OPINION:
The missile threat from North Korea is rapidly outpacing our planned response in both numbers and sophistication. We must deploy advanced capabilities in space if we are to meet our national security requirements. The greatest obstacle to moving forward is ideology, not technology or affordability. Failing to act will leave the United States open to nuclear blackmail and attack.Earlier this month, Kim Jong Un presided over yet another military parade, this time to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army. The most prominent weapons on display were the intercontinental range ballistic missiles with the ability to strike anywhere on the U.S. homeland.
These included at least 11 Hwasong 17 missiles on transportable erector launchers and five other launchers with canisters reportedly representing mock-ups of solid fueled long-range missiles currently under development. Once fielded, these missiles will represent a major advancement in the threat as their greater mobility will significantly complicate the targeting challenge to destroy them on the ground — left of launch, in Pentagonese. In turn, their improved survivability will place even more reliance on the ability to intercept these missiles in flight.
U.S. intelligence agencies will be keen to assess the implications of the weapons Pyongyang has shown the world. The fact that both the Hwasong 17 and the canisterized mockups have been seen before should not lead to the conclusion that their appearance is just for show. Instead, the numbers and types of missiles observed is further evidence that the North is aggressively expanding its missile force sufficient to overwhelm American defenses, a stated goal of the Kim regime.
In December, Pyongyang announced that the latest solid rocket motor test was successful. And in the past year, the North has conducted a record number of ballistic missile tests of all ranges. Accompanying the growth in the missile threat is an equally rapid increase in the North’s nuclear weapons arsenal, with Western estimates predicting that North Korea could have in excess of 200 warheads in the next four years.
This unprecedented expansion of the North’s capabilities to hold American cities hostage puts enormous pressure on U.S. missile defenses to protect the homeland. These defenses were designed 20 years ago for a different threat, to intercept “handfuls of missiles,” not the much larger force being built by North Korea.
The key questions are: Can the next-generation interceptors currently being developed keep pace with the emerging threat, particularly as the threat continues to accelerate both quantitatively and qualitatively? Would adding more of these new interceptors, even with multiple kill capabilities, be an effective and executable option, or would it simply extend obsolescence? While many of the operational capabilities of the next-generation interceptor are classified, we now know enough about the threat to question the efficacy of the program of record in meeting the threat. Simply put, unless we pursue further advanced capabilities, the missile threat from North Korea will outpace the U.S. ability to defend against it.
Moreover, the question of missile defense requirements reaches beyond the need to defend against North Korea. Given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated threats of limited nuclear strikes and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s military buildup in preparation for war against Taiwan, we need to reassess the role of defenses in deterring their coercive threats, as well as the capabilities needed to achieve this objective.
To strengthen deterrence of Moscow and Beijing from threatening and executing such attacks, it is not necessary to create an impenetrable shield capable of intercepting every Russian and Chinese ballistic and hypersonic missile. Rather, the goal should be to strengthen deterrence through defenses that increase the uncertainties in the calculations of the attacker — to undermine his confidence that he will achieve the attack’s objectives. Again, the current U.S. response is neither designed for nor capable of countering the threat.
To defend against North Korea and Iran in the future and to deter Russian and Chinese coercive attacks, the United States must field space-based capabilities, including space-based kill capabilities. While past Republican and Democratic administrations have favored ground- and sea-based capabilities, the threat has fundamentally changed. Today, a space-kill capability has become a critical component of the layered missile defense architecture. It is technologically feasible and affordable and the only means to provide an effective boost phase defense needed to defeat present and emerging threats.
Ground- and sea-based interceptors cannot substitute for space-based assets as they cannot be cost-effectively scaled to counter the threats. In the meantime, while space-based capabilities are developed, ground- and sea-based interceptors should be upgraded to improve reliability and operational effectiveness. Promising airborne boost phase capabilities should also be pursued. These can serve as an interim hedge against the threat and a supplement to the space-based force in the future.
As far as the United States is concerned, the Biden administration will almost certainly oppose any effort to deploy advanced missile defenses in space out of misplaced concern about militarizing space. This ideological resistance ignores the actions of Russia and China, both of whom are deploying advanced space and counterspace capabilities. But Congress, as it has done in the past, can act by first funding the development and testing of critical capabilities, such as sensors, that will provide key elements of the infrastructure for a U.S. space-based system. This will allow a new president to accelerate the fielding of the missile defenses essential to meet our national security deterrence and defense requirements.
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