William Alberque
Russia’s use of missiles in its war on Ukraine has been less effective and decisive in helping achieve its war aims than leaders in Moscow likely expected. And the country’s actions related to the use of missiles and their import and export since the start of the war have harmed international attempts to control missile proliferation and undermined the credibility of Russia’s compliance with its international arms-control obligations.
Russia’s extensive use of short-range ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles in its war against Ukraine has had several repercussions in the field of arms control. Most notably, the use of dual-capable missiles, that is, missiles capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional warheads, against tactical targets and Moscow’s decisions regarding missile proliferation both before and after February 2022 have damaged the prospects for future arms-control efforts with the United States and globally, particularly regarding missile-related technology. And these missiles have done little to help Russia achieve its declared war aims, leading some analysts to revise their views of the utility of non-strategic missiles in wartime.
Employing a diverse set of missile types, poorlyRussia has employed several types of ballistic and cruise missiles to strike Ukrainian ground targets, and Western analysts have been able to inspect the wreckage of these systems much more easily than when they were last used in Syria. This has offered insights into Russian missile design, components and capabilities, particularly with regard to design limitations, targeting systems and the use of foreign-sourced components. The missiles used include modern, dual-capable systems such as the ground-launched short-range ballistic missile Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) and the air-launched ballistic missile Kinzhal (RS-AS-24 Killjoy). It has also used legacy systems such as the Tochka-U (RS-SS-21 Scarab); various modern land-attack cruise missiles including the air-launched Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak); older land-attack cruise missiles such as modified and de-mated versions of the Kh-55 (RS-AS-15B Kent) and possibly the Kh-555 (RS-AS-22 Kluge); the ground-launched land attack cruise-missile Iskander (RS-SSC-7 Southpaw); and the sea-launched 3M14 Kalibr (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) and Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile). It is not known whether Russia has used the longer-range ground-launched cruise missile 9M729 (RS-SCC-8 Screwdriver), which it may be holding in reserve for striking US or NATO targets rather than targets in Ukraine. Separately, Russia announced a deployment of the Tsirkon (RS-SS-N-33) missile in January 2023. Russia has stated that the Tsirkon is intended to strike ‘decision-making centers’ within minutes, even those in Washington that are guarded by ‘advanced air defence and missile defence systems’.
The Russian armed forces often have made poor use of their missiles in the war due at least in part to inadequate planning; limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and a lack of dynamic targeting. These failures have caused reputational damage to Russia’s missile programme – which had recovered remarkably from the design and testing failures of the 1990s and 2000s – and to its doctrine. It has also become clear that Moscow’s apparent reliance on foreign components for some of its modern missile capabilities, in the context of comprehensive sanctions, may hamper its ability to reconstitute its missile force and possibly to fulfil future military sales to external customers. Norwegian intelligence has assessed that, as a result, Russia will limit further use of its modern missiles against Ukraine to reserve them for a potential war with NATO and for other deterrence missions.
Arms-control ramificationsRussia’s actions have implications in four major areas that will make future missile-control efforts more complicated and potentially impossible:
1. Adaptations to missile mode and typeRussia has repurposed missiles across launch platforms, using several different types of anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles against Ukrainian ground targets. These include modern ground-launched coastal-defence systems such as the K-300P Bastion-P (RS-SSC-5 Stooge), as well as older Soviet designs such as the air-launched Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 Kitchen) and Kh-32 (RS-AS-4A Kitchen mod 2). Russia also has used S-300 surface-to-air missiles for ground attack. It is unclear whether the S-400 system has a similar capability, but if it does it would have a longer reach. Analysts knew before the war that three missiles had limited ground-attack capability. Russia and Belarus have both used S-300 missiles for this purpose in recent years, but because the systems’ accuracy is probably low – and Russia possessed many other dedicated land-attack systems – analysts did not think they were likely to be used against ground targets in Ukraine. The designers of the three older systems (the Kh-22, Kh-32 and S-300), however, also configured these missiles to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads (in part to compensate for their low accuracy, in part to destroy larger targets). Ukraine, for its part, has adapted US anti-radar missiles previously thought impossible to launch from Soviet-made fighters seamlessly into its attacks. It is still unclear what system Ukrainian forces used to strike the Saky air base in Crimea.
