Zack Cooper
The new AUKUS announcement is the latest in a string of Biden administration initiatives on the Indo-Pacific. Recent progress with Japan, the Philippines, and several Pacific Islands has been impressive. But even for someone who has long supported Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and the United States forward deploying Virginia-class boats to Perth, this plan has several concerning features.
The new AUKUS plan reportedly has three phases. In the first phase, American and British attack submarines will forward deploy to Australia on a rotational basis. Australia will also invest in port facilities for nuclear-powered submarines and co-crew some allied boats so that Australian sailors can learn how to operate nuclear-powered submarines.
In the second phase, the United States will sell three to five used Virginia-class submarines to Australia. New submarines were not an option in part because Australia did not want Virginia Payload Modules. Australia will also make an investment into the US shipbuilding industry as part of this deal.
The third phase will be a mainly United Kingdom-Australia project to construct a new AUKUS-class submarine. The new class will be modeled on the British Astute-class submarine with some US elements incorporated. The boats would be built in both the United Kingdom and Australia.
But is it sensible for Australia to operate two different types of nuclear-powered submarines? This will dramatically increase the endeavor’s cost and complexity. Since Australia is only likely to operate a handful of submarines—probably less than a dozen—acquiring two different submarine types will notably increase expenses.
The primary drivers for this Frankenstein approach are conflicting timelines and domestic political constraints. The new AUKUS-class boats likely will not be ready until the 2040s, well after Australia’s current Collins-class boats must be retired, so an interim solution is required. Used Virginia-class boats are available sooner, but this leads to questions about why Australia chose not to field a single fleet of Virginia-class submarines.
This is where domestic politics come into play. Leaders in Canberra have promised submarine construction to South Australia. The United Kingdom and United States also want a role for their own domestic shipbuilding industries, which helps to explain how this option gained traction in capitals.
There is also a second concern from an American perspective: the United States could essentially lose nearly one-tenth of its submarine fleet in the decade of its greatest need. Submarines are America’s biggest asymmetric advantage over China, but this plan could cut three to five submarines out of the U.S. force at a particularly critical time.
Of course, Australia might deploy alongside the United States in a major contingency. Yet, one should not simply assume Australia’s participation in a major conflict involving China. Canberra is acquiring submarines primarily to monitor and defend the naval approaches to its shores, so its submarines might be needed for that purpose.
Australia and the United States have fought together in every major conflict of the last hundred years, but Canberra will continue to make sovereign decisions about the use and disposition of its forces. Washington cannot treat Australian assets as equivalent to American ones.
Several years from now, when Australia’s defense budget is under strain from the cost of the Virginia-class acquisition and other soon-to-come defense initiatives, leaders in Canberra may come under pressure to rethink the third phase of this plan. If Australia already has five operational Virginia-class submarines, why not acquire a few more and defer the AUKUS-class program with its associated logistics, training, technical, and budgetary challenges?
This would require a major investment in the US submarine industrial base, which should have occurred as part of 2021’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill. That ship has now sailed (or rather, not sailed), but the United States still needs to bolster submarine procurement. The industrial base produces roughly 1.2 Virginia-class submarines a year, when we are supposed to be building two, and should be building three, per year.
Cancelling phase three would no doubt devastate the shipbuilding industry in South Australia and anger the United Kingdom as well, but budget constraints could still force a debate about doing so. Neither Prime Minister Scott Morrison nor his successor Anthony Albanese were willing to give up on domestic submarine production, but a future prime minister who was not directly affiliated with these decisions might see little alternative but to rethink Australia’s approach.
AUKUS has great potential. It could federate defense by allowing the United States and its allies to field capabilities in larger numbers and at lower cost. But that would require the United States and its allies to jointly procure systems to take advantage of economies of scale. Unfortunately, the current AUKUS approach violates this basic principle, likely leading to higher unit costs and fewer fielded systems. We can do better. And we must.
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