Tatiana Stanovaya
In just under a year, on March 17, Russians will head to the polls for the 2024 presidential election. Given the country’s current social and political conditions, few people doubt that President Vladimir Putin will easily receive a sixth term. According to some Russian media outlets, Putin’s team plans on making sure the president gets more than the record-breaking 77 percent of the vote he won in 2018.
In theory, this target should be easy to meet. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is broadly supported at home, and polling from the independent Levada Center shows that Putin’s approval rating is at a near-record high. The Kremlin dominates Russia’s media and can easily arrest or otherwise silence any critics. Russia’s controlled opposition groups—the pliant political parties authorized by the Kremlin to field candidates against Putin—have never been more supportive of the president. As it stands, they are unlikely to nominate a presidential candidate who could take even modest shares of the vote. They might actually outwardly align with the Kremlin to ensure that Putin hits his desired electoral margins.
But today in Moscow, little is certain about the future. The war has thrust Russia into a period of pervasive unpredictability in which no one feels safe and it is impossible for policymakers to engage in even short-term planning. Recently leaked recordings of a conversation between the famous Russian music producer Iosif Prigozhin and the former senator Farhad Akhmedov showed that both were enraged at Russia’s leadership and believed the country’s policymakers lacked the capacity to make critical decisions. They also alleged that several of Russia’s most powerful people, including the leader of its National Guard, were plotting against the country’s defense minister. Their statements are representative of what Russian elites say to one another when they think no one is listening, and they suggest high levels of discontent.
A significant military escalation could aggravate these sentiments and dramatically complicate Putin’s ability to maintain domestic control. If Moscow carries out further mobilizations, something the government is trying to avoid, it will stir up more social anxiety with unpredictable consequences. If Russia faces additional setbacks, Putin will have to deal with escalating criticism. Both situations could prompt him to cancel elections, implement elements of a military dictatorship, and purge the elites in a bid to shore up his security. Relatedly, they could prompt Russia’s elites to challenge the regime. The Kremlin may be confident that Putin will win reelection by a commanding margin and right now, that is the most likely outcome. But the war means Putin is becoming more vulnerable than most people think.
RISKY BUSINESS
It is easy to see how Russia could end up escalating its operations in Ukraine. Kyiv is preparing a full-scale counteroffensive, slated to take place this spring, that will challenge Russian positions across wide swaths of land. Ukraine is also carrying out sabotage and drone attacks on Russian military installations, and it could decide to start shelling Russia’s border regions. One of Russia’s most popular pro-war military bloggers was killed on April 2 in an explosion in St. Petersburg, showing that the conflict means no one is safe. Any of these attacks might prompt Moscow to increase its investment in the war, lest it lose more territory and find itself further embarrassed.
In theory, Russia could escalate the conflict without impinging on the lives of its citizens. Moscow could, for example, intensify its strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure or attempt to assassinate members of Ukraine’s leadership. But if its losses are serious enough, Russia will likely feel compelled to do what it did after Ukraine routed Russian troops outside Kharkiv: announce a new mobilization and draft hundreds of thousands of men to fight. Indeed, Russia already appears to be gearing up for such a possibility. In over 40 regions, conscription officials are sending out summonses “to check the data” on draft-eligible men.
The last mobilization, conducted in September and October, made the population highly anxious and pushed over 300,000 young people to flee the country. Another draft would likely have a similar effect. This social turbulence may reshape domestic politics, in large part by further strengthening the hand of Russia’s siloviki, or security services. Members of this group have long been pushing for Moscow to eliminate Russia’s remaining freedoms, which they see as risky democratic indulgences. They advocated for canceling last year’s regional elections and have insisted that the Kremlin enact martial law and close Russia’s borders. These efforts have mostly failed: the elections took place, Putin’s imposition of martial law was only partial, and the borders remain open. But if Russia faces military failures and, consequently, social unrest, the siloviki might gain the upper hand. Putin may find he has less control over policymaking as security officials speak out or refuse to neatly follow his orders.
Russia could see more arrests, seizures of property, and purges.
Military failures will also fuel outrage among Russia’s “angry patriots”: a term used by Kremlin political consultants to describe the prominent, pro-war bloggers who have publicly blasted the Russian military’s performance. Some have even criticized Putin himself and threatened to not support him in 2024. They could fill Russia’s information environment with insults against the military, just as thousands of ordinary Russians are trying to escape the country. Such a dire situation could force the Kremlin to employ the tactics of a military dictatorship—with more mass repression as the state fully orients itself around the war—further exacerbating divisions between Russians who want to escalate the conflict and those who do not.
In a worst-case scenario for Putin, the elites might begin to panic about his rule, and the country’s most powerful figures could begin outwardly promoting political agendas that differ from his own. Indeed, the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin is distancing himself from the president, spewing charges that Putin’s appointees and staff are making grievous mistakes. This internal criticsm would not cost Putin the elections; the Kremlin has no difficulty suppressing or eliminating opposition from the outside. But the instability could expose Putin to palace challenges from other members of his regime.
Renewed escalation, then, could trigger two conflicting trends. On the one hand, it could cause Russian elites to panic, leading them to fight among themselves and even against the Kremlin. On the other hand, it could get the siloviki to push for and succeed at further repressing the country into silence. Either way, Russia could see more arrests, seizures of property, and purges. Putin could even lose some of his grip on power.
INTO THE ABYSS
Both Western observers and Russian elites like to speculate about who might lead Russia once Putin is gone, and analysts in both camps have come up with shortlists of possible contenders. To do so, they closely monitor Putin’s public remarks, particularly when he praises or criticizes someone. They have taken note, for example, of his recent praise for Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev and his criticism of Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov. They also pay attention to the way various candidates behave. Deputy Security Council Chair Dmitry Medvedev’s incendiary rhetoric, for example, is seen by many Russian experts as a sign that Medvedev believes Putin has selected him to be Russia’s next president. The same is true of Nikolai Patrushev, the security council’s secretary (and Dmitry Patrushev’s father).
But the speculation makes no sense. To date, the topic of Putin’s plans remains taboo even within his inner circle let alone among other senior officials, and no one truly knows whether Putin will run for reelection. It has created another problem for the elites. Not only is their aging president leading Russia toward a possible military defeat; he is also making it hard for them to plan for Russia’s domestic future. The two problems are related. If the military situation worsens, the likelihood that Putin will step down in the foreseeable future decreases, aggravating the country’s internal tensions.
Russians are aware that Putin could remain in power for a long time to come. Indeed, when members of the elite describe someone as a potential successor to Putin, they are often trying not to make predictions but instead to get that person in trouble. (Putin does not look favorably on people who want jobs he does not want to give them.) Yet if the conflict drags on and Moscow continues to flail, it is possible to imagine that the country’s elites could start to seriously consider choosing a successor themselves. The longer Putin stays in power, the harder it may become for him to control the succession process, and if Putin becomes more distracted by the war, the wealthiest and most powerful Russians will have an increased incentive and ability to organize on their own. They will be especially likely to work around Putin if he becomes indecisive, hesitant, or misinformed.
That does not mean Russia’s elites will attempt any kind of coup in the immediate future; for now, Russia’s leader reigns supreme. But the war is remaking Russia, and Putin’s willingness to commit ever-greater resources to avoid defeat has set him on a risky path, tethering his future to that of an unpredictable conflict. Putin may not be likely to lose power, but a historically large reelection victory is by no means guaranteed.
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