In February 2023, Russia suspended its implementation of the New START Treaty, the last remaining US–Russian nuclear-arms-control treaty, bringing a world of unrestricted nuclear arsenals one step closer to reality. In this research paper, published as part of the Missile Dialogue Initiative research programme, Michael Albertson and Dr Nikolai Sokov individually consider the implications of this unravelling of arms control and the prospects for its revival.
Since the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union – and later, Russia – have been involved in some form of arms control that served to curb arms racing and prevent nuclear escalation. However, the post-Cold War period has seen the failure of several arms-control agreements, as well as a gradually worsening security environment, further impaired by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. A year later, Moscow’s suspension of the New START Treaty (NST), the final remaining agreement constraining the United States’ and Russia’s nuclear forces, is the latest blow to arms control.
This paper presents the differing perspectives of two experienced arms-control practitioners from the US and Russia on how the unravelling of arms control came to be, what consequences it might have and how to approach the complex task of preventing the nuclear-arms-control architecture from collapsing.
The NST, while criticised for insufficient ambition, has proven to be a durable treaty that contributed transparency and predictability to the US–Russia nuclear relationship, both of which remain desirable today. The suspension of the NST demonstrates Russia’s refusal to compartmentalise arms control and its willingness to jeopardise strategic stability. Should the NST be prematurely abandoned, all transparency measures with respect to strategic offensive arms would be stopped, potentially spurring the US and Russia into unconstrained nuclear expansion. This dangerous dynamic could be further complicated by the emergence of China as a major nuclear power.
A follow-on to the NST and a broader revitalisation of arms control will prove challenging. The two sides currently lack the political will to pursue arms-control talks. Any potential engagement is further hindered by deep disagreements about what the next treaty should cover.
In individual chapters, the authors argue for taking a step back and revisiting the original aims and components of arms control and how they can be adapted to meet the current security environment. The questions to consider include the format of the next agreement, the number of parties to be involved and the scope of the negotiations. The authors agree that while there many issue areas for arms control, which require a comprehensive approach to negotiations, the next legally binding agreement should be limited in scope in order to succeed. The future of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the US–Russia relationship is uncertain, but the outlook for nuclear arms-control might not be entirely dire if both parties recognise that it is an endeavour to be pursued irrespective of broader political sentiments.
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