CHONG JA IAN
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The past year saw yet more heated debate over definitions of what “one China” means. Beijing asserts that there is widespread international acceptance of and agreement with its “one China principle,” which sees Taiwan as part of a Chinese state represented by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC accuses the United States of departing from what it claims is Washington’s long-standing acceptance of the PRC position, given U.S. efforts to improve cooperation and contact with Taipei. In reality, the United States’ “one China policy” states that Washington does not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and merely “acknowledges” the existence of a Chinese position even as Washington officially recognizes the PRC as the government of China. The United States reserved the right to maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan as it sees fit. Taipei’s official position is that it is already independent as the Republic of China (Taiwan), whose jurisdiction covers Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and other outlying islands.
As the PRC becomes more insistent regarding its claims over Taiwan, Beijing is seeking to leave a clearer imprint of its preferences on the discourse over “one China.” PRC officials are increasingly couching other states’ positions in terms of its “one China” principle, at times claiming that originally stated differences are new deviations from or infractions on earlier understandings. By fostering an impression of broad agreement, Beijing’s claims establish a sense of legitimacy and a seeming moral high ground from where Beijing can highlight what it sees as inconsistencies or even betrayal by others. Given its greater ability and willingness to press its case, Beijing has encountered limited international resistance. For those interested in tracking developments in PRC policies and narratives, such evolving conditions mean greater importance in appreciating the range of stances states adopt toward PRC claims over Taiwan. They can provide a starting point from which to assess statements by predecessors or those of neighbors and partners, as well as any actual shifts in positions.
Countries around the world have used a broad range of official formulations beyond Beijing’s “one China principle,” Washington’s “one China policy,” and Taipei’s more ambiguous position. These widely varying positions largely originate from when the country in question established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. Some had more reason to maintain separate and robust even if unofficial ties with Taiwan, while others saw little reason to weigh in on some far-flung dispute that they believed had little to do with them. Of course, a small number of states have maintained official ties with Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC) rather than with PRC, adhering to Taipei’s approach during the authoritarian martial law period (1949–1987), when it claimed to be the legitimate government of all China. Taipei loosened this claim with the repeal of the 1948 “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in 1991 and introduced additional articles to the ROC Constitution between 1991 and 2005 as part of efforts to enhance democracy, which also limited election activity to citizens of the “free area” of the ROC.
PRINCIPLE, POLICY, AND CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES
Given the centrality of language to the “one China” issue, official texts from the PRC, the United States, and Taiwan mark an important place to begin the discussion. Beijing’s “one China principle” contends that:
There is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.
Surrounding the release of a 2022 white paper, “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” by the PRC State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office was a shift in emphasis but not meaning. As seen in this 2022 PRC Foreign Ministry statement, Beijing more frequently reiterates that its “one China principle”
has been clearly recognized by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 181 countries have established diplomatic relations with China on the basis of the one-China principle. The one-China principle is a universal consensus of the international community and a basic norm in international relations.
Beijing tends to increasingly frame the United States’ “one China policy” within the context of the PRC’s own “one China principle” in its public statements. Such characterization of the U.S. position appears to be becoming more frequent. This perspective suggests that Beijing believes Washington’s position since the establishment of formal ties in 1979 agreed with the PRC line but now Washington is reneging on those past promises. The Mandarin language text of the 1978 Normalization Communiqué available on the PRC Foreign Ministry website states that the United States “recognizes” the PRC position on Taiwan. (The official website did not provide an English language text at the time of this article’s writing.)
The above claims diverge from the “one China policy” articulated by the United States as well as that of several other governments and entities. The text of UNGA Res 2758, for instance, makes no mention of Taiwan’s status, merely representation of China by the PRC rather than the “representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” a point detailed by Jessica Drun and Bonnie S. Glaser. According to Washington, undergirding its “one China policy” are three U.S.-PRC joint communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and the Six Assurances. This is a position that U.S. officials reiterated last year in light of public differences with Beijing.
More specifically, the 1979 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué announcing the establishment of official diplomatic ties states that the “Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China.” The United States takes no official position on Taiwan’s sovereignty despite extending official diplomatic recognition to the PRC as the government of China. Similar to the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, there is no U.S. recognition, endorsement, or support for the PRC view on Taiwan even if they choose not to challenge it. In fact, Washington and Beijing agreed to disagree at many points of the 1972 text. Further, when normalizing ties with the PRC, Washington undertook to “maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.”
Under the TRA, these sets of unofficial interactions include tracking the cross-strait military situation, enabling Taiwan to defend itself, and maintaining a military capability to intervene in a Taiwan contingency should U.S. policymakers decide to do so. A subsequent 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué states a limiting and eventual drawdown of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan. However, Washington interpreted this arrangement as conditional on a decrease in the PRC threat to Taiwan. Washington concurrently issued Six Assurances to Taiwan, stating that the U.S. government:Has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan
Has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan
Will not play [a] mediation role between Taipei and Beijing
Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act
Has not altered its position regarding the sovereignty over Taiwan . . .
Will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC
Beijing accepts neither the TRA nor the Six Assurances, indicating that the PRC sees the U.S. position they articulate as contravening the three joint communiqués.
Along with its transition away from authoritarian rule and toward democracy, Taiwan adjusted its position on “one China” to come to terms with changing realities. Under the Kuomintang’s (KMT) martial law, Taipei had maintained that it was the legitimate government of China, including the mainland and Taiwan. Facing growing diplomatic isolation, the 1970s and 1980s saw a shift in orientation from forcefully retaking the mainland to unification under Sun Yat-sen’s “Three People’s Principles.” Subsequent presidents floated “special state-to-state relations” and “one country on each side (of the Taiwan Strait)” as possibilities for cross-strait ties, only to be accused of “splittism” by Beijing. The PRC also rejected proposals for confederation floated by politicians in Taiwan. Administrations in Taipei sought to avoid formal declarations of independence, which they believed would trigger armed attack because Beijing considers it a red line. This despite the fact the PRC has never ruled Taiwan and the popular appeal of unification—especially speedy unification—is very low.
Taiwan’s population finds Beijing’s offer of a “one country, two systems” formula—as applied to Hong Kong, where Beijing’s control comes with promises of a “high degree of autonomy”—as unpersuasive, unappealing, and even untrustworthy. Wariness of the “one country, two systems” formula spiked following Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong and introduction of a National Security Law, which grants broad authority to regulate political activity. The current Democratic Progressive Party administration’s official position is that since Taiwan is already independent, a declaration of independence is unnecessary. Taipei rejects the language of the 1992 Consensus where the KMT claimed an understanding with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that allowed for “one China, different interpretations.”
Taipei does, however, accept the spirit of setting aside political differences for practical cooperation put forward during KMT-CCP meetings in 1992. Beijing has pressured Taipei to adopt the 1992 Consensus but concedes neither alternative formulations of “one China,” including “different interpretations,” nor Taipei’s call for practical collaboration. Polling indicates that Taiwanese people overwhelmingly prefer to maintain the current status quo and Taiwan’s ambiguous status but may become more sympathetic to independence should PRC threats dissipate. Such a position is unsurprising given broad popular acceptance that even a successful war of independence will be highly costly for Taiwan and restrains Taiwanese politicians from undertaking risky behavior. Whatever the views that Taiwanese people hold about Chinese culture, that does not seem to translate automatically into acceptance of PRC rule, abandonment of their current political system with its attendant rights and freedoms, or a provocative declaration of de jure independence.
THE OTHER “ONE CHINAS”
Apart from Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, other governments have a range of positions on “one China.” Most of these rest on how a given state assessed its relations with the PRC, the United States, and Taiwan when establishing formal ties with Beijing and as relations developed. Fourteen states maintain official relations with Taipei and formally recognize only the ROC. Since “one China” is generally not of primary importance to most states, many do not bother to adjust their stated positions even if practical circumstances evolve. As Beijing entices or cajoles more governments to recognize the PRC and as the formal diplomatic position of the ROC further declines, the case for the Taiwanese population to accept the ROC as representing their polity based on international legitimacy may diminish. Taiwanese people could well end up finding an alternative nomenclature for their government more appealing. This could inadvertently call Beijing’s attempts to convince people in Taiwan about the appeal of some idea of “one China” into further question.
In a 1996 essay, Lee Tzu-wen listed nine types of positions that states generally adopt on the “one China” issue at the point of establishing official diplomatic ties with Beijing. I list the categories in the table below, albeit with more precise language, and updated the names and numbers of states in each group as of January 2023. I also add a classification for states recognizing the ROC.
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