SIGAR released its latest report, Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise.
SIGAR’s interim report on this topic, released in May 2022, was the first U.S. government account on how and why the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) collapsed abruptly in August 2021. SIGAR’s new report updates that evaluation with compelling on-the-ground perspectives from witnesses to the ANDSF collapse. An “In Their Own Words” section provides quotes from over 40 interviewees, including former Afghan and U.S. officials who gave SIGAR perspectives about the ANDSF’s final two years. This section includes first-person accounts of the disintegration of the Afghan government and security forces as the Taliban closed in on Kabul, and the aftermath of the fall of the Ghani government.
SIGAR Findings and Commentary (Final Report):
-- The last-minute wholesale restructuring of Afghanistan’s security institutions between March and June 2021, in particular, undermined ANDSF cohesion, morale, and ultimately, its ability to counter the Taliban offensive. In 2021, amid rapidly deteriorating security, President Ghani reshuffled most of his security officials, often replacing them with fellow ethnic Pashtuns, especially Ghilzai Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan. These leadership changes were part of a broader pattern of politicization and ethnicization (in favor of Pashtuns) of the security sector in the final years of the Ghani administration.
(Page 23-24)
-- Analyst Timor Sharan told SIGAR, “Districts collapsed not because of the army, but because of that restructuring that happened and the fact that none of [the replacement police chiefs] had connections” at the district level. He claimed that it was the police that did most of the fighting in the final 18 months, not the army. By undermining the morale and political legitimacy of the police, this restructuring directly contributed to the collapse in August 2021.
(Page 25-26)
-- Ethnic competition between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns (Tajiks, in particular)—enflamed by the Ghani-Abdullah rivalry—was likely the single biggest source of dysfunction within the ANDSF. But some former Afghan officials described other types of friction. One former MOD official described competition between the younger and older generation of officers, between the jihadis and the professional officers, and between ethnicities. All these issues distracted from the fight, he said.
(Page 26)
-- General James Mattis, who served as head of Central Command from 2010 to 2013 and as Secretary of Defense from 2017 to 2018, told SIGAR, “The lack of political clarity on ends, ways, and means meant we were always wondering if we were still going to be here next year. Were we going to be funded next year? We weren’t sure whether to attack, retreat or go sideways.”
(Page 41)
-- “In Their Own Words” (Appendix III) provides quotes from former ANDSF, Afghan and U.S. officials. It is broken down into six sections.
- The U.S.-Taliban Agreement and Withdrawal (Begins on Page 95)
- Withdrawing U.S. Contractors (Begins on Page 98)
- The ANDSF Disintegrates (Begins on Page 99)
- Exodus (Begins on Page 106)
- Evacuation from Kabul Airport (Begins on Page 107)
- Aftermath (Begins on Page 109)
-- “Overnight…98 percent of U.S. air strikes had ceased…the Doha agreement’s psychological implication was so great that the average Afghan soldier felt this idea of abandonment…U.S. soldiers were confused [about] what to engage and what to not. On an hourly basis, the U.S. military had to coordinate with the Doha office of Ambassador Khalilzad and others from the State Department to get clarification on what they could do.”
– Gen. Sami Sadat, former Afghan Army corps commander
-- “They [U.S. partners] said it was not right, but they have to follow orders. They would see the Taliban attacking our checkpoints. They would have videos of the Taliban doing it. But they would say we are not able to engage, because we have limitations. There was also so much concern about civilians, which gave the Taliban an advantage.”
– Former Afghan Army Gen. Habatullah Alizai
-- “Before June…all the Black Hawks had maintenance contractors who could repair them in 24 hours. After June, Black Hawks had to be fixed in Dubai, which took weeks to months…My [special operations forces] were running out of supplies.”
– Gen. Alizai
-- “Ghani was more interested in the tactical daily engagements on small minor issues rather than the big strategic issues that the country was facing…for God's sake, we had provinces falling and he would still bloody hold National Procurement Council meetings for four hours. He would hold urban planning meetings while we had districts falling…”
– Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hekmat Karzai
-- “Nobody wanted to die for Ghani…die for people who were here to rob the country.”
– Former Interior Minister Gen. Masoud Andarabi
-- The interviewee determined…they had 12 MD 530s ready to fly and 17 MD 530 pilots. He told his commander they were able to provide 360-degree protection of Kabul and asked for his orders... The commander said that the Taliban were not able to enter Kabul, and forbade anyone from leaving the area. The commander then left to speak to the media, stating that no one can enter Kabul, when in fact, the Taliban were already near the Palace.
– Former Afghan Air Force pilot, paraphrased interview
-- “The Taliban are going after former ANDSF on a daily basis. They search their homes and if they cannot find the individual they will go after their family members…Since the collapse I have relocated four times…If they find out anything I will be executed.”
– Former Afghan military intelligence officer
-- “…you’ve got guys who certainly do deserve to come to the U.S. who aren’t able to, and they’ve got a target on their back. The Taliban knows where they are and how to find them. It’s like we gave this guy a rope and noose around his neck and then kicked the chair out from under him.”
– U.S. Marine Corps infantry officer
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