Conor M. Kennedy and Colonel Scott E. Stephan, U.S. Marine Corps
The operational concepts and organizational changes associated with Force Design 2030 have sparked heated debate inside and outside the Marine Corps since The 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance was published in 2019. These initiatives are meant to better prepare it to participate in a naval campaign against China. Adversary perceptions are critical elements of deterrence and warfighting, so understanding Chinese and Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) evaluations of these operational concepts and force design programs is essential to gauging the initiatives’ success. This requires learning how the PLA expects the Marine Corps to fight, how it views existing and emerging capabilities, and, ultimately, how these assessments might inform its own operational planning and force design.
Assessing these issues is complicated by language barriers and classification levels in both China and the United States. But much can be learned from unclassified, public material published by Chinese defense sources. These writings and perspectives can give feedback to U.S. leaders charged with planning and implementing sweeping changes to force design and operating concepts. Several perspectives within Chinese writings—and some of the lessons they take away from their close observation of the Marine Corps’ development—can inform that planning.
China’s Perceptions of Force Design
Unquestionably, experts from the PLA and other Chinese sources understand the Marine Corps reforms currently underway. But a few caveats are necessary: First, we do not have access to internal PLA discourse on the subject, including regarding concept development and wargames. But open-source discussions reveal extensive interest in U.S. Marine Corps and Navy developments. Second, there is no unitary verdict among Chinese-language sources. They are likely engaged in debates like those in the U.S. Department of Defense, albeit from the other side. Third, the sources examined here are of varying authority; the attention each receives in what follows reflects a balance of authority and depth of analysis.
These sources show that the PLA attentively follows the latest changes to the Navy and Marine Corps. Updates are frequently posted in service newspapers, academic journals, news sites, and television shows noting milestones, failures, and general trends. Observers within China are keenly aware of the purpose of Force Design 2030 changes and joint operational concepts such as distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in a contested environment, and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO). Official PLA sources include detailed descriptions of major line-item changes, such as reductions to specific aviation units, divestment of tanks and cannon artillery, the evolution of unmanned aerial vehicle squadrons, and the acquisition of antiship missiles.1
Chinese authors also demonstrate a sober recognition that these concepts are focused on China. One commentator states that the rapid deployment of small units capable of long-range maritime and surface strike onto numerous islands will constitute “a dense, multi-directional intersecting kill zone over large areas west of the island chain,” intended to hem in PLA Navy (PLAN) forces and even directly attack mainland coastal targets such as PLA combat units crossing the sea or ports.2 The recent U.S.-Japan large-scale exercise Noble Fusion held in the Luzon and Miyako Straits has been described in one nationalistic outlet as validating EABO concepts and associated equipment and “tactics specifically tailored against China.”3 These sentiments are unsurprising, given that U.S. Department of Defense and Marine Corps publications refer to China as the benchmark to guide development.4
Observers inside China generally agree with the logic behind Force Design. Many writers recognize the urgency and the effects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over 20 years. One Navy Today article from mid-2020 states the Marine Corps’ amphibious landing capabilities gradually atrophied to the breaking point. The authors note that the Marine Corps is ill-prepared to face a stronger adversary, having dealt with enemies with no structured air forces, modern air-defense systems, or large-scale armored forces. They argue the Marine Corps’ overall combat capabilities were reduced in its “duplication of army roles,” and its force structure is unsuited to modern warfare.5
Some interpret the Marine Corps’ structural changes as a major boost. Authors in China Military Online note that, despite reductions in the force’s ability to conduct large-scale ground warfare, the post-reform Marine Corps will be “even more suited to the requirements of amphibious operations, with an overall increase in mobility and firepower and a large improvement in its rapid response capabilities.”6 Another author writing in the PLAN’s official newspaper, People’s Navy, finds that greater naval integration should bring the Marine Corps increased flexibility and combat power. This observer points out that “the current reductions in personnel and armaments is by no means a contraction in the size of the force or a weakening of its combat functions. Nor can it be regarded as a second-best choice due to tightening defense budgets.”7
These authors in China Military Online recognize the significance of the Marine Corps’ reforms, especially the creation of the Marine littoral regiment (MLR). They note the combination of modern and traditional tactics into a contemporary version of “island hopping” and regard the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit’s exercises since 2019 as initial tests.8 They see the creation of MLRs as an attempt to integrate existing and developing capabilities: the F-35B; manned ships with unmanned systems; and antiship missile batteries, to form a new combat system for littoral operations. In addition, reforms offer Marine Corps procurement a unique opportunity to reduce redundant capabilities, potentially decreasing the force’s allocation of second-hand equipment. MLRs also change deployments and operational patterns within existing force structures to deal asymmetrically with adversary strengths such as hypersonic missiles. This could be a net saver in expenditures more broadly. The authors perceive these new capabilities as a significant threat and challenge.9
