Anuj Srivas, and Kabir Agarwal
In January, after New York-based short seller Hindenburg Research released a report accusing Adani Group of accounting fraud and stock manipulation, the Indian conglomerate defended itself by appealing to nationalism. “This is … a calculated attack on India, the independence, integrity and quality of Indian institutions, and the growth story and ambition of India,” the group said in a 413-page response refuting the allegations.
It is no surprise that Adani Group tied itself to India’s “growth story.” The industrial empire of Gautam Adani, the group’s founder, has been key to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision for India, which centers on big infrastructure projects as drivers of growth. In turn, Adani’s support for Modi’s nation-building plans, from airports to green hydrogen plants, has propelled his conglomerate’s meteoric rise. From 2014 to December 2022, Adani Group’s market capitalization soared from $6.5 billion to more than $223 billion.
Hindenburg’s report triggered a sudden reversal, however. The value of Adani Group’s publicly traded stocks soon fell by more than half—a rout that has continued a month after the report’s release. Modi has chosen to remain quiet about the affair, even as it has raised serious questions about India’s economy.
If Adani Group seeks refuge from criticism by tying its success to that of India’s, then the converse must also be reckoned with: The collapse of its shares represents a stress test for India’s growth project. It has cast doubt on whether Modi’s strategy of propping up a few favored corporate titans can translate into lasting results on the ground. And, beyond that, whether Modi’s India can deliver on hopes that it could become a driver of global economic growth, as China was for the past three decades.
Modi’s rise has long been intertwined with that of Adani’s. As chief minister of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014, Modi made his name through his so-called Gujarat model of development, with its large infrastructure projects, such as dams, extensive highways, and solar power plants. Adani was critical not just to constructing many of these projects but also to bringing big business around to the idea of Modi as a potential prime minister. After Modi was elected in 2014, he flew from Gujarat to his new home of New Delhi in Adani’s private jet.
As Modi became India’s most popular leader since the republic’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, Adani’s business interests expanded. His conglomerate partnered with the government on critical infrastructure projects within India and, increasingly, abroad. Since Modi entered office, Adani’s net worth increased by more than 5,000 percent to $150 billion in September 2022, making him Asia’s richest man before the scandal. His wealth came largely on the back of winning government contracts; expanding into strategic sectors, such as clean energy and defense; and building critical infrastructure projects. For instance, Adani Group secured seven out of the eight airports that the Indian government leased out to private companies. These kinds of contracts, in turn, led to more interest in Adani Group stock from investors.
The government has undoubtedly placed its trust in Adani, but the Hindenburg report could be a stumbling block in Modi’s plans to ensure that India remains the world’s fastest-growing major economy. After the brutal stock rout, the group called off a $2.5 billion share sale and had to delay its expansion plans. A margin call followed, leading Adani to prepay a $1.1 billion loan. Meanwhile, French energy giant TotalEnergies has put on hold a $4 billion investment in an Adani Group green hydrogen project.
Over his tenure, Modi has been unwilling or unable to push through structural reform that would allow more companies to enter new sectors without significant risk-taking. He therefore has no option but to depend on national champions, such as Adani. But even among Indian billionaires, Adani is unique. Very few businesspeople enjoy the government’s confidence, can navigate dizzying state regulation, and, most of all, are willing to risk enormous amounts of capital.
In 2015, Credit Suisse published its House of Debt report, which examined the precarious debt levels of 10 prominent Indian business groups with a significant presence in various infrastructure sectors. Out of the 10 groups, many have ended up in bankruptcy courts in recent years, while others have pursued debt consolidation plans. Only one group—the Adani conglomerate—has continued to borrow and invest at a breathtaking pace.
The Economist has estimated that the combined revenues of companies controlled by Adani and fellow tycoon Mukesh Ambani, chair of India’s Reliance Industries, are equivalent to 4 percent of India’s GDP. Firms controlled by the pair also account for nearly a quarter of the capital spending of all publicly traded non-financial firms.
While many analysts fret over whether Adani Group is too big to fail, the more pertinent question is whether Adani has been too integral to the Indian economic project to fail.
Modi now faces a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, he relies heavily on large infrastructure development delivered by India’s billionaires. For example, Adani plans to develop massive renewable energy projects—and without them, India would find it challenging to fulfill its commitment to meet 50 percent of its energy requirements with renewables by 2030.
On the other hand, if Modi continues to protect Adani—as India’s opposition has alleged—by not addressing Hindenburg’s allegations, he runs the risk of undermining the credibility of India’s corporate governance and, by extension, its growth narrative.
Although India’s financial regulatory institutions are far from perfect, India has an established history of investigating and punishing financial fraud. The Adani Group scandal, however, has cast doubt on the ability of these institutions—such as the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the country’s capital markets regulator—to operate independently.
It’s worth asking whether the Adani saga could have been anticipated, investigated, and defused long before Hindenburg came along if watchdogs had done their job.
Consider, for instance, a puzzling question that Hindenburg has sought to address: What explains the mind-boggling rise in the price of many Adani Group stocks? The price-to-earnings ratio of Adani Enterprises, the conglomerate’s flagship entity, went from 37.6 to 343.9 in just two years. But as experts have pointed out, growth of that nature is typically seen in companies in the technology sector, not brick-and-mortar industries.
There could be innocuous explanations, but the fact that the company’s board of directors didn’t examine the issue publicly opened the door for worrying allegations put forth by Hindenburg. In particular, the short seller has alleged that Adani Group’s stocks are being inflated by the conglomerate itself through secretive offshore entities.
This brings us to the question of what India’s stock market and banking regulators were doing. Long before Hindenburg came along, news outlets had pointed to the existence of three Mauritius-based funds that appeared to only invest in Adani Group companies and whose ultimate ownership was opaque. Why weren’t these funds forced to furnish details of their ownership structure at any point in the last few years and nip allegations of “round-tripping” in the bud?
In addition, SEBI continued to sign off on the conglomerate’s fundraising proposals even though the Indian government disclosed in Parliament in 2021 that SEBI had begun a probe to investigate some Adani Group companies over “non-compliance of rules.” It’s unclear what the scope of the SEBI investigation was and whether it has concluded.
For years, India’s beleaguered political opposition has accused regulatory authorities of corruption and raised allegations of crony capitalism, specifically pointing to Adani. But given the opposition’s lack of specific allegations made against SEBI, it seems more likely that the economy and stock market’s overseers are simply indifferent and plagued by inertia. Regardless, these accusations, and the Adani Group controversy, have not hurt Modi’s popularity, thanks in part to his administration’s tight control over the mainstream media.
Yet there may be consequences that stem from outside of India’s borders. It’s possible that global investors will become less bullish on India if they think that Indian business empires won’t be able to build necessary infrastructure or be reined in by domestic regulatory systems. Overseas partnerships and joint ventures could face headwinds as well, just as the Adani-TotalEnergies partnership has.
A fair, independent, and transparent probe into the allegations against Adani Group could ease these fears. Modi has so far ignored demands for one made by opposition political parties. But continuing to do so could very well be damaging to the long-term economic interests of India, and the world, even if it does not hurt Modi politically in the short term.
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