Jamie McIntyre, Senior Writer
Ukraine’s strategy for its planned counteroffensive against the Russian invasion force might be similarly summarized as: “First, we're going to cut it off, and then we'll watch it die.”
Ukraine faces a daunting task, dislodging and defeating several hundred thousand entrenched Russian troops who have spent six months digging hundreds of miles of trenches and erecting all manner of tank traps along more than 745 miles of front lines.
In more than a year of war, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military has suffered a series of battlefield humiliations and lost more than 200,000 troops, either killed or wounded.
Russian troops are downtrodden and dispirited, poorly led, treated, trained, and equipped, but they will be on defense, and Putin need only hold the territory he now occupies to eke out the semblance of a win.
On the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky believes only total victory, defined as the expulsion of Russian forces from every inch of Ukraine, will ensure his nation’s security in the short term. And more permanently by securing membership in NATO, which can’t happen while the country is divided.
It’s no secret Ukraine will soon strike back. But while its broad objectives are clear, the Ukrainian General Staff hopes its war plan will take Russia by surprise.
Most Western military experts agree that, at the minimum, Ukraine needs to break through Russian lines and cut the so-called land bridge between the eastern Donbas region and Russian-occupied Crimea to the south, isolating pockets of Russian troops and cutting supply lines.
There are some who believe the capture of Crimea, illegally annexed by Russia in 2014, is also a real possibility.
Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is not among them.
“I think that's a very high bar,” Milley said earlier this year. “I think, from a military standpoint only, that would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve militarily this year. What is achievable, I think, is significant liberation of Ukrainian territory.”
While a mercenary army of the Russian Wagner Group has been bogged down for months trying to take the eastern Donbas town of Bakhmut and taking horrific losses of up to 30,000 troops, Ukraine, with Western help, has been slowly building its counterstrike force.
“Our focus is on supporting the Ukrainians to change the dynamic on the ground,” said a senior defense official briefing Pentagon reporters this month. “We have marshaled commitments of important armor capabilities to enhance Ukraine's ability to conduct complex maneuvers.”
But the dogged defense of Bakhmut has also come at the cost of heavy casualties among its war-weary fighters, including the loss of some of its most battle-tested soldiers and experienced commanders.
Some in the West have urged Zelensky to give up defending what is left of the bombed-out mining town to save his forces for the coming showdown. But the former comedian has proven to be a wily wartime commander who judged the need to attrit Russian forces and deny Putin a symbolic victory as an equal priority.
“I actually think it was the right decision,” said retired Adm. William McRaven, the former head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, on CNN.
“What Zelensky looked at was, look, if we lose Bakhmut, it plays into Putin's narrative that the Russians are winning," McRaven said. "It will bolster Russian morale; it will probably unduly affect Ukrainian morale. It could also affect support from Europe and the United States. So, while it is just a small tactical piece of ground, I think it has huge strategic implications.”
While the front lines have been static the last few months, thousands of fresh Ukrainian troops have been returning from training in the West on everything from Patriot missile batteries in the United States and Challenger 2 tanks in the United Kingdom to Leopard tanks and Marder and American Bradley fighting vehicles in Germany.
“To achieve victory, Kyiv will have to cut deep into Russian defenses and rapidly outflank disorganized Russian combat formations,” said Can Kasapoglu, a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. “To its credit, Ukraine’s tank arsenal is fast becoming the most diversified armor deterrent of the 21st century.”
The Ukrainian offensive will have two priorities: regaining lost ground and killing Russians, according to retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe.
“They will need to execute very tough offensive missions,” Hertling tweeted last month. They will have to "retake and secure lost territory, penetrate and cause chaos and destruction in Russian security zones and rear areas, while also keeping nascent supply lines for new types of equipment secure and operational. Really tough tasks for a force that's already been fighting a year.”
Meanwhile, the Russians, Hertling says, “will defend in depth from prepared positions, willingly sacrifice soldiers, reorient artillery from civilians to Ukrainian Army troops, use electronic warfare to thwart drones, and reconnaissance tools to thwart penetration.”
While the Russian defenses look formidable from satellite imagery that shows hundreds of miles of zig-zagged trenches, they could turn out to be a modern-day Maginot line, the vast border fortifications built by France that proved utterly useless in stopping the German blitzkrieg in 1940.
“Trenches will be filled with the same unhappy, poorly-led, poorly-equipped Russian troops that have failed to win elsewhere,” argues retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, another former U.S. Army Europe commander active on Twitter. “No need to assault these trenches. Long-range precision against HQs and logistics sites defeats mass.”
Hodges is one of the few retired U.S. commanders who believes Ukraine could drive Russia out of Crimea, not with a full-frontal assault but by pushing close enough to take out Russian supply lines that could make defending it “untenable.”
But that would require longer-range ATACMS missiles that, so far, the Biden administration has refused to provide, deeming them to be too escalatory.
One prime target would be the 11-mile bridge over the Kerch Strait, linking Crimea to the Russian mainland, which has been under repair since it was severely damaged by a truck explosion last October.
“The Ukraine General Staff is more creative than the Pentagon,” Hodges argues. “Liberate Crimea, the decisive terrain, and watch Russian defenses collapse elsewhere.”
Russia has concentrated much of its defensive forces in areas where a Ukrainian strike could cut supply lines and isolate its forces, such as the city of Melitopol in Kherson province, which sits along a crucial railway route and is bisected by two major highways.
But Russia can’t know exactly where Ukraine will strike, and it can’t perfectly defend an almost 800-mile front.
“Ukraine’s Army will regain additional ground, but the spring offensive won't be a 'war winner,’” predicts Hertling, who says he has a few ideas of specific things Ukraine could do to increase its chances for success. But he said, “I ain't sharing.” At least not on Twitter.
No comments:
Post a Comment