These operational changes have greatly complicated future arms-control efforts that seek to differentiate between certain classes of missiles and whether they are associated with certain launch platforms or capabilities. For instance, if a hitherto dedicated air-launched anti-ship missile could be adapted for use as a ground-launched land-attack system, it could create substantial uncertainty and undermine efforts to limit dedicated ground-launched surface-to-surface missiles, which was the goal of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The problem in arms control often comes down to the individual inspector viewing an individual system and trying to make an assessment. In a way, Russia’s frugal interoperability – creating a system and adapting it across platforms and target missions – makes differentiation during inspections a significant challenge that is now a far greater challenge than it was during negotiations over the INF Treaty.
2. Dual-capabilityRussia has repeatedly used systems capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional warheads to strike targets in Ukraine, and its willingness to do so is surprising. Many analysts had thought that Moscow would reserve most of the high-end, dual-capable missiles such as Kinzhal for theatre or near-strategic missions (e.g., targeting command centres or nuclear bunkers) rather than tactical targets. And many of the older, low-end dual-capable missiles were thought to be too inaccurate to be useful in this type of war. Norway’s intelligence service believes Russia has reached an inflection point, having used so many of these advanced dual-capable systems that it may have reduced its ability to perform deterrence functions. Regardless, the use of dual-capable systems on such a wide scale in a conventional conflict has illustrated sharply the difficulty in verifying the presence or absence of nuclear warheads on missiles in the future.
This use of dual-capable missiles in the war on Ukraine comes in a context in which some analysts have suggested that future missile-related arms control with Russia should focus on limiting or eliminating the nuclear-armed dual-purpose cruise missiles, leaving aside the cruise missiles derived from the same design but only assigned to conventional missions. But Russia – and China to an even larger degree – rely upon dual-capable missiles and the deterrent effect of the resulting ambiguity (a condition known as entanglement). Without a sea change in Russian doctrine, design philosophy or its theory of how to conduct armed conflicts, this idea – differentiating between nuclear and conventional-armed missiles of the same type – is unlikely to succeed, and it ignores similar behaviour in China, India, North Korea and Pakistan. Dual-capability has immense doctrinal value and design roots in all of these countries.
3. Missile mobilityRussia has moved Iskander launchers with ease from the Far East to strike Ukrainian targets and could, in a rush, load them onto aircraft for faster deployment, giving the lie to Russia’s September 2019 offer of a ‘moratorium’ on deployment of the 9M729 to its Western Military District. This type of mobility has demonstrated that a regional approach to limiting Russian missiles is not only impossible but also foolish. The myopic willingness in Europe to pursue an unverifiable Russian promise to prohibit medium- and intermediate-range missiles in the European theatre, but not elsewhere, has long been unpopular with partners in East Asia for this reason. Japan, for example, rejected such a proposal from the Soviet Union in 1986 in the context of the negotiations of the INF Treaty.
The US had long urged its European allies – particularly France – to reject negotiating a regional moratorium with Russia, but in a December 2021 volte-face, Washington agreed to broach the subject with Moscow the following month, leaving its allies confused. Had these talks progressed, they would have given rise to complicated discussions in Tokyo and Seoul about the value of US extended-deterrence guarantees. The invasion weeks later saved the US from making any unwise concessions on limiting missiles in Asia in exchange for likely ephemeral Russian promises about inadequate verification.
4. Unexpected imports and exportsMoscow has damaged global missile controls by exporting the Iskander-M, a Category I system under the Missile Technology Control Regime, to Belarus earlier this year. Category I items include cruise and ballistic missiles capable of delivering a payload of 500 kilograms or more over distances of 300 km or more. They are ‘subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial regardless of the purpose of the export’, and Russia’s open transfer of this missile to Belarus is a violation of the letter and spirit of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Russian President Vladimir Putin has declared that these very missiles are nuclear-capable, and they have a demonstrated range of approximately 500 km. Russia had previously exported only a shorter-range version of the Iskander-E (limited to 280 km) to Algeria and Armenia. Russia also reportedly has purchased Iranian missiles, including the shorter-range Fateh-110 and medium-range Zolfaghar missile systems, further damaging the Missile Technology Control Regime and violating United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. These acquisitions go alongside purchases of Shahed-136 direct-attack munitions and Mohajer-6 armed drones.
Russian decisions to import Iranian weaponry and to export Category I systems with an explicit mention of their nuclear capability are body blows to global missile controls. Indeed, the country’s approach to proliferation throughout the war will further complicate any future missile-control negotiations between Russia and the US and has further damaged the credibility of its compliance with its international obligations. This credibility was already strained, however, given its violation of the Budapest Memorandum and INF Treaty; its violation and suspended implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; its non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document.
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