Some observers point out the importance of Marine Corps concepts to the larger U.S. strategy of “containing” China. One source from Tank and Armored Vehicle, a magazine sponsored by the China North Vehicle Research Institute, states functioning expeditionary advanced bases (EABs) can amplify the effectiveness of conventional large-scale forces, which otherwise will have to pay a heavy price to get inside the antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) zone. Having a Marine Corps A2/AD system in place will effectively blockade China, prevent its military from entering the western Pacific, and even shut off commercial and trading activities.10 Another observer states in Military Digest that General David Berger’s Concept for Stand-in Forces not only combines cognitive and kinetic effects, but also apply political pressure against China by forcing decision-making dilemmas prior to the fight (“stepping on and testing red lines”).11
Marines with the 1st Marine Division move simulated casualties onto an MV-22B Osprey. Chinese analysts believe the core problem EABO presents to the PLA is finding, identifying, and monitoring in real-time the movements and actions of small-scale forces in the first island chain and the near seas. U.S. Marine Corps (Skyler M. Harris)
There also are skeptics who question the changes’ probable effectiveness and the feasibility of implementing them. Authors in Navy Today described several risks to Force Design 2030. The ten-year redesign of the force will require the Commandant’s successor to possess a similar perspective, otherwise “the newcomer will have to start from scratch.” Another war or crisis could greatly disrupt this transformation, a fair possibility over a ten-year period.
The skeptics highlight concerns within the United States that this plan is overly focused on great power competition to the detriment of the Marine Corps’ ability to respond to other, more likely contingencies in the Middle East and other remote places. They note that this plan could simply be “wishful thinking” resulting from complications from interservice battles for funding, the Marine Corps’ longstanding low budget allocation, and its position within the Department of the Navy. Last, they point out the difficulty the Marine Corps has in controlling what equipment it acquires, citing examples from both Gulf Wars.12
An Analyst Digs Deep
While official PLA publications tend to be restrained in voicing concerns or opinions, unofficial commentators provide more in-depth analysis and discussion. For example, a longtime contributor to Shipborne Weapons—sponsored by China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation—provides an analysis of how the PLAN can counter the EABO threat. The author, an analyst writing under the pseudonym Tianying, demonstrates a thorough if understated recognition of the core elements of the concept and presents the main problem for the PLA: finding, identifying, and monitoring in real-time the movements and actions of small-scale forces in the first island chain and the near seas.13
According to Tianying, the reconnaissance fight requires the integrated use of space, air, and sea assets to continuously conduct focused and close surveillance of the waters and airspace around Taiwan, especially nearby islands. Despite potential difficulties in detecting distributed, low-signature forces, the range of their deployments will be dictated largely by the maximum range of HIMARS and antiship missiles. These must be deployed within several hundred kilometers of the island of Taiwan or the mainland if they are to interfere with a Chinese attempt at armed unification. Potential deployment areas include Japan’s Sakishima Islands (the southernmost end of the Ryukyu island chain, including the islands of Miyako and Yaeyama), the Babuyan Islands (a Philippine archipelago located in the Luzon Strait), other strait-adjacent islands in the first island chain, and potentially even Pratas Atoll (controlled by Taiwan). The author argues that areas farther from this region are not significant for PLA operations focused on Taiwan.
Furthermore, Tianying claims it will be difficult for EABs to stay hidden in the first island chain. Islands are fixed positions, and China’s growing constellation of high-resolution observation satellites, with resolutions of 0.5 meters or less, should be capable of identifying maritime surface and ground targets.14 Even if Marines can avoid satellite detection, useful locations are within range of the PLA’s aerial reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. The PLA’s growing unmanned aerial vehicle inventory provides long-endurance observation, monitoring, tracking, and strike capabilities from hundreds of kilometers away. These can be used to monitor likely EAB sites adjacent to the near seas, fill in gaps of satellite coverage, and guide PLA long-range precision-guided weapons. Equipped with only light air defenses, he argues, EAB forces that are found can be targeted quickly by numerous land, sea, or air-based fires.15
Tianying also presents the issue of economy of force when engaging EABs. Even with a large arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, surface combatants, and more at its disposal, a major campaign against Taiwan that draws in other nations would require the prudent application of firepower. The author recommends more economical methods to disrupt EABO, such as recon-strike by unmanned aerial vehicles, single-use attack drones, and even “mobile firepower platforms.” PLAN ships will be charged with conducting air defense and antisubmarine warfare, screening sea-crossings, and counterstriking intervening forces. Tasking a surface combatant to counter a HIMARS battery is tantamount to “using our best horses to battle against your lame horses” (我之上驷去对彼之下驷).
