Richard Haass: This is not a war about NATO enlargement or a future expansion to include Ukraine (which was not about to happen). It is not about NATO at all, or the United States, for that matter. This is a war initiated by Russia to eradicate Ukraine as a sovereign entity. Ukraine represented an alternative path for a Slavic nation – one characterized by a democratic political system and deep ties to the West. This was and is unacceptable to Putin, lest it stoke demands at home to shift Russia onto a similar path.
That Putin’s goals are so existential makes it difficult to see the war ending any time soon with the two sides reaching some kind of territorial compromise. Putin’s belief that time will weaken Western resolve further reduces the likelihood that he will consider any kind of settlement to end the war. For Ukraine’s part, the desire to reclaim all of its lost territory, secure economic reparations from Russia, and ensure accountability for Russian war crimes similarly precludes compromise. Again, we need to gird ourselves for a protracted conflict.
PS: In 2021, you wrote that the goal of US policy toward Taiwan “should be to reduce uncertainty about America’s intentions and its ability to make good on them, while underscoring to Chinese leaders the economic and military costs of aggression.” With this in mind, has the West’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine made a Chinese attack on Taiwan less likely? More broadly, what changes to America’s China policy – one of the few domains where there is bipartisan agreement – are most urgently needed?
RH: The West’s response to Russian aggression in Ukraine may have affected China’s calculations on Taiwan. China has to assume any use of military force against Taiwan would lead to severe economic sanctions. Moreover, whereas the United States and others have helped Ukraine only indirectly, there is a real possibility that they would participate directly in the defense of Taiwan. Russia’s failure to achieve a swift victory, and its continued battlefield setbacks, have probably also given China pause, though it will learn from Russia’s mistakes and strengthen its capabilities.
At the same time, China may believe that the delivery of huge amounts of material and financial support to Ukraine will undermine the West’s ability to assist Taiwan militarily. Its leaders could also conclude that Western countries’ far deeper economic ties with China than with Russia would make them less willing to impose severe sanctions.
The US needs to work with Taiwan and Japan to demonstrate to China that any use of force against Taiwan would bring more costs than benefits, while counseling Taiwan not to take any potentially provocative actions. Meanwhile, the US must lead its allies in an effort to scrutinize their economic dependence on China, which must not be allowed to use this dependence to gain geopolitical leverage over the West. Finally, the US must try to find a way to reintroduce a private, diplomatic element into its sharply – and dangerously – deteriorating relationship with China.
PS: You argue in your new book, The Bill of Obligations, that if America is to confront either “Russian aggression” or a “more capable and assertive China” effectively, it will need to reverse the “deterioration of democracy” at home, which you view as possibly the “most serious threat to global security and stability.” Why does restoring US democracy require shifting from a purely “rights-based” conception of American citizenship to one that places obligations on an equal footing?
RH: Rights are central to any democracy. But they cannot, on their own, make a democracy secure or functional. The reason is simple: rights inevitably collide with one another. We see this every day in the US, on issues ranging from abortion to guns. When such clashes of rights occur, the result is often gridlock, which prevents the design and implementation of responses to challenges at home and abroad. Clashing rights could also easily lead to internal violence. Obligations, both among citizens and between citizens and their government, are essential to avoid these outcomes and enable democracy to function effectively and peacefully.1
PS: From “Be Informed” to “Get Involved” to “Support the Teaching of Civics,” education plays a large role in meeting a number of the ten obligations you present. How must the US education system change to create the “culture of obligation” that you advocate?
RH: Education is central to building and sustaining a democracy, not least because it provides a ladder for the advancement of citizens. Civics education, in particular, is a critical means of imparting an understanding of why democracy is valuable, how it operates, and what it requires of its citizens. In an age of misinformation, it is also essential to teach information literacy – that is, how to scrutinize and assess information. To strengthen US democracy, civics education should be required in all middle and high schools, as well as in all colleges and universities.
PS: In Obligation VIII, you argue that we must “make government service far more common than it is.” Why does this matter, and what laws, programs, or other incentives do you believe would be most effective in making it happen?
RH: Public service offers a way to bring together citizens of varying backgrounds and help break down some of the barriers – like those arising from differences of religion, class, race or ethnicity, or ideology – that divide a nation. It can also help close the political distance between citizens and their governments, while providing useful skills for individuals.
I do not argue that public service should be made mandatory – an approach that would trigger considerable political resistance. Instead, we should create better incentives for citizens to opt for public service, including financial incentives – from higher salaries to student-loan forgiveness – and career-boosting opportunities, such as enhanced access to jobs or additional education.1
PS: After 20 years as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, you are preparing to step down in June. What legacy do you hope to leave, and what changes do you hope to see at CFR after you depart?
RH: I am beyond fortunate to have served as the president of the Council on Foreign Relations for the last 20 years. During this time, we continued to provide serious, policy-relevant, non-partisan, and independent analysis to our members, corporations, journalists, and government officials. In addition, we took on a large education mission, providing background on the world and US foreign policy to middle- and high-school students and teachers, to college and university students and professors, and to citizens.
We accomplished all of this by publishing shorter, more accessible pieces – such as explainers and backgrounders – online, as well as longer reports and books, while also maintaining Foreign Affairs as the field’s premier magazine. We also convened thousands of events with scholars and political leaders from around the world. More than anything else, I feel a sense of satisfaction about all we did here at CFR over the past two decades to bring a much larger number of people in this country and around the world into discussions of foreign policy and why it matters.
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