Francis P. Sempa
In an article in the Naval War College Review, three academics cast doubt on what they call the “growing hawkish consensus” about China’s “intent and capabilities.” Jeffrey Meiser, an associate political science professor at the University of Portland (Oregon), Renny Babiarz, an adjunct faculty member at Johns Hopkins, and David Mudd, who recently graduated from the University of Portland with English and political science degrees, “see significant evidence that China’s intentions are indeterminate and, in some arenas, neutral or even possibly aligning with U.S. national security interests.” The best strategic approach to China, they conclude, is not engagement or containment, but instead what they term “entanglement.” This article is an example of why most academics should be kept as far away from policy making as possible.
The three academics caution those who fear the worst about China’s intentions that there are “complexities involved in understanding the intentions and capabilities of rising powers.” The China hawks, they suggest, are engaging in “anti-Chinese” groupthink. Just as those who counseled engagement with China in the early post-Cold War period were over-optimistic about China’s intentions, today those who counsel containment of China have an “overly simplistic” view of China’s strategic culture which is not monolithically aggressive but consists of competing “subcultures” that affect elite decision-making. Meiser, Babiarz and Mudd believe that China’s strategic culture shifted “between the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping eras,” and that shift was followed by “an inconclusive amalgam of concepts and goals, and visions of success articulated by Presidents Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping.”
From their safe ivory tower, the three academics briefly cite China’s recent aggressive rhetoric and deeds but claim that these “do not point uniformly towards an aggressive orientation.” As proof, they cite “a chorus of Chinese academics [who] have elucidated various visions that argue that China’s uniquely humane characteristics (Confucianism, most notably) could contribute to a more ‘harmonious world’”--as if Chinese academics have a say in policy making. Meiser, Babiarz and Mudd downplay the geopolitical significance of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its nuclear buildup. And they use academic jargon--China’s “norms, goals, actions and outcomes”--to portray Chinese intentions as “uncertain.” They even rank so-called “levels” of uncertainty, placing China between level 3 (a “range of futures”) and level 4 (“true ambiguity”).
Instead of trying to predict China’s intentions, goals and strategies, the United States, they write, should attempt to “shape” conditions that affect China’s intentions, goals, and strategy.” We should “channel China’s rise in the direction of being ambitious without growing aggressive, toward either the United States or its security partners” by “empower[ing] norms of nonmilitarized diplomacy in East and Southeast Asia.” But our efforts at “shaping,” they caution, could be viewed by China as “hostile” and in that case would be “counterproductive.” For example, they suggest that an arms buildup by the United States “could be perceived as aggressive.” Instead, we need to outperform China without taking actions to weaken China.
Their proposed strategy is called “entanglement,” which they define as “a series of positive linkages between the United States and key countries in East and Southeast Asia.” First, the U.S. should strengthen the core alliances in East Asia. And second, the U.S. should increase engagement with the ASEAN nations. That’s it. No buildup of American military power in the region, which they contend would only alienate our allies in the region and cause China to “feel less secure, triggering a security dilemma spiraling to an arms race and higher likelihood of preemptive attack.” They characterize the China hawks’ policy of toughness and realism as resting “on a foundation of sand, inconsistent with principles of strategy and overconfident to the point of recklessness.”
The Chinese Communist Party claims the South China Sea as its own; repeatedly states that its goal is to reunify Taiwan with the mainland either peaceably or by force; has engaged in a massive naval and nuclear buildup that threatens every smaller country in the region; has formed a strategic partnership with Russia; has constructed islands and reefs in the South China Sea and placed military bases on those islands and reefs; has ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Navy (PLAN) to conduct provocative exercises near and around Taiwan; has constructed a series of ports (the “string of pearls”) in and around the Indian Ocean; has sought to extend China’s influence across Eurasia to Africa, and even to Latin America; and has repeatedly promoted the ultimate triumph of communism over capitalism. But, we are to believe, that China’s intentions are “uncertain” and a mystery. That academics think like this is really no surprise. That they are given a forum for this nonsense in the Naval War College Review is a surprise. Alfred Thayer Mahan must be turning over in his grave.
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