Instead, Tianying argues, the PLA should attack EABs with extra-long-range, precision, large-caliber multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) mounted on merchant vessels. The author suggests there are few technical barriers to this approach, pointing to tests of the HJP-3 Shipborne Fire Support Module (derived from the PLA’s PHL-03 300-mm MRL) on the training ship Shichang. With improvements in range, guidance, lethality, integration, and containerization, MRL systems can be deployed on board numerous platforms and dispersed to areas within range of land-based air support and in striking distance of the first island chain.16 These systems can also serve a dual function of striking Taiwanese targets during an invasion.
Last, Tianying observes that EABO, as a supporting component of the U.S. military’s distributed maritime operations concept, must rely on theater information-sharing systems.17 Echoing this point, another author examining the stand-in forces concept concludes this to be one of the main challenges in implementing EABO. They assess that evolution of the Joint All-Domain Operations Command and Control System (JADC2), on which EABO is to rely, will prove difficult.18 Issues in the larger joint command-and-control architecture could limit the utility of stand-in forces, a factor potentially beyond the Marine Corps’ control. In a more martial tone, Tianying argues that striking key nodes in the opponent’s information systems with soft and hard kill measures will not only disrupt EABO, but also facilitate other PLA air and maritime operations.19
Other unofficial articles focus on specific systems. One frequent Chinese military commentator published a focused analysis in Modern Ships in early 2022 on Marine Corps use of unmanned ground vehicle–based fires to gain sea control. After close analysis of ROGUE Fires and the features of the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), the author argues the system still has essential flaws. These include its relatively short range of 185 kilometers; an opponent needs only to plan to physically avoid the threat. The author also argues for boosting ship defenses against the missile threat by strengthening sensors and interception capabilities. In addition, gaining electromagnetic and air control could enable shipborne aviation and special forces to infiltrate and destroy NMESIS and nodes once datalinks are disrupted.
The bottom line is there are multiple ways to address the threat these U.S. systems present. Nonetheless, the author concludes that, deployed in the first island chain, U.S. stand-in forces could become a shackle on the PLA, and, if not effectively countered, could lock the PLAN in the near seas.20
Modernization offers the Marine Corps a unique opportunity to reduce redundant capabilities, potentially decreasing the force’s allocation of second-hand and aged equipment such as these F/A-18C and D Hornets photographed in February 2022. U.S. Navy
Some Lessons for the PLA
Observers inside China see the U.S. Marine Corps’ transformation as an excellent opportunity to learn. One PLAN source finds important lessons for the development of the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC). Despite the U.S. Marine Corps’ partial reorganization, its role as a strategic maneuver force in readiness for overseas deployment has not fundamentally changed, and thus, the observer believes, China should strive to build up its own “world-class Marine Corps.” That is, the PLAN should study and learn from advanced U.S. theories and combat in guiding the development of its marine corps.21
The PLANMC faces the tyranny of competing missions. It must focus on both large-scale amphibious operations and increasingly urgent contingency response issues in the near and far seas. It must plan overall development in both while protecting national territorial integrity, planning for sovereign unification, and caring for overseas interests.22 The author’s reference to conceptual and geographic tensions in PLANMC missions echoes the current debate in the U.S. Marine Corps regarding global contingency response and the urgent need for contested littoral environment capabilities against a peer threat.
After describing EABO as an example of the U.S. military’s “cold war mentality,” one author in a 2021 issue of Modern Ships lists lessons this modern high-tech form of island-hopping holds for the PLA. These include greatly increased use of unmanned systems (air, ground, surface, and underwater), expanded range of attack through long-range precision fires, greater variety in delivery platforms to increase the pace of combat and increase force mobility, and a larger joint role for marine forces (long-range precision strike, garrisons in forward airfields, antisubmarine warfare, and ground-based antiship forces). The author concludes, “We can learn the strengths of the adversary during tracking and analysis and develop our own strengths and build contemporary modern counterforces so that we can be prepared when conflicts arise.”23
Listen Closely
China is a nation of 1.4 billion people, and the PLA is a complex bureaucracy, much like the U.S. military. Even if there is a unitary PLA view of the ongoing changes to the U.S. Marine Corps, it is difficult to ascertain. But the sources examined offer perspectives, both optimistic and pessimistic, on the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 initiatives. They also provide insights into China’s perceived options for dealing with stand-in forces.
China’s military establishment is watching the Marine Corps closely. Cautious in their assessments, Chinese observers know they need to monitor the development of concepts such as EABO and the associated changes to Marine Corps and joint force systems that are still being tested.24 U.S. leaders should listen carefully to those observations.
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