is disturbing but logical and understandable. National leaderships must make decisions on a daily basis regarding the best route for their nation’s security—as power balances shift in favor of U.S. foes, that movement may suggest that allies placate those foes and correspondingly distance themselves from the United States. As two prominent European commentators have observed, “… based on global American strategic supremacy, the very idea of autonomous European defense has long been considered detrimental to the vital transatlantic link. However, with global strategic challenges growing fast, this principle is no longer tenable.”[41]
The manifest inconsistency in U.S. behavior important to allied views of their security in other parts of the world has accelerated this problem. As one Israeli analyst has observed, “The consensus in the region is that the US has abdicated its role as the Superpower vis-à-vis the [Middle East].”[42] And, the trend within major parts of the Republican Party to challenge continuing military aid to Ukraine reflects some underlying domestic skepticism regarding the wisdom of continuing costly U.S. commitments in the face of Russian and Chinese threats. These trends are not lost on allies who fear for their security and now are ultimately dependent on alliance with the United States for that security.
The trend among some allies and partners to hedge their national bets should come as no surprise, but undoubtedly will shock many in Washington who continue to expect the prerogatives of being the world’s “hyperpower.” That status no longer exists, and allied hedging will likely intensify if the U.S. extended deterrence and assurance measures come increasingly in doubt, as seems to be the case. If so, this dynamic has the potential to undo the U.S. alliance system.
What to Do?
Given the varied allied responses to contemporary threat developments, Washington’s actions and messaging must meet the 5 “C’s.” That is, the United States must have a coherent, consistent, credible, compelling, and readily communicated position that lends manifest reality to its extended deterrence commitments in diverse threat circumstances. Vigorous words are not enough. As Russian, Chinese and North Korean nuclear and non-nuclear threats continue to cause understandable fear in allied capitals, and the Sino-Russian quasi alliance matures, the need for a credible U.S. extended deterrence posture and its effective communication to sustain alliances will only increase.
To address this challenge, the United States can and must: a) strengthen its extended nuclear deterrence posture in the context of increasing threats—a posture that must have sufficient credibility both to deter foes and assure allies in diverse threat circumstances; and, b) communicate this strength to those allies who have increasing doubts about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent and are under pressure variously to: embrace nuclear disarmament; acquire independent nuclear capabilities; and/or to hedge their geopolitical bets by distancing themselves from the United States.
To do so, the United States must better communicate to allies: a) Why global nuclear disarmament is wholly implausible in current international conditions and thus provides no answer to the nuclear threats facing the United States and allies; and, b) why allies can have confidence in the U.S. extended deterrent and thus do not need distancing or independent nuclear capabilities for their security. It should be noted that this diverse messaging presents a formidable task, i.e., explaining: Why nuclear disarmament is an illusion; why sustaining and likely increasing U.S. nuclear capabilities is necessary for deterrence; but also, why allies do not need independent nuclear capabilities. The complexity and challenge of communicating to allies each of these points simultaneously helps to explain why, in general, the United States does it so poorly.
There are illustrative examples of this inadequacy of both substance and communication. For example, for decades, allies have consistently expressed sharp, substantive opposition to U.S. proposals for a “No-First-Use” or “sole purpose” nuclear policy. Their opposition appears largely to be based on understandable fears that the adoption of such policies would weaken extended deterrence.[43] Yet, some U.S. administrations repeatedly express readiness to adopt them—raising questions among allies about the continuing credibility of the U.S. deterrent. During the preparation of the 2022 NPR, the Biden Administration reportedly sent a questionnaire to allies asking them about their views regarding U.S. adoption of such policies.[44] Allied responses reportedly were overwhelmingly negative, including from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and Australia.[45] Indeed, successive Japanese governments have opposed U.S initiatives to adopt such declaratory policies.[46] Yet, the Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review continues to identify a “sole purpose” policy as the U.S. goal[47]—extending a U.S. aspiration that seems wholly obtuse to enduring, serious allied concerns.
With regard to issues that are more about communication than substance, the United States has long done a questionable job of communicating its story to allied leaderships and publics. The factors that place the U.S alliance system at risk stem in part from the paucity of effective communication with allies. While essential, the existing forms of consultation may be inadequate to the task as it becomes more challenging in a more severe threat context.[48] In addition, existing channels are very limited in scope and involve a very limited number of interested people. The existing discussion fora must be augmented and broadened.
This situation follows from the reality that, since the end of the Cold War, the United State has let its information infrastructure atrophy and has largely retired from the public affairs business, particularly in allied countries.[49] The U.S. effort to understand and effectively communicate with allies, e.g., “public diplomacy,” has been deteriorating for years—partly for fears of provoking “Putin into new steps to undermine Western societies,” partly for worries that its efforts would not work, and partly for a belief “that an attempt to assertively promote our views would inevitably deteriorate into our spreading false information.”[50] This U.S. retirement from the field hinders allies’ efforts to counter adversaries’ disinformation more generally, but it also makes it harder to reach mutual understandings about national security issues that require a degree of prior knowledge. [51] Inadequate U.S. focus, understanding and communication contributes to unenforced errors and leaves unchecked Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns.
There are several steps the United States could take to improve the current situation. With respect to nuclear deterrence and assurance, existing strategic deterrence dialogues must be strengthened, but also expanded to incorporate other audiences that are usually not a part of the discussions. These include parliamentarians from allied countries and their staffs, journalists, and NGOs. Because ignorance and widely believed myths about extended deterrence and assurance undercut both, this expanded participation would help by contributing to the development of expertise necessary for the conduct of a more informed public discourse.
As a part of its communications strategy, the United States also could invest in expanding the practice of hosting visits by journalists, government and non-government experts from the United States and allied countries to its nuclear facilities and military bases that host delivery systems.[52] While the United States cannot (for obvious reasons) provide full disclosure, there is a good deal of public information that can be made available to produce engaging fact-based stories that help to dispel the many popular myths that so often are repeated in debates on nuclear deterrence.[53] The opportunity could be used for the purpose of educating interested allied (and domestic) audiences regarding the realities of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and the systems that underpin it. Perhaps most importantly, U.S. and allied policymakers themselves, if suitably informed, could participate more in public discussions in foreign and domestic media to clearly communicate and defend their country’s national security needs in terms that are assessable to the public.
Conclusion
The short-lived era of unquestionable U.S. military supremacy is over and unsurprisingly coincides with a new threat environment in which great power foes are dedicated to overthrowing—violently if necessary—the rules-based international order that has been led by the United States for seven decades. Washington is not the global “hyperpower” with no great power threats of consequence. Both Russia and China see the United States as the impediment to the respective goals they define as of existential importance. Their combined hostility and growing power are new realities: The United States has entered a threat environment of unprecedented danger and some U.S. allies and partners are in Russia’s and China’s direct line of fire. These developments create new challenges for the viability of U.S. alliances, particularly for those allies increasingly concerned about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. Allied responses to this increasingly severe threat environment are varied and even contradictory, but together, if expanded, pose a threat to the continuing viability of the existing U.S. alliance system and to U.S. hopes for nonproliferation.
The current generation of U.S. leaders accustomed to America’s unparalleled power status following the Cold War appears loath to give up the presumptions that where Washington leads others will follow and that China will rise peacefully with generous American tutelage. Those presumptions are comforting, but now demonstrably false. A general recognition of the unprecedented threats confronting the United States, and the value of U.S alliances to meet those threats, is Washington’s needed first step. The reluctance to acknowledge the emerging problems and their severity must be overcome before moves to address those problems are likely. However, simply understanding emerging challenges—as difficult as that can be—is inadequate. The United States and allies must then take the potentially hard force posture and communications steps needed to address those challenges and sustain the U.S. alliance system. Without a conscious effort along these lines, critical emerging fissures in that system will deepen, with truly serious repercussions for U.S. and allied security.
No comments:
Post a Comment