Robert Peters
If the war in Ukraine is teaching the United States anything, it is that great powers can unexpectedly suffer battlefield defeat because expectations and assumptions about their military prowess are outdated. The United States and China may be reaching a similar point where an innovative China outperforms an historically superior United States on a future battlefield, shattering a host of assumptions in the process.
Some widely held American assumptions include a belief that the Chinese leadership is conflict adverse and fears a war with the United States. Given recent military exercises and statements by Xi Jinping at last October’s 20th National Congress, such assumptions are no longer valid—if they ever were.
A second assumption suggests the United States and its regional allies enjoy overwhelming conventional superiority in the Western Pacific. This is unlikely to be true, given China’s expansion of its naval forces, it’s fourth and fifth generation fighters, and the world’s largest and most diverse missile force. While the United States might well assemble a formidable coalition to confront Chinese aggression, China’s rapid military expansion means that it would be touch and go for either side in a conflict.
China still may formally maintain a nuclear “no first use” policy—since the time of Mao—however, the expansion of its arsenal, to include a potential nuclear first strike capability, raises the question of whether this long held policy remains credible. Many believe it is not.
Since its birth, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained a “minimum deterrent,” which required a small nuclear force to strike cities and other high value targets. In recent years, China has expanded and modernized its nuclear forces, to include those with theater utility. Indeed, the DF-21, DF-26, and an air-launched ballistic missile are designed specifically for regional missions. Due to America’s lack of theater range nuclear weapons in Asia (outside of Reagan-era nuclear tipped air launched cruise missiles) China enjoys nuclear dominance at the theater level in the Pacific.
The final size and shape of China’s desired nuclear force is unknown. It is, however, clear that Beijing seeks a diverse and sophisticated arsenal that matches or exceeds the United States’. This may well include improved and expanded theater nuclear options intended to provide flexible options during a conflict. Such weapons also complement their conventional forces that are designed to deny the United States access to the first and second island chains.
Defense policymakers should accept that the current Chinese nuclear expansion may be part of a nuclear coercion campaign, designed to cast a credible nuclear shadow over any conflict in which China participates. Such an expansion would complicate American decision-making should a crisis or conflict erupt.
It is possible that during the acute stresses of a military conflict and during the fog of war, Chinese leaders may believe that the United States will not respond to nuclear use in a meaningful way—particularly if said nuclear employment is against a military target. Such an assumption may or may not be true, but Chinese leadership will perceive their decision as a rational choice to employ nuclear weapons against a superior nuclear armed adversary. In particular, they are likely to believe that if used against a military target with little to no civilian effect, there is less of a chance of a retaliatory nuclear response. If China no longer maintains a “no first use” policy, it is fair to question whether Beijing fears that a conventional conflict with the United States will escalate to nuclear use and whether they believe China loses such a conflict.
Given Chinese statements, its expansion of its strategic and conventional capabilities, and its incursions into Taiwanese air space, it is prudent to consider updating our assumptions about the Chinese decision calculus when it comes to a potential conflict with an American led coalition. Indeed, we should consider the possibility that China views nuclear employment as a rational (though not to say certain or likely) course of action in a high stakes conflict with the United States. Therefore, the American defense community cannot continue to assume that China will not use nuclear weapons, even if such an employment carries significant risk of escalation.
Indeed, Chinese leadership may accept those risks given the pressures they face to win a conflict with the United States. If old assumptions about the Chinese arsenal is inferior to the United States’ and that China maintains a no first use policy are no longer valid, what are some alternate assumptions we should consider? Any of the following are plausible:Chinese believes that Washington fears war with China more than Beijing fears war with the United States.
China does not seek a confrontation with the United States, but it may not fear a conflict.
Beijing believes that any American-led coalition to defend Taiwan will be brittle and easily fragmented by exploiting the fears of a broader conflict across the Western Pacific.
China believes the United States’ civil society is not willing to fight a major war over Taiwan and will exert political pressure on the president to limit support to Taiwan.
Testing these assumptions, short of actual conflict, is not possible. However, it is possible to posit a plausible scenario to understand how a war may break out and how each side may behave in a conflict. Imagine a scenario where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) begins initial efforts at an invasion of Taiwan during which time the United States and other free nations provide large amounts of lethal aid to Taiwan. Once a full-scale invasion begins, the United States, Japan, and Australia publicly declare they will oppose the invasion with military force.
In this scenario, the PRC miscalculates American and coalition will and strength. The PLA’s initial attempt to land significant amount of ground forces on Taiwan fails. In China, internal pressures to win and terminate the conflict quickly, whatever the costs, mount. In such an eventuality, China believes that employing a nuclear weapon is the best way to snatch victory for the jaws of defeat—by demonstrating capability and, more importantly, will.
China likely believes that the United States is hesitant to engage in a limited nuclear exchange far from home, where the stakes are asymmetrical and more important to the PRC. Further, Beijing likely believes Washington’s fear of a limited nuclear war escalating into a general nuclear exchange will deter the President from continuing the fight after first nuclear employment. Given China’s superiority in theater range nuclear systems, this is a reasonable, if not necessarily correct, assumption.
The context of a nuclear employment will matter. Because the United States does not extend its nuclear umbrella over Taiwan, China likely believes that it can employ a nuclear weapon on Taiwanese soil without a high risk of American nuclear response.
Further, Chinese leadership likely doubts that the United States will attack targets on mainland China with nuclear weapons. Beijing believes that the Chinese mainland is a sanctuary and that the United States will not dare strike it in response to a Chinese nuclear strike on a target in the Pacific—for fear of triggering reciprocal strikes by the Chinese on the American mainland.
If China uses a nuclear weapon against a Japanese ship engaged in combat operations, for example, there is certain to be a vigorous debate within the American political system whether to respond in kind. Some will argue that the United States should respond with non-nuclear capabilities while others argue a nuclear response is required to deter follow on nuclear strikes. At the same time, American political leaders will discuss the nuclear endgame. If the United States responds with a nuclear weapon, how does a war remain limited and how does it end? The intensity and length of such a debate is likely to be significant and would therefore impact allied and partner perceptions. The debate itself may give the PLA breathing room to retake the initiative and achieve its objectives.
While there are reasons for China to doubt an American nuclear response, there are operational and strategic advantages for the PRC to employ nuclear weapons. It is possible that Chinese leadership believes that a war for Taiwan is a vital national interest that they cannot lose. Otherwise, the Chinese Communist Party fears regime stability is at stake. It is also possible that they welcome a scenario in which the United States comes to the aid of an ally, only to be defeated by China—particularly if that defeat is capped with a nuclear detonation that goes unanswered by Washington. There is no greater or more visible signal of China’s preeminence in the Pacific.
To be sure, in this scenario, China accepts risk by using nuclear weapons to stave off defeat against an American coalition in the Pacific, but Beijing may deem nuclear use less risky than defeat by the Americans. This is particularly true if Chinese leaders convince themselves that the risks of nuclear employment are manageable, unlikely to manifest, or acceptable given the stakes.
Admittedly, both the assumptions and scenario posited above are speculative, but not far from the reality of current knowledge about Chinese thinking. With the United States largely focused on the Ukraine war, it is important to keep an eye on China and prepare for a war that might come. And should it come, long-held assumptions about the efficacy of military power, alliance cohesiveness, and the efficacy our integrated deterrent posture may be tested or even shattered.
Given the stakes in a Sino-American conflict, particularly one that includes nuclear employment, we must begin testing such assumptions now. Waiting until it happens is too late.
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