KYLIE JONES
In a grave warning to the United States, Kim Jong-un laid out his guiding principles for responding to any of its military advances in the upcoming year: “nuke for nuke” and “all-out confrontation for an all-out confrontation”. After a year full of escalatory moves — testing a record number of missiles, issuing explicit nuclear threats, and violating South Korean airspace — North Korea (DPRK) has become more resolute about crossing significant thresholds, even in the face of the rampantly escalating risk of conflict with the US and South Korea (ROK). Escalation, in fact, plays a key role in North Korea’s grand strategy.
Under Kim’s leadership, North Korea has increasingly taken escalatory measures to achieve certain foreign policy aims, from gauging South Korea's military preparedness to testing America's commitment to South Korean defence to satisfying domestic audiences. But, while Kim can achieve some of these short-term goals through deliberate and calculated escalation, these same efforts frustrate North Korea’s more longstanding foreign policy aspirations, such as gaining international legitimacy and normalising relations with the United States. Thus, North Korea’s growing appetite for escalation suggests a change in the way Kim Jong-un is prioritising North Korea’s foreign policy objectives. Because North Korea has been able to adapt to the consequences of its escalatory measures despite the precarious situation on the Korean Peninsula, the short-term benefits of escalation are beginning to outweigh its long-term costs.
Escalation brings short-term gains..
There are several ways North Korea benefits from intentional provocations against the United States and South Korea. For one, deliberate escalation allows Pyongyang to gauge Seoul’s military preparedness. On 26 December, five North Korean drones entered South Korean airspace. South Korea failed to down them with fighter jets and attack helicopters. The drones managed to fly over ROK territory for hours, exposing significant weaknesses in South Korea’s ability to respond to military provocations from the North and boosting Kim’s confidence in his country’s ability to carry out a real attack.
To avoid a devasting conflict, the United States needs to persuade Kim Jong-un that salvaging relations between the two countries is in his best interest.
Escalation also allows North Korea to test US commitment to South Korean defence and exploit tensions in the alliance. The record number of missile tests, transgressions of decades-long political borders, and violations of the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement all serve as probes intended to assess how much North Korea can provoke without significant consequences, exacerbating doubts in Seoul about the reliability of US protection. Indeed, Kim’s efforts would appear to be paying off; in January 2023, South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol expressed concerns about whether the United States would protect his country with nuclear weapons.
Finally, escalation provides Kim with a way to satisfy domestic audiences. Kim took risks with his military and political elites by pursuing diplomatic negotiations with the US in 2019. After the talks suffered an intense breakdown, Kim likely faced reputational costs. As a way of re-establishing his image among domestic audiences, Kim can leverage escalation — through threatening rhetoric, military parades, and missile tests — to reestablish an image of power after the fallout from his unsuccessful attempts at diplomacy.
..and long-term costs?
While Kim fulfils several of his short-term foreign policy goals through escalatory measures, many of these gains come at the cost of objectives that have historically influenced North Korea's foreign policy — namely attaining international legitimacy, ensuring regime survival, seeking sanctions relief, and normalising relations with the United States.
Exponentially increasing missile tests that defy numerous UN resolutions undermine North Korea’s case for international legitimacy. Stealing record amounts of cryptocurrency weaken North Korea’s case for sanctions relief. Issuing bellicose nuclear threats and violating negotiated agreements works against North Korea’s case for normalising relations with the US and others. Thus, Pyongyang’s greater appetite for escalation, despite the long-term costs, suggests a broader shift in the way North Korea is reprioritising its foreign policy objectives. Because North Korea is increasingly able to adapt to many of the challenges it previously sought to ameliorate, such as diplomatic ostracisation and sanctions, the short-term benefits of escalation for Pyongyang have begun to outweigh its long-term costs.
Pyongyang’s diminished concern about the elevating risk of military conflict is likely due to Kim’s greater confidence in his ability to manage the security situation with North Korea’s improved nuclear capabilities. In the past, North Korea's room for escalation was significantly constrained, with it having little capability or confidence to carry out reciprocal military actions beyond a first confrontation. However, now that it has diversified its arsenal — improving the reliability of its nuclear weapons and claiming to have developed tactical nuclear weapons — Pyongyang has more options at its disposal to shape political calculations in Seoul and Washington.
Sanctions relief has also become less of a priority for Pyongyang because North Korea has found ways to adapt to its challenging economic environment. Kim recognises the tradeoff between economic relief and the escalatory impact of maintaining his nuclear deterrent, underscoring in one speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly that North Korea “will not pursue an immediately visible improved environment for the economic life at the cost of giving up the nuclear weapons”. Despite the grave economic cost of North Korea’s escalation, public sentiment indicates that North Korea is less enthusiastic about sanctions relief or economic assistance than ever, possibly due to a combination of its successful efforts to evade sanctions, receive support from Russia and China, and survive despite prolonged self-isolation.
Finally, Pyongyang’s pessimism about the utility and feasibility of improving relations with the US, plus its success in finding allies elsewhere, has lessened the importance of improving the relationship in North Korea’s eyes. Normalising diplomatic ties with the US by working toward denuclearisation has been a staple of North Korean foreign policy across leaders since Kim Il Sung’s initial pursuit of this policy in the 1990s. But, following a years-long string of stalled diplomacy, continued joint military exercises between the US and ROK, and the sustained imposition of debilitating sanctions, Kim largely abandoned this aim in 2022. This shift became most pronounced after his speech while passing North Korea’s newest nuclear law, where he underscored the purpose of this new legislation — to “draw an irretrievable line so that there can be no bargaining over [North Korea’s] nuclear weapons”. Instead of seeing value in improving ties with the US, Pyongyang is turning to others, reaching new heights in its cooperation with Russia and China.
Implications for Washington
The likelihood of North Korean nuclear use continues to reach uncomfortable heights as tension on the peninsula rises, and Pyongyang appears less and less concerned about the associated risks and consequences. Meanwhile, the window of opportunity for the United States to change this trajectory continues to shrink as North Korea adapts to the challenges of the present security environment. Thus, the current situation has imperative implications for US policy.
To avoid a devasting conflict, the United States needs to persuade Kim Jong Un that salvaging relations between the two countries is in his best interest. This begins with Washington’s acceptance that Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is here to stay, at least in the near term, eliminating the primary barrier preventing the two sides to reconvene at the negotiating table. While the two countries are unlikely to reconcile on the issue of denuclearisation any time soon, both have a shared interest in avoiding nuclear war. Thus, opening the door to negotiate practical risk-reduction measures in the short term — which would contribute to incremental progress toward eventual denuclearisation — is in each party's best interest. Otherwise, without a reimagined approach to deal with today’s emboldened North Korea, this harrowing trend of escalation is likely to become the new normal.
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