Katsuji Nakazawa is a Tokyo-based senior staff and editorial writer at Nikkei. He spent seven years in China as a correspondent and later as China bureau chief. He was the 2014 recipient of the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist prize.
It has been 10 years since Zhou Yongkang, the former Politburo Standing Committee member and boss of China's internal security apparatus, was purged.
So enormous was his influence at one point that even the country's top leader, then-President Hu Jintao, was unable to directly intervene in public security and police matters.
Now there are signs that the domestic security domain will be strengthened in a significant way, under Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.
Clues were laid in a communique issued Tuesday after a three-day session of the party's leadership -- known as the second plenary session of the party's 20th Central Committee.
It talked of "a plan for the reform of Party and state institutions," without giving specifics. It only said that the plan will be deliberated in accordance with due legal procedures at the upcoming annual session of the National People's Congress, China's parliament, which begins on Sunday.
Earlier at a separate meeting, Xi had said the reform would focus on resolving difficult issues that are serious and of social concern. He hinted at a sweeping overhaul of party and state organizations.
Some party sources have expressed concern, worrying that China is at risk of becoming a suffocating police state like the former Soviet Union. The crux of the matter is the possibility of creating a new police and state security organization placed under the direct command of Xi, the "core" of the party's Central Committee.
"There is a plan to beef up organizations related to state security and public security under a completely non-traditional framework," one source said, without giving details. "The number of personnel could double if rural areas are included. The goal is to establish such a structure by 2027, when the next national congress of the Communist Party will be held."
Another source noted that while all eyes are on what kind of economic stimulus measures will come out of the National People's Congress, the truly important element, politically, is the massive reform of party and state institutions.
"China could become a country like the former Soviet Union within the next four or five years," the source said.
A person walks by a giant screen in Beijing broadcasting news of Xi talking during the second plenary session of the party’s 20th Central Committee on Feb. 28. © KyodoRecently, Hong Kong-based Chinese-language newspaper Ming Pao reported that China's Ministry of Public Security, which supervises the police, and its Ministry of State Security, in charge of hunting down spies, will be separated from the State Council -- China's government -- and placed under the party as a new organization called the Central Internal Affairs Committee.
In China, law enforcement is not limited to formal public security and police organizations run by the central government. There are also units established by local governments in charge of managing public order. Removing unlicensed stalls from streets is one example of what these units do.
At large-scale events, such as the party's national congress or the National People's Congress, temporary administrative staffers appear, wearing jackets and armbands with "volunteer" printed on them.
Formal public security and police organizations are said to have more than 2 million members. But local law-enforcement organizations have even more.
In the 10 years of Xi's rule, the power of the central government has been gradually curtailed. Organizations and functions under the State Council have been shrunk, while there has been a proliferation of "small groups" under the direct control of the party's Central Committee.
In the eras of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, there was an effort to separate the party and government. Now, this trend has been unequivocally reversed.
The State Council Information Office, in charge of government public relations, still exists but has been integrated with the party's Publicity Department, in effect. It operates under the party organization.
In a report he delivered at the party's 19th national congress in 2017, Xi declared that the party would manage all organizations and groups within the country. The State Council has since seen its powers further reduced, with Premier Li Keqiang's influence lost.
If the new internal security organization is established, it will be placed under the direct control of Xi.
The problem is that the organization could wield more powers than necessary out of maximum consideration to Xi.
People gather for a vigil and hold white sheets of paper in protest over the zero-COVID policy in Beijing on Nov. 27, 2022. (Photo retouched for security reasons) © ReutersLying behind the recent series of rapid developments is a sense of crisis Xi and the party's Central Committee have over the "white paper" and "white hair" movements.
The white paper movement, which demanded the immediate abolition of the strict zero-COVID policy, erupted in November, with some protesters even publicly calling for Xi to resign.
Many of those who were at the forefront of the movement in various parts of the country, holding up blank sheets of paper and shouting slogans, were young women. It is a new trend.
They and other participants in the movement from the end of last year to the beginning of this year were summoned by public security authorities for questioning.
But the authorities are scratching their heads over how to deal with the movement as it took an organic shape with no clear organizers.
Adding fuel to the difficult problem of social unrest was the white hair movement, which quickly sprouted in February. It is a massive demonstration, primarily by middle-aged and older retirees, against reduced benefits due to the reform of the medical insurance system.
An image posted on Twitter purportedly shows a scene from a demonstration in Wuhan, Hubei province, China, on Feb. 8. (Kyodo). © KyodoWuhan, Hubei Province, was locked down for a long period after the novel coronavirus case was first discovered there more than three years ago.
In February, on-and-off demonstrations by those who retired from local companies took place in the provincial capital. According to local residents, those who shared videos of the demonstrations on social media and some of the protesters were detained.
Both movements are closely related. The reduction of medical benefits, for example, is a consequence of the failed zero-COVID policy.
For nearly three years, the policy was strictly imposed for political reasons, with huge amounts of government funds poured into conducting free PCR tests for all Chinese on a daily basis.
Meanwhile, government revenue sank due to an economic downturn amid sluggish consumption.
The finances of the central and local governments have deteriorated to such an extent that they cannot easily be restored.
If civil actions similar to the white movements spring up in the future, they could pose serious and unprecedented threats to the communist regime.
The strengthening of the security apparatus and the creation of a new party-run security organization are the result of such fears; they are defensive reactions.
Li Qiang speaks at the annual Central Economic Work Conference in Beijing in December 2022. © Xinhua/KyodoXi has cemented his grip on the party by waging a fierce anti-corruption campaign over the past decade. In one sense, he has achieved great success. But this campaign has targeted only party members, which now count nearly 100 million.
Those who played an active role in the white paper and white hair movements are, however, among the remaining 1.3 billion ordinary folks who have no direct relationship with the party. The methods that worked in the anti-corruption campaign do not work.
Li Qiang, a close aide to Xi, is set to become China's new premier at the upcoming National People's Congress.
It is believed that Li's first job so far has been to compile policies toward significantly boosting the economy, something that attracts global attention.
But in reality, his most important political mission is likely to be reducing the powers of the State Council, China's government, and transferring more government powers to the party's Central Committee.
Li will hold his inaugural news conference when the annual session of the National People's Congress closes in mid-March. What message will he send to Chinese people and the rest of the world?
No comments:
Post a Comment