Russia's war on Ukraine: one year on

Ben Barry

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Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine was intended to quickly overthrow the Ukrainian government. The campaign was based on inadequate intelligence and excessive optimism; Ukraine’s leaders stayed at their posts, and the Ukrainian armed forces did not collapse. Poor execution by underperforming Russian forces, combined with external support to Ukraine, entangled Moscow in an extended campaign. Almost a year into the war, some key military lessons can be identified.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy helped galvanise Ukraine’s population and armed forces, showing the importance of the human factor in war. Better-motivated and better-led Ukrainian forces slowed and eventually stalled Russia’s first wave of attacks. The war reinforces the value of investing in personnel, without which investments in equipment can be wasted. The Russian military system was also weakened by corruption.

As well as reaffirming that competence is the bedrock of military capability, the war has shown how important it is for armed forces to be able to adapt. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces adapted during combat, though with varying degrees of success. After failing in its initial attempt to seize the country, Russia reshaped its offensives to concentrate on the Donbas. It also executed two withdrawal operations – from around Kyiv and Kherson. Ukraine rapidly incorporated foreign weapons and technology, such as the US HIMARS precision rocket artillery, and further developed its capability to use small uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). Situational awareness ranging from battlefield observers controlling small UAVs to space sensors is only growing in importance. Moscow’s shortage of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems hampered its campaign, while Kyiv benefitted from intelligence supplied by the United States, the United Kingdom and other nations.

War on land There have been many tank battles and artillery barrages. Much fighting, though far from all, has revolved around the control of urban terrain. Battles around Kyiv and in Mariupol showed that the towns and cities can favour determined defenders with the will to hold out against superior numbers of attackers.

While emerging technologies such as cyber have been employed, the conflict has underscored the continuing importance of the capabilities provided by conventional land forces. As British Army Chief General Sir Patrick Sanders remarked, 'you can’t cyber your way across a river’.

The war has also illustrated the continuing importance of the combined-arms approach to land warfare. Infantry, tanks and armoured vehicles and artillery used together have had utility for each side. Russian armoured vehicles have also exhibited weaknesses. This was evident in the apparent ease with which US-designed Javelin missiles and Anglo-Swedish Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapons (NLAWs) destroyed Russian tanks by attacking the weaker armour on the top of the vehicles.

Both sides have made extensive use of indirect fire, mortars, guns, and rocket launchers. Concentrated indirect fire has inflicted heavy casualties on both sides, not just to personnel but also to light-armoured vehicles. Russian difficulties in crossing rivers have highlighted the crucial roles of combat-engineer and military-bridging capabilities.

War at sea The conflict has been a reminder of the interconnectedness of the global economy, not least via the maritime domain. This has been reflected in the concerns over grain supplies, global energy and resource interdependence, and the security of sea lines of communication. And it has validated important traditional levers of naval and maritime power, including blockades.

The conflict exposed the shortcomings of significant parts of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s capabilities, operations and training. It has highlighted Ukraine’s ability, again, to exploit asymmetric opportunities. There were particular operational circumstances and failures that contributed to the loss of the cruiser Moskva. However, it was also a reminder of the threat posed by even relatively modest anti-ship capabilities to surface vessels, particularly when operating in the littoral. The attack on the Sevastopol naval base, in particular, highlighted the increased role of uninhabited surface and air systems in the maritime domain, even if these devices are used in pursuit of age-old naval tactics.

Meanwhile, the Nord Stream gas pipeline incidents were reminders of the vulnerabilities of undersea and offshore infrastructure. For all the Russian Navy’s difficulties in asserting control in the Black Sea, it has sustained a significant blockade and demonstrated its ability to influence a land campaign. This has included the launching of sea-based land-attack cruise missiles.

War in the air Neither belligerent has so far gained air supremacy, but this does not reflect a lack of activity or effort. Rather, it underscores the challenge of operating in a contested airspace where both sides possess ground-based air defence in combination with combat aircraft in the counter-air role. Both combatants have lost significant numbers of fixed-wing aircraft and in the case of Russia, a similar number of attack and transport helicopters. The low-altitude environment has proven to be particularly hostile for rotary-wing platforms.

Russia has managed to sustain its air campaign following its immediate failure to achieve a quick victory, but the air campaign has also been sporadic and at times seemed to exhibit a lack of cohesion. In the first few days of the war, Ukraine’s air-defence ground architecture was struck, but there was little obvious effort by Russia at battle-damage assessment, or to revisit targets. Attacks on Ukraine’s power infrastructure have also been intermittent.

The Russian Air Force has used all three bomber types for cruise missile attacks: the Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack A mod, Tu-95MS Bear H mod heavy-bomber aircraft, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire C medium bomber. The Tu-160 and Tu-95 carried the Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak) long-range conventional land-attack cruise missile, while the Tu-22M3 carried the Kh-22 (RS-AS-4A Kitchen) and the Kh-32 (RS-AS-4A mod Kitchen). The Kh-22 and Kh-32 missiles are anti-ship weapons that are inaccurate for land attack. Their use reflects a lack of concern for collateral damage and the inventory pressure placed on the considerably more accurate Kh-101.

Russia’s air force has been able to restrict Ukrainian air operations by using mainly the Sukhoi Su-35S Flanker M operating with the Vympel R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B Adder) and the Vympel R-37M (RS-AA-13A Axehead) medium- and long-range air-to-air missiles respectively, to hold at risk Ukrainian aircraft at extended engagement ranges.

War of logistics and stockpiles Numbers have counted. Achieving mass at decisive points has also depended on being able to move forces, concentrate them and sustain their key supplies of fuel, ammunition and spare parts. The need for large-scale stockpiles has been demonstrated, evidenced by high usage rates for guided weapons and artillery ammunition and heavy attrition of armoured vehicles. The same can be said for both conventional and precision-guided munitions: usage rates for both have been heavy. This not only suggests that a future military capability relying heavily on precision weapons will likely be expensive but also that planners need to carefully consider issues of resupply. In turn, this sharpens focus not only on defence-industrial capacity, including production flexibility and possibilities from multinational cooperation initiatives, but also on the size of national armaments stockpiles. The war is a stark reminder of how costly a high-intensity conflict can be, in personnel and material